With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, external auditors face a new regulatory inspection process in addition to an increase in litigation (or engagement) pressure. It has been communicated that this new inspection process will place an increased emphasis on the efficiency of integrated audits while maintaining the same level of effectiveness. In an experiment, I explore how external auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function will be affected by different inspection focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of risk associated with the audit test or procedure. While I expect that there will be significant main effects for inspection focus, engagement risk and the riskiness of the audit test, I explore the potential presence of a three-way interaction between these three factors. My findings suggest that the auditor reliance decisions are impacted by differing levels of engagement risk, the focus of the inspection process, and the riskiness of the audit tests. In general, as engagement risk increased, auditors’ reliance decreased. Also, as the riskiness of the audit test increased, auditors placed less reliance on the internal audit function. However, when the focus of the inspection changed, these factors interacted with one another. Specifically, when auditors faced a focus of both effectiveness and efficiency, their reliance decisions increased as engagement risk and riskiness of the test decreased, but when auditors faced a focus of effectiveness only, their reliance decisions were not impacted by the engagement risk when the riskiness of the test was high. Thus, the impact of engagement risk on auditors’ reliance decisions depends on the focus of the inspection process and the riskiness of the tests.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has recently begun inspecting foreign audit firms. An important policy concern is that several foreign jurisdictions have refused to allow the PCAOB to conduct inspections of their audit firms. In this dissertation, I investigate (1) whether audit quality is higher for client firms (henceforth "complying" clients) whose foreign auditors have been inspected by the PCAOB, compared to client firms (henceforth "blacklisted" clients) of foreign auditors whose governments have refused inspections by the PCAOB, and (2) whether audit quality improves in the post inspection period for clients of inspected foreign auditors. I use abnormal accruals, total accruals, value relevance, and the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion as proxies for audit quality. I conduct empirical tests on two samples, a cross-sectional sample consisting of blacklisted and complying clients, and a longitudinal sample of clients of inspected foreign auditors before and after PCAOB inspections. For the going-concern models, the samples are confined to financially distressed firms, which are either clients with negative net income or negative operating cash flows or clients in the top quartile in the bankruptcy probability distribution. The cross-sectional models indicate that blacklisted clients have significantly higher abnormal and total accruals, lower value relevance and a lower likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion, than complying clients, suggesting that clients of PCAOB-inspected auditors seem to have higher audit quality. Moreover, longitudinal analyses of clients of inspected foreign auditors show that abnormal accruals and total accruals are lower after PCAOB inspections than before inspections, and value relevance is greater after inspections than before. The likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion is higher after PCAOB inspections than before inspections for one of the two distressed-firm samples. Overall, the results are generally consistent with the PCAOB's claim that the clients of foreign audit firms that have undergone PCAOB inspections have benefited from the inspections. Further analyses indicate that the benefits are concentrated in jurisdictions where the PCAOB has conducted joint inspections with local authorities, in countries where legal traditions follow common law, and for clients of Big 4 auditors. / Business Administration/Accounting