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This discussion argues that the United States-Pakistan alliance of 1954 emerged because American strategic concerns for the Middle East, arising in the aftermath of the Korean War and based upon a recognition of Britain's declining ability to defend the region, coincided with Pakistan's strategic needs as a newlyindependent nation. The United States believed that Pakistan-a moderate Islamic nation, situated on the eastern flank of the Middle East, and ideologically inclined toward the West-could assist Western efforts to protect the Middle East from Soviet influence, penetration, or attack. This discussion further argues that the United States only brought Pakistan into the Western strategic network when a series of events made it seem that Asia would be the next battleground for the Cold War and after it was clear that if containment were to be extended to South Asia, Pakistan was the only choice available. Pakistan's persistent and sophisticated courtship of the United States differed greatly from India's efforts to remain neutral in the Cold War. And this discussion argues that the alliance was consistent with the broader policies of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and that it stemmed not from American interests in South Asia but from Washington's global strategic efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States-Pakistan alliance was not the result of American attempts to "contain" or dominate India, of Anglo-American competition over the subcontinent and the Middle East, or of American efforts to establish economic hegemony over South Asia. Indeed, as the United States' fears for Middle Eastern security subsided, so did its commitment to the alliance with Pakistan.

This discussion argues that the United States-Pakistan alliance of 1954 emerged because American strategic concerns for the Middle East, arising in the aftermath of the Korean War and based upon a recognition of Britain's declining ability to defend the region, coincided with Pakistan's strategic needs as a newlyindependent nation. The United States believed that Pakistan-a moderate Islamic nation, situated on the eastern flank of the Middle East, and ideologically inclined toward the West-could assist Western efforts to protect the Middle East from Soviet influence, penetration, or attack. This discussion further argues that the United States only brought Pakistan into the Western strategic network when a series of events made it seem that Asia would be the next battleground for the Cold War and after it was clear that if containment were to be extended to South Asia, Pakistan was the only choice available. Pakistan's persistent and sophisticated courtship of the United States differed greatly from India's efforts to remain neutral in the Cold War. And this discussion argues that the alliance was consistent with the broader policies of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and that it stemmed not from American interests in South Asia but from Washington's global strategic efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States-Pakistan alliance was not the result of American attempts to "contain" or dominate India, of Anglo-American competition over the subcontinent and the Middle East, or of American efforts to establish economic hegemony over South Asia. Indeed, as the United States' fears for Middle Eastern security subsided, so did its commitment to the alliance with Pakistan. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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The Soviet-U.S. rapprochement in the late 1980s ended one of the bitterest rivalries of modern history. Before this landmark event, the study of accommodation as a security strategy hardly received its fair share of attention in international relations theories. This thesis attempts to add to the growing body of work on the dynamics of accommodation. Specifically, it analyzes accommodative moves of Pakistan vis-a-vis India, thereby studying the dynamics of accommodation in the context of developing states. Four cases are studied in depth: first, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960); second, the Tashkent Declaration (1966); third, Post-Brasstacks Accommodative Moves (1987); and finally, Post-1990 Accommodative Moves. This thesis argues that three factors are particularly important in the initiation of accommodation in the developing world, namely, (1) decision-makers' desire to minimize losses (in the external politico-military sphere, the internal economic sphere and the internal political sphere), (2) their commitment to serious domestic reforms and (3) the involvement of a powerful third party that exercises leverage over both adversaries.

The purpose of this thesis is to study and analyse the development of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the effect of their respective outlooks upon the various proposals for settlement brought forward by the United Nations or their own leaders, and the reasons for each subsequent failure to resolve the eighteen year deadlock. Twelve years ago, Michael Brecher concluded in The Struggle for Kashmir that both India and Pakistan had economic, strategic and political interests in the State; and of the three, those brought about by the two-nation theory and the conflicting religious and secular policies were deemed to be the most important. While one cannot disagree with Brecher's general conclusions, this writer feels that the specific importance of Kashmir to either India or Pakistan at any given time is not a constant factor but instead has been influenced by contemporary foreign and domestic events and has been in a perpetual state of change. What was considered of primary importance in 1947, therefore, does not necessarily hold the same position today. Indeed, to single out one factor as the reason for the continuation of the dispute would not only be inopportune, but incorrect. Because of the very nature of the dispute and its international and domestic.characteristics, one is faced by a plethora of material - including White Papers on correspondence; over one hundred Security Council debates; many pamphlets and some thousands of diplomatic newsletters. It has been necessary, therefore, to sift through all available evidence and to extract only that which is pertinent to the topic. It must be realized that because of the importance of Kashmir to both India and Pakistan;, all the information from governmental sources or written by their nationals contains the type of material calculated to present their case in the best possible light. Thus it becomes necessary in many cases - the Pathan incursions in October 1947, the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks and the Mohammed All-Nehru discussions, and the essence of the Nehru-Sheikh Abdullah proposals for federation - to read between the lines in order to trace developments. In the early stages of the dispute, one can sympathize with Pakistan's claim to Kashmir and her efforts to obtain a "free and impartial plebiscite." Unlike India, she accepted every practical proposal brought forward to settle the dispute. Although neither India nor Pakistan produced a statesman capable of resolving the deadlock, the former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, must be singled out as the major contributor to the continuation of the dispute. It was not that his actions were incomparable with his Pakistani counterparts; but rather that as a statesman of such magnitude, willing to solve the world's problems - with or without invitation he could adopt a self-righteous "Babu" attitude when dealing with the State. Indeed, Nehru appears to have become emotionally incapable of treating Pakistan as an equal; hence the dispute continued in deadlock. India's intransigence has continued in open defiance of the United Nations and in complete contradiction to her earlier promises for self-determination in Kashmir. Notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan, in her effort to gain international support for her Kashmir policy, has virtually talked - herself out of any claim to the State, one can now sympathize with the Indian position. It is not that India is more right today than eighteen years ago, but rather that her interest in the State - originally a prestige issue - has now degenerated to the point where a plebiscite could possibly mean her internal collapse through the onslaught of communalism. She accepted and held Kashmir as a showplace for secularism and for the prestige offered by its geographic location; today she controls a monster within which could lie the seeds of her own destruction. The point of view taken in this thesis, therefore, is that the existing stalemate appears to be the only practical solution to the Kashmir dilemma, and that history may prove Nehru's negative attitude towards Kashmir to have been correct. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that the voice of Kashmiri nationalism has yet to be taken into account. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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