Abstract This paper uses a sample of listed and unlisted securities companies in Taiwan to investigate the effects of employee productivity. The empirical estimation is based on a modified Cobb-Douglas production function. To provide a preliminary account of how the securities firms use the group incentive system and if the system certainly works as well as other companies on productivity effects, this paper examines the productivity effects via pooling the financial data during 1997-2000, the dataset is constructed of 132 securities firms. In addition, to estimate the incentive effects from the bonus, a number of independent variables are included in this study, such as profit-sharing dummy variables, amount of distributed shares, stock price and the ratio of profit sharing to net-profit. Moreover, the study also adds the ratio of profit sharing to wage to explore that if the wage risk could reduce the effects of employee productivity. The result indicates that firms with stock bonus will perform better than others, it apparently shows on listed companies, and the stock price is a key factor. Further, this study also finds that increasing the ratio of cash bonus to wage or to net-profit, it would significantly reduce employee productivity, especially on unlisted companies, and the stock bonus is contrary to the cash bonus.

Employing a hermeneutic phenomenological approach, I explore the experiences of eight individuals engaged differently with nonprofit accountability. The principal-Agent perspective provides the framework. My investigation is prompted by my dissatisfaction with portrayals of governments’ relationships with financially dependent nonprofits as being dysfunctional, and necessarily oppositional, dyads. Simultaneous calls for more collaboration and ever-greater accountability risk dislocating excessively stretched joints. Preserving the uniqueness of each actor’s depiction and interpretation of accountability, I hope to shed light on what is really going on as accountability is negotiated, mediated and enacted by implicated individuals, and suggest how we might improve performances if we pay more attention to performers’ pragmatic interpretations of accountability scripts. Participants’ considered improvisations may enlighten accountability’s audiences and its directors and script-writers.

Employing a hermeneutic phenomenological approach, I explore the experiences of eight individuals engaged differently with nonprofit accountability. The principal-Agent perspective provides the framework. My investigation is prompted by my dissatisfaction with portrayals of governments’ relationships with financially dependent nonprofits as being dysfunctional, and necessarily oppositional, dyads. Simultaneous calls for more collaboration and ever-greater accountability risk dislocating excessively stretched joints. Preserving the uniqueness of each actor’s depiction and interpretation of accountability, I hope to shed light on what is really going on as accountability is negotiated, mediated and enacted by implicated individuals, and suggest how we might improve performances if we pay more attention to performers’ pragmatic interpretations of accountability scripts. Participants’ considered improvisations may enlighten accountability’s audiences and its directors and script-writers.

No description available.

This study examines whether diversification is beneficial to commercial banks using data of U.S., Europe and Asia banks from 1997 to 2003. The empirical results suggest that banks perform better if they diversify between interest and non-interest activities, but this effect is not significant when banks diversify within each of these broad sets of activities. Regional results point out the different effects of commercial banks in U.S., Europe and Asia. My results show that banks earn less risk-adjusted returns from commission, fee and trading income. We conclude that increasing non-interest shares is not as good as expected.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, March 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1935. / Vita. Published also without thesis note. "List of references": p. 215-220.

Thesis--London. / "Selected bibliography": p. 170-172.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Richard M. Morton, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept. of Accounting. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 15, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-84).