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The customizable area whole farm insurance (CAWFI) is proposed and evaluated as a possible wholearm revenue protection design for crop farms. The evaluation included assessing appropriate weight, optimal scale, and optimal coverage level. The optimal CAWFI was tested against no insurance program, 90% farm level whole farm insurance (90% CFWFI), and CAWFI with scale and coverage level as provisioned in GRP product (restricted CAWFI) in representative farm in Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and Mississippi. The study finds the optimal CAWFI outperforms no insurance program and restricted CAWFI asserting that CAWFI is a workable insurance model and relaxing restriction on scale and coverage level can increase expected utility of farmers. The optimal CAWFI results in a risk reduction roughly equal with 90% farm-level wholefarm insurance though the expected indemnities in it are at least three fold.

Increasing evidence suggests the personal traits of chief executive officers (CEOs) can influence corporate policies. We examine how one dimension, past professional experiences, can affect corporate payout policy. Exploiting exogenous CEO turnovers and future employment, we hypothesize that CEOs experiencing a distress event in their past career alter the corporate payout policy at their subsequent firm of employment. We discover that CEOs having experienced prior professional career distress are less likely to pay dividends and use repurchases and pay out lower levels for each type of payout. Additionally, when CEOs with distress do have a payout policy greater than zero dollars, there exists a preference toward the use of repurchases in the payout policy, adding to the literature of substitution and differences between the two forms of payout. We find that dividend smoothing is reduced by CEOs that have past professional distress. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2019. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

This study investigates payouts in Swedish family firms by focusing on both the level and speed of adjustment of dividends. In addition, the use of dual-class shares in family firms is examined to further identify potential drivers of payout differences between family-controlled companies and non-family firms. Agency theory and previous studies suggest that high and stable payouts are used by controlling families to mitigate minority shareholders’ concerns of being expropriated. We find that family firms in Sweden do not differ from non-family firms in their payouts. The results could be seen as an indication of expropriation if minority shareholders should be compensated for higher agency costs, but it could also be that family control does not worsen agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. Rather, other ownership structures such as the use of dual-class shares to gain control in excess of ownership seem to be associated with higher levels of payouts. Neither do family firms smooth their dividends more than non-family firms. Instead, they adapt towards their target dividend at a higher pace.

I examine whether and to what extent tax uncertainty affects a firm's dividend payouts. Based on the argument that tax uncertainty impairs the persistence and predictability of after-tax cash flows, I hypothesize and find that firms with greater tax uncertainty exhibit a lower probability of dividend payouts. The effect of tax uncertainty is stronger in the presence of financial constraints and weaker for firms that distribute dividends to alleviate agency conflicts. Furthermore, I find a negative effect of tax uncertainty on dividend levels, which is moderated by the costs of dividend reductions. These results are economically meaningful as a one standard deviation higher tax uncertainty leads to a 9.9 percentage point lower probability and a $23.6 million reduction in dividend payouts. Taken together, my findings document a real effect of tax avoidance and contribute to the understanding of interactions between uncertain tax avoidance and a firm's financial ecosystem. / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

This thesis examines three important topics in corporate finance: the relation between the dividend-paying status of a firm and its investment and operating performance following a seasoned equity offering (SEO), the market's view on one-dollar CEO salary announcements, and the value of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the event of a data breach. First, I provide an in-depth analysis of the connection between dividend payouts and corporate investment of SEO firms. Empirical studies have documented the decline in post-issue operating performance of SEO firms, and the potential overinvestment of SEO proceeds seems to be a critical factor. Studies on dividend payouts argue that the agency cost of overinvestment could be lowered when dividends are paid to reduce free cash flows held by managers. To examine the connection, I utilize two post-issue dividend policies, paying consecutive dividends or nothing, to separate my sample of SEO firms and compare the two groups' post-issue investment and operating performance. I find that non-dividend-paying SEO firms overinvest more, leading to the deterioration of asset turnover and worse post-issue operating performance compared with dividend-paying ones. The results suggest a beneficial effect of consistent dividend payouts on post-SEO business operations. Second, I examine the market reaction to the public announcement of a $1 CEO salary decision using explicit reasons for the decision and mechanisms for dealing with the base salary to disentangle possible explanations for the reaction. It shows that the market does not favour the so-called personal sacrifice when CEOs eliminate their salary to counter a downturn or crisis. When a firm is in a predicament or has poor performance, the market sees its CEO’s decision to give up the salary as a signal that the outlook for the firm is bleak and the CEO is attempting to save their position. However, when newly hired CEOs start with a $1 salary, the market reacts positively. The results ascertain that a $1 salary is not seen purely as a vehicle for interest alignment. Third, I investigate whether public firms' CSR activities pay off when they suffer a data breach that potentially harms their reputation and hurts firm value. I use a sample of US data breaches and two sources of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) ratings to investigate whether CSR engagement by public firms mitigates the negative stock market reactions to their data breach announcements. I utilize pre-breach ESG scores to separate my sample of breached firms into high and low CSR groups. Using event study methodology, I find that the market reacts significantly negatively to only the low CSR group's announcements. Consistent with previous studies on how firms benefit from CSR activities when they face adversity and lose public trust, the results suggest that social performance protects firms against information leakage incidents. However, the extent to which the market assesses the ratings from different providers is still divergent, which is a concern for practitioners. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Since theories of corporate finance are recognised to be conditional, this study explores the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and institutional settings in determining corporate financial decisions. The recession on the supply of credit and demand for credit affects the corporate financial channels. The credit recession causes more agency costs, bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry, which adversely influence both borrowing and investments. Firms reduce debt financing, retain more cash and cut corporate payouts due to a sharp rise in uncertainty. Moreover, the role of institutional settings on corporate decisions differs following the GFC. Three empirical chapters contribute to the literature: First, Chapter 3 investigates the role of GFC on determinants and the adjustment speed of leverage and debt maturity and reveals that the effect of bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information asymmetry only increases on debt maturity, as opposed to leverage in the post-GFC. The adjustment speed of leverage and debt maturity drops after the GFC due to the low supply and demand for credit. Chapter 4 examines how cash holdings have been affected by the GFC across countries which have different agency problems and analyses how the rise of agency costs and information asymmetry can explain cash decisions before and after the GFC. Financially constrained firms have quicker cash holdings’ adjustment compared to unconstrained firms. However, while firms in low-governance countries have slower adjustment speed of cash than those in high-governance countries in pre-crisis, it has been found that it is vice versa in the post-crisis period. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the effect of agency problems and the GFC on dividend payouts. Contrary to firms in high-governance countries, those in common-law countries are less likely to pay out dividends, as confirmed by the substitute and outcome models, sequentially after the GFC. Also, dividends are used as a signalling device by the GFC. Overall, the GFC and institutional settings impact corporate financial policies of firms to specify where and when their shareholders invest. / Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey İlim Yayma Vakfı İstanbul İktisatçılar Derneği (İKDER)

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’analyser l’existence de spécificités dans l’utilisation par les banques de la politique de dividende comme moyen de résolution des conflits d’intérêts. Il s’agit également de s’interroger sur l’opportunité d’une réglementation visant à imposer aux firmes le versement de dividendes, dans une perspective d’amélioration de la qualité de la gouvernance. Le premier chapitre analyse l’influence de deux conflits majeurs, dirigeants vs actionnaires et actionnaires vs créanciers. Il montre que les banques prennent en compte les deux types de conflits, la résolution des conflits entre actionnaires et dirigeants revêtant toutefois une importance prédominante. Les banques utilisent les dividendes comme un substitut à de faibles degrés de protection des droits des actionnaires et des créanciers. Le second chapitre explore ces conflits d’intérêt plus avant en analysant l’impact de la concentration de l’actionnariat et du degré d’opacité des banques. Que l’actionnariat soit dispersé ou concentré, un plus fort degré d’opacité favorise les comportements d’expropriation par les insiders (dirigeants ou actionnaires majoritaire) et conduit à des dividendes plus faibles. Un environnement institutionnel plus protecteur des droits des actionnaires ou un régime de supervision strict permettent de limiter l’expropriation. Une réglementation limitant le versement de dividendes, telle que définit dans Bâle III, pourraient renforcer de tels phénomènes. Le dernier chapitre s’interroge sur l’opportunité d’une réglementation de la politique des dividendes et s’intéresse au cas de l’Indonésie caractérisée un faible taux de versement et un faible degré de protection des actionnaires. En cohérence avec la théorie du cycle de vie, une telle réglementation devrait tenir compte du stade de développement de la firme et contraindre uniquement les firmes ayant atteint un stade de maturité, une réglementation uniforme de la politique de dividende n’étant donc pas souhaitable. / This dissertation aims first to investigate whether banks, which have unique characteristics, use dividends to reduce the agency conflicts between their different stakeholders. Another objective is to investigate if the implementation of a regulation of dividend policy is necessary to oblige firms to pay dividends for good governance purposes. In Chapter 1, we examine if bank managers use dividends to reduce agency cost of equity (managers vs. shareholders) and agency cost of debt (shareholders vs. creditors). We show that bank managers use dividends as substitute to weak legal protection and strike a balance in their dividend policy with however a more decisive role played by the agency cost of equity than the one of debt. Chapter 2 further explores if the degree of ownership concentration and the level of asymmetric information (opacity) faced by outsiders influence banks’ dividend payouts. In either concentrated or dispersed ownership structure insiders (managers or majority shareholders) pay lower dividends when the degree of opacity is high. In line with the entrenchment behavior for banks, insiders extract higher levels of private benefits when it might be more difficult to detect such opportunistic behavior. Higher level of shareholder protection and stronger supervisory regimes help to constrain such behavior. These findings have critical policy implications for the implementation of Basel 3 with restrictions on dividend payouts that might reinforce this entrenchment behavior. In the Chapter 3, we investigate if the implementation of a regulation to oblige firms to pay dividends for better governance is desirable. We consider the case of Indonesia, where the regulator plans to implement a mandatory regulation on dividends in a context of declining dividend payments and weak shareholder rights. The findings recommend that firms should only be required to pay dividends when they reach a certain development stage, and action should only be taken against those firms which do not pay dividends, although they should be able to. Overall, dividend policies should not be regulated by one-policy-for-all regulation.

BAKGRUND: Investerare har försökt slå marknaden så länge kapitalmarknader har funnits. En investeringsstrategi som använts är ”Dogs of the Dow”. Investeringsstrategin bygger på att investera i de bolagen med högst utdelningsandel. Vedertagna ekonomiska teorier förespråkar även att investeringar i stabila utdelningsbolag ger möjlighet att generera riskjusterad överavkastning. Det finns idag motstridiga bevis från olika aktiemarknader huruvida det går att skapa riskjusterad överavkastning genom placeringar i högutdelande bolag. SYFTE: Syftet med studien är att undersöka om det går att skapa högre riskjusterad avkastning än SIX Return Index (.SIXRX) genom att placera i de aktierna med högst direktavkastning på Stockholmsbörsen. Vidare syftar studien att undersöka både huruvida ”Dogs of the Dow”- strategin och en investeringsstrategi i stabila utdelningsbolag kan generera riskjusterad överavkastning jämfört med index på Stockholmsbörsen. GENOMFÖRANDE: Det skapas två portföljstrategier där den ena utgår från ”Dogs of the Dow” och den andra utgår från placeringar i stabila utdelningsaktier. Studien är en kvantitativ undersökning där data samlas in från välrenommerade databaser. Portföljerna innehåller tio bolag som rebalanseras varje år för att sedan justeras för risk och transaktionskostnader. SLUTSATS: Studien presenterar inga bevis för att det går att skapa riskjusterad överavkastning med utgångspunkt i ”Dogs of the Dow”-strategin på Stockholmsbörsen. Däremot visar studien att det med hjälp av placeringar i stabila utdelningsbolag går att skapa riskjusterad överavkastning på Stockholmsbörsen men utan statistiskt signifikans. / BACKGROUND: Investors have been trying to beat the market for as long as capital markets have existed. An investment strategy used to outperform the market is “Dogs of the Dow”. The investment strategy is based on investing in the companies with the highest dividend yield. Economic theories argue that investments in companies with stable dividend payouts are able to create risk-adjusted excess returns. There are contradictory evidence from different markets whether it is possible to earn risk-adjusted excess return through high-yield investments. PURPOSE: The purpose of the study is to investigate whether it is possible to earn higher risk- adjusted returns than the SIX Return Index (.SIXRX) through investing in the highest dividend yield companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The study aims to investigate whether the “Dogs of the Dow” strategy and an investment strategy in companies with stable dividend payouts can generate risk-adjusted excess return compared to the SIX Return Index. COMPLETION: There are two portfolio strategies, one of which is based on ”Dogs of the Dow” and the other is based on investments in companies with stable dividend payouts. The quantitative study collects data from reputable databases. The portfolios contain ten companies that are rebalanced each year and the returns are adjusted for risk and transaction costs. CONCLUSION: The study presents no evidence that it is possible to earn risk-adjusted excess return with the “Dogs of the Dow” strategy on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. However, the study shows that investments in companies with stable dividend payouts can earn risk-adjusted excess return on the Stockholm Stock Exchange but without statistical significance.