In Africa, the new electoral freedoms of the 1990s often ushered in not less but more violence and corruption. Somewhat paradoxically, democratization appeared to lead to greater despotism. Current theories of democratic transitions fail to adequately explain this negative "fall out". On the one hand, by focusing on formal institutional change, most transitions theory marginalizes the "informal" politics of patronage and violence. On the other hand, theorists of "informal" politics tend to assume that formal institutional change does not impinge on patrimonial dynamics. This thesis explains how the advent of electoral freedom challenges patrimonialism and, in the process, deepens local despotism. By a careful look at the Kenyan case, this thesis argues that the re-introduction of multiple political parties posed a genuine challenge to highest level patronage networks. This challenge consisted of "patronage inflation": competitive elections escalated demands for and promises of patronage just as international conditionalities and economic difficulties led to a decline in traditional supplies of patronage. Further, with multiple political parties, voters gained bargaining power to demand both resources and accountability. A critique of patrimonialism emerged into the public realm, particularly from those who had lost out in the spoils system, the growing numbers of poor and landless. These challenges were met by counter-strategies on the part of those most set to lose by a turnover in elections. With the introduction of alternative political parties, President Moi and key patronage bosses instigated localized but electorally beneficial violence in the form of "ethnic clashes". In their struggle to maintain patrimonial dominance, they also increasingly turned to less internationally scrutinized public lands as a patronage resource, leading to increasing and increasingly violent "land grabbing". This triggered counter mobilizations which aimed at reasserting local co

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