This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

This thesis is a quest to find the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. I point out that what we are inclined to believe about the justification of egoistic concern, let's call it the Old Theory, is that personal identity is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, that personal identity involves a deep further fact, and that physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for personal identity. I argue that, if personal identity involves the deep further fact, then physical and psychological continuity are not good evidence for personal identity and thus the Old Theory is mistaken. Furthermore, if the everyday egoistic concern that we have for a person who is physically and psychologically continuous with us is clearly rational, then physical and psychological continuity must be good evidence for the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, and thus either personal identity is not the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, or personal identity does not involve the deep further fact. Therefore, I suggest that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should have the following structure; some relationship, let's call it E, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern, E does not involve the deep further fact, and physical and psychological continuity are good evidence for E. I then point out that a new theory about the justification of egoistic concern should take into account the dominant intuitions that the Old Theory was based on, but should ignore intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs flowing from the Old Theory. I argue that it is not easy to separate these two types of intuitions, but, nevertheless, in trying to find E I attempt to capture the intuitions that underlie the Old Theory, while avoiding the use of methods that might capture intuitions that are based solely on mistaken beliefs involved in the Old Theory. After considering the various candidates for E, I conclude that psychological continuity, even if it occurs coincidentally, is the relationship that justifies egoistic concern. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.