Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references. / by R. Russell Rumbaugh. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2013. / "September 2013." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 262-284). / The central argument of my dissertation is that national labor relation institutions where transnational private regulatory efforts are implemented influence the extent and manner of public-private regulatory complementarities. The analytical framework I use to examine the processes of regulatory complementarities is informed by the political economy of gradual change in the comparative institutionalism literature. The labor relation institutions of particular relevance include tripartite and industrial relation institutions, as well as political affiliations between state and workers' organizations, although to a more limited extent. On one hand, these institutions influence the incentives for domestic unions to use transnational private regulatory efforts in strategic manners to promote regulatory improvements. On other hand, they shape the ability of domestic unions and transnational actors to use state regulation as a source of legitimacy for their demands for improvements. I further argue that these favorable conditions are more common in national contexts with market oriented, rather than state-directed and coordinated labor relation institutions. I use the electronics sector from Hungary, Romania and Slovenia during the 2000s as the empirical window to examine divergent pathways of regulatory interactions. The empirical analysis illustrates that while labor relation institutions facilitated the emergence of regulatory complementarities in the market-oriented institutional context of Hungary, these institutions were less favorable to similar developments in the state-directed context of Romania and coordinated institutional setting of Slovenia. Additionally, the implementation style of transnational private regulation set opportunities for two types of regulatory developments: union and compliance driven regulatory complementarities. An additional essential claim of the dissertation is that instead of approaching public-private regulatory complementarities as functional synergies that emerge automatically, to rather understand them as political processes that are closely connected to national institutions. Finally, regulatory complementarities are more likely to emerge around labor concerns that are prevalent and politically salient in a national context. / by Timea Pal. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 380-404). / by Hans K. Klein. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2005. / Pages 73 and 74 blank. / Includes bibliographical references. / This thesis examines the role of simulation in the development of armored warfare doctrine during the interwar period. All the Great Powers faced the challenge of how to integrate new technologies, particularly the tank, radio, and aircraft, into a coherent combined arms doctrinal framework. I compare the French and German experiences in order to assess the role that wargames played in driving doctrinal development. The case studies show that wargames, on the map and in the field, gave the German army a significant edge as it sought to develop new doctrine for armored warfare. This finding is an important addition to existing theory on military innovation, which tends to view doctrine as the product of geopolitical and organizational forces. Wargames provided a means of testing doctrinal ideas in a simulated wartime environment, and the lessons learned during these simulations fed into ongoing debates on doctrinal development. Wargaming well is a technically challenging business, and requires particular technical skills and capabilities. The Germans developed these capabilities earlier than their French counterparts, in part because the German army traditionally favored a rationalist, corporate approach to the management of military affairs. / (cont.) This cultural outlook made it easier to develop a rigorous wargaming capability, and also meant that lessons learned in games were taken more seriously than they were in France. Given the right conditions, wargaming can be a powerful tool for developing new military doctrine during peacetime, thus conferring a significant edge on the battlefield should war erupt. / by Daniel S. Carter. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2011. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 519-544). / Militaries have long been eager to adopt the latest technology (IT) in a quest to improve knowledge of and control over the battlefield. At the same time, uncertainty and confusion have remained prominent in actual experience of war. IT usage sometimes improves knowledge, but it sometimes contributes to tactical blunders and misplaced hubris. As militaries invest intensively in IT, they also tend to develop larger headquarters staffs, depend more heavily on planning and intelligence, and employ a larger percentage of personnel in knowledge work rather than physical combat. Both optimists and pessimists about the so-called "revolution in military affairs" have tended to overlook the ways in which IT is profoundly and ambiguously embedded in everyday organizational life. Technocrats embrace IT to "lift the fog of war," but IT often becomes a source of breakdowns, misperception, and politicization. To describe the conditions under which IT usage improves or degrades organizational performance, this dissertation develops the notion of information friction, an aggregate measure of the intensity of organizational struggle to coordinate IT with the operational environment. It articulates hypotheses about how the structure of the external battlefield, internal bureaucratic politics, and patterns of human-computer interaction can either exacerbate or relieve friction, which thus degrades or improves performance. Technological determinism alone cannot account for the increasing complexity and variable performances of information phenomena. Information friction theory is empirically grounded in a participant-observation study of U.S. special operations in Iraq from 2007 to 2008. To test the external validity of insights gained through fieldwork in Iraq, an historical study of the 1940 Battle of Britain examines IT usage in a totally different structural, organizational, and technological context. / (cont.) These paired cases show that high information friction, and thus degraded performance, can arise with sophisticated IT, while lower friction and impressive performance can occur with far less sophisticated networks. The social context, not just the quality of technology, makes all the difference. Many shorter examples from recent military history are included to illustrate concepts. This project should be of broad interest to students of organizational knowledge, IT, and military effectiveness. / by Jon Randall Lindsay. / Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 132-137). / Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007. / Chapter 2 is based on two axioms: party members must run under common platforms, but are made up of incumbents who seek their own individual re-election. Politicians seek to win their own seats in the legislature, but they must run under a common party label. In both single-member district and proportional representation systems, equilibrium platforms are shown to diverge substantially, with one party located near the 25th percentile of the voter distribution and the other near the 75th percentile, rather than converge to the median. The model also yields predictions concerning short-term economic shocks, incumbency advantages, and gerrymandering. Chapter 3 is based on ideological voters. With purely ideological voters, party vote share depends on the distribution of voters in the entire country. Seat share depends on distribution of district medians. The seats/votes curve is therefore a combination of two different functions. This presents an identification problem for studying either function without accounting for the other. The incumbency advantage is also considered. Chapter 4 measures ideology using the Cooperative Congressional Election Study using factor analysis on voter responses to policy questions. I discuss the robustness of the measure and implications for the model of chapter 3. Chapter 5 finds little evidence of structural bias against either party under districting. However, in a hypothetical party-list system, there would be a massive structural advantage for the left party. The seats/votes curve is predicted to be approximately linear or logistic, unless one takes into account incumbency, in which case the curve becomes non-linear. Senate party platforms are predicted to be more converged than the House, with a midpoint right of center. / by William Michael Leblanc. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2010. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 395-428). / This dissertation explores how states can use positive inducements and negative sanctions to successfully bargain with nuclear proliferators and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It seeks to answer the following question: How effective are offers of inducements and threats of sanctions - i.e., 'sticks' and 'carrots' - in efforts to prevent or to roll back the proliferation of nuclear weapons? I pay particular attention to the use of positive inducements, asking: How effective and efficient is the use of inducements relative to negative sanctions? Under what circumstances is each most likely to be useful? I propose an issue-linkage theory with which the use of negative sanctions and positive inducements might be understood. In the theory, negative sanctions and positive inducements are conceptualized as bargaining proposals that link punishments or rewards to particular demands made to the target state. Negative sanctions and positive inducements are effective when they enhance the power and interests of domestic political factions in the target state that support compliance with the sender's nuclear demands. I argue that positive inducements are typically a more effective tool of foreign policy than negative sanctions. Also, the difference in the effectiveness between the two is more pronounced when dealing with adversaries than it is with allies. With allies, both sanctions and inducements can be effective, but inducements are more likely to secure long-term cooperation. With adversaries, negative sanctions are not only much less effective than inducements, but run the risk of triggering escalation. The theory is tested against three counter-proliferation cases: North Korea, South Korea, and Libya. I find that negative sanctions were successful only in the South Korean case, while threats and sanctions triggered escalation in both cases involving US adversaries. On the other hand, positive inducements were used successfully in all three cases. A detailed reading of the three cases lends support to the theory, and suggests that a broader test is warranted. / by Robert J. Reardon. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 5, leaves [1208]-1272). / by Aykut Kansu. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. / Russia has organized its energy industry similarly to a vertically integrated energy corporation. Not only does Russia possess vast oil and gas reserves, it also has capabilities at every step in the production chain. The execution of Russian energy strategy is incredibly intricate and flows from all points including the state, firms, suppliers, degrees of ownership and transit locales. This work reviews five important aspects of Russia's vertical integration strategy. Firstly, Russia is brining the domestic industry under state control. Secondly, it has pushed out particular types of foreign investment in order to gain control of domestic reserves, their monetization and the development of important projects. Thirdly, Russia seeks to keep resource rich states in its near abroad in its sphere of influence in order to keep their supply within its grasp. Fourthly, it manages relations with neighboring states in possession of transit infrastructure to keep supply routes open to markets. Lastly, it invests abroad in order to increase market presence, cut out middlemen, and further build production chains. Russia expects to strengthen its international position, both economically and geopolitically by undertaking this strategy of vertical integration. / by Nina J. Fahy. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 497-525). / by Richard Edward Deeg. / Ph.D.