Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 271-289). / by Daniel P. Grossman. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references. / by Wei Li. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-287). Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-287). / Does alliance restraint happen in international affairs? What theories explain the success or failure of restraint efforts? Do states ever form alliances in order to restrain? Alliance restraint - an actual or anticipated diplomatic effort by one ally to influence a second ally not to proceed with a proposed military policy or not to continue an existing military policy - most definitely happens in international affairs, and sometimes it is successful. This study of alliance restraint suggests three central conclusions about alliances: 1) On both a conceptual and empirical level, the alliance restraint dynamic means that alliances can have a stabilizing and peace-promoting effect on the international system. When calculating the net impact of alliances on international peace and stability, scholars should account for restraint, not just chainganging, buckpassing, and other pathological (destabilizing) alliance dynamics described by Waltz, Posen, Snyder & Christensen, and Vasquez. 2) The success or failure of restraint efforts is best explained by rational restraint theory - a combination of capabilities, interests, and communication. Rational restraint theory, analogous to rational deterrence theory, provides a better explanation than ones based on power, alliance norms, or domestic opinion. This is demonstrated in three cases of Anglo-American decisionmaking in the Middle East and Asia in the 1950s: Iran (1951), Indochina (1954), and Egypt (1956 Suez Crisis). / (cont.) 3) Some states form alliances with the express purpose of restraining their new ally. This serves a reminder that the primary reason for a given alliance may be the policies and interactions of the allies themselves rather than those of an adversary. Such internal motivations as controlling, restraining, or re-making an ally are better explanations for the origin of some alliances than external motivations such as balancing against one's adversary based on considerations of power (Waltz) or threat (Walt). This has important policy implications for those making or analyzing alliances. / by Jeremy Pressman. / Ph.D.

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-96). / by Cristine Denver. / M.S.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1984. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Bibliography: leaves 440-449. / by Eleanor E. Glaessel-Brown. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2005. / Vita. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 296-304). / This dissertation explores the evolution of welfare systems in post-socialist countries. Utilizing a range of data on social policy legislation and outcomes across countries, the author shows the extent to which post-socialist welfare systems vary in their design and effects. Variation is demonstrated using six indicators that measure: the extent of universality of social benefits, active policies, effective redistribution, wage-based financing of social programs, benefit levels and familization. Cross-country variation has occurred in spite of the common experiences of opening their economies to international competition and in spite of political pressure from international organizations and the European Union to adopt similar, pre-packaged policy agendas. To explain this variation, the author uses case studies of unemployment and family policies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, to argue that domestic policy actors in each country make the critical decisions about welfare reform. Comparative case analyses show that the direction of welfare reform in the post-communist countries was largely set in place during the few years following regime change in each of them. / (cont.) At this time, domestic institutions involved in policy formation were vested with particular inclinations regarding the objectives of state welfare, and certain capacities to implement social programs. Over time, the interaction between three domestic institutions - political parties, interest groups and welfare bureaucracies - has led to the perpetuation of unique policy arrays in each country. The development of welfare systems in the post-communist countries is therefore shown to be path-dependent, with the critical juncture occurring immediately after regime change, roughly between 1989 and 1993. The mechanism by which policy directions are perpetuated over time is the interaction between key domestic institutions, each of whose repertoires of potentially acceptable policies is delimited by its characteristic inclinations and capacities. / by Dana L. Brown. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. / This study proposes and tests three models of foreign lobbying in the United States. The "Reaction Model" assumes that the foreign lobbying results largely from countries' desire to act when issues related to them catch US public attention. The "Resource Model" assumes that the countries that can afford it do more foreign lobbying in order to cultivate friendly atmosphere in Washington. The "Norms Model" assumes that the foreign lobbying is a result of countries doing in Washington what they are used to doing at home. This research shows that the "Reaction Model" best explains and predicts the varying country patterns in foreign lobbying in the US, while the "Resource Model" and the "Norms Model" also show importance in determining how much foreign lobbying countries do. The research has produced country data sets as dependent variables, based on 2,034 records of foreign representation carried out on behalf of 53 countries between 1988 and 1991. The data have shown significant variations among different countries. In explaining the variations, the study has chosen three categories of independent variables. For the first group, the "issues" variables, several different measurements are used for measuring political and economic issues raised in the US with regard to each country. The "capabilities" variables are indicators of national wealth and measurements of countries' knowledge of and familiarity with-the US system. They reflect economic and knowledge resources that allow necessary actions to be implemented. The "norms" variables reflect the degree of pluralism in each country or the degree of similarity between the US and foreign country's business practices. They have been chosen based on the expectation that the norms would limit a country's set of options in lobbying. Multivariate regression has yielded various findings. Most importantly, the frequency of bilateral "issues" raised in the US has the most influence in determining how much foreign lobbying a country does. In addition, the countries that are more familiar with the US system ("capabilities") tend to focus more on advocacy lobbying to the Congress than other countries do. And, the countries where business cultures are similar to the US ("norms") are more active in the overall trade lobbies and in the advocacy lobbying to the Congress. / by Byoung-Joo Kim. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-61). / The racial status quo in the American South persisted through an unspoken detente between the federal government and the Southern state governments during the second half of the 19 th century. The political disenfranchisement of blacks took place in distinct stages following Reconstruction. In the 1880s, Jim Crowe had not yet been enacted but Reconstruction was over. Blacks were technically allowed to vote, but turnout was around five percent at any given election. The prevailing historical theory is that the threat of violence was a form of de facto disenfranchisement that prevented blacks from turning out to vote. Both historians and political scientists assume lynching to be the method through which the white population of the American South prevented political and social equality. Lynching is a form of ethnic violence, but there has not yet been a rigorous methodological examination of it as a potential form of political violence. In the following thesis I will examine the claims regarding the use of political violence within lynching in the southern United States. Under what circumstances would political violence be used or not be used in equilibrium? I begin with the assumption that lynching increases due to an impending election. Violence would be a function of the temporal proximity of a certain election. I will examine this claim using the dates of lynching and elections from 1880 to 1890. The second analysis of the paper examines whether or not political violence is due to factional politics. Violence would then be a function of the margin of the Republican or Democrat victory. The temptation to engage in political violence to manipulate election outcomes increases as the election draws closer. In this analysis, we examine the violence leading up to the election date with controls, including fixed effects (by state and county), census data and clustered standard error. / (cont.) When the United States Constitution was ratified in 1789, free male blacks could vote in Maine, Tennessee and Vermont. In 1865, free male blacks could vote in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and Rhode Island. In 1866, only 5% of eligible blacks voted in former Confederate states. One year of extending the franchise to blacks and the percent rose to 80.5% (Valelly 2004, pg. 3). The black vote enraged elements of the white population, substantively crystallized in movements such as the KKK, which was founded in 1868. During the 5 3 rd Congress (1893-1895), 94% of the voting rights measures legislated during Reconstruction were repealed (Valelly 2004, pg. 1). The national rates of lynching fell shortly afterwards. Violence in the American South escalated throughout the second half of the 19 th century. The homicide rate in the South was the highest in the United States and among the highest for industrialized nations (Ayers 1992, pg. 155). From 1882-1931, 4,589 people were lynched with a peak in the 1890s of 154 victims per year (Horowitz 1983). Historians see lynching as a reassertion of white Supremacy in light of the abolition of slavery and the carpetbagger occupation of the South (Horowitz 1983). Political violence during Reconstruction vastly surpassed the political violence we note in our decade of interest (1880-1890). After 1877, Republican assassinations and the threat of violence had all but suppressed opposition to the Democratic Party (Kousser 1999, pg. 22). Republicans still garnered respectable vote shares throughout the 1880s, though there were drops in their vote share immediately following violence (Kousser 1999, pg. 23). Violence was as common a tool as miscounting Republican votes (Vallely 2004, pg. 50). While Kousser believes that the vote drop-off cannot be solely attributed to the violence, he does allege a connection between elections and violence, a claim consistently present in the following literature review. Political violence was not an effective long term deterrent, repetition was necessary in order to disenfranchise blacks. / (cont.) As "redemption" ended and the "restoration" of the South began (the time periods will be subsequently discussed) lynching decreased. The national rate of lynching dropped as disenfranchisement became permanent and legal (Vallely 2004, pg. 144). Again, regardless of the effectiveness of political violence or the direct correlation to turnout, lynching persisted throughout the 1880s. Lynching peaked in the 1890s, while Jim Crowe and other legal "reforms" were being instituted, only to fall by 1900 and decrease each decade after (noted in both our dataset and the historical literature). Blacks are being excluded from voting through intimidation. If violence increases before a federal election, the powers that be are attempting to prevent an influx of blacks voting for the Republican Party or third party movements, such as Populism or Greenbacks. In the brief period where adult male blacks had the right to vote, there was evidence that the social and political structure of the South would be irrevocably altered, as over 80% of the eligible black voting population voted, even electing black representatives to Congress. The Reconstruction configuration of elites allowed the disfranchisement of a large (in some areas, a majority) group. The disenfranchisement process created high voting penalties. The Australian ballot and other double edged election reforms lowered the cost of voting "incorrectly" by privileging one's vote; at the same time, the cost of voting increases as political violence is strategically implemented to prevent blacks from going to the polls. Any lynching causal mechanism returns to this historical claim of lynching increasing before elections. Whether the impetuses for violence are an attempt to prevent wealth redistribution or reduce Republican turnout, both allege violence to be politically motivated prior to elections. / by Kimberly Menaster. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2010. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 481-498 ). / Great Powers often adopt coercive strategies, threatening or using limited force to convince weak states to comply with their demands. While coercive strategies have succeeded in just over half of asymmetric crises since World War I, there remain a number of cases in which weak states have chosen to resist. With their tremendous military advantage, why is it that Great Powers so often fail to coerce weak states? While a high probability of victory in war gives them the leverage to make high level demands of a weak target, concession to such demands can threaten the very survival of the weaker state, its regime, or its regime leadership. Perceiving its survival to be threatened at any level, a target will likely resist, so long as it has the means to do so. Commitment problems have also been cited as an explanation for why states cannot reach peaceful agreements. Yet Great Powers have, in fact, largely been able to overcome commitment issues in asymmetric conflicts by forming coalitions, by involving third party Great Powers in negotiations, making incremental tit-for-tat concessions, and taking diplomatic measures to reduce the target's audience costs. Finally, externalities such as international norms against invading a sovereign state without first seeking resolution through the United Nations have increased the costs to a Great Power for employing a brute force war strategy. In such cases, in fact, a Great Power may first choose a coercive strategy designed to fail in order to obtain justification for its preferred strategy of war. To reach these conclusions, I introduce a game theoretic model for asymmetric coercion, calculate equilibrium conditions, and formulate hypotheses for coercion failure based on survival and commitment issues. I create a data set of 116 asymmetric cases from 1918 to 2003 and then conduct ordered probit regressions to test predictions of survival and commitment hypotheses. I then conduct extensive qualitative case studies from the recent asymmetric conflicts between the United States and the states of Iraq. Serbia, and Libya. / by Phil Haun. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-127). / This study examines the consequences of the Gramm-Rudman super-majority budget rules on fiscal decision making in the Senate. It attempts to determine the efficacy of these rules as defined by those who advocate them, Public Choice scholars and conservative activists, by testing both whether they restrain spending overall and, second, whether they more often block spending benefiting concentrated special interests than other types of spending. The study concludes that super-majority budget rules do not restrain spending, much less spending on special interest legislation. The Gramm-Rudman rules were not responsible for the budget surplus that emerged in the late 1990s, and public choice scholars have no credible explanation for the surplus. Further, I argue that these rules have had the unintended effect of strengthening the hand of the leadership of the committees responsible for spending and tax legislation and diminished the ability of other Senators to influence money bills. These rules have compounded the anti-democratic bias of the Senate, increased hold-out costs, and generally made the legislative process less transparent and understandable to the public and even to the Senators themselves. / by Marsha Jean Simon. / Ph.D.