The aim of this study is to evaluate the United Nations (UN) role in the resolution, management and termination of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with specific reference to the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The aim emanates from the basic research question: To what extent did the deployment of MONUC contribute to the termination of internal conflict in the DRC and create conditions conducive for the holding of democratic elections? The research problem generated four subsidiary questions: Was the intention of the drafters of the Lusaka Agreement for the UN converted into a viable peacekeeping mission, especially in the early phases of the mission? Did MONUC receive adequate resources to fulfil its task, commensurate with the size and complexity of the operational theatre and its mandate? Why was a development such as the deployment of Interim Emergency Multi National Force (IEMF) in Ituri (2003) necessary, given the fact that MONUC was deployed? Were the expectations regarding MONUC involvement in the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, resettlement and repatriation (DDRRR) programme and the domestic disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR) programme realistic? Therefore four sub-problems were addressed, namely the issue of the mission mandate; the resourcing of the mission relative to the mandate and the operational theatre; the external augmentation of the mission; and the MONUC role in DDRRR and DDR. Following a definition of the concept internal conflict and a discussion of the factors contributing to internal conflict, the theory of peacekeeping was described to determine a framework for the evaluation of the UN peace mission in the DRC, based on the recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi Report. Emphasis was placed on the mandate, force levels and composition, and operational capability. A historic overview contextualised the complex conflict situation in the DRC that the UN was required to help ameliorate. MONUC made a contribution to the termination of internal conflict in the DRC by managing the conflict in a fashion that permitted democratic elections to be held. This was achieved despite the fact that the actual deployment of MONUC (in terms of its functioning, especially regarding DDRRR) did not meet the requirements for a UN force as envisaged by the signatories of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement. The expectations of the signatories regarding DDRRR were not realistic, but the UN response in terms of the mandate and allocation of resources also fell far below what was required to establish a credible UN peace mission. The graduated approach ensured a reactive MONUC posture in the field, but the reticence to provide adequate resources in response to political and operational developments necessitated the external augmentation of the mission on two occasions. While this development brought a new facet of ‘co-deployment’ in UN peacekeeping operations to he fore, it also served to highlight the MONUC deficiencies in terms of its ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians under threat of violence. MONUC was mandated from its inception to discharge this responsibility, without receiving the necessary resources to enable the conduct of operations to protect civilians. This inability resulted in the mission lacking credibility amongst the population of the DRC. Copyright / Dissertation (MSS)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Political Sciences / MSS / Unrestricted

La promotion de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité est un objectif fondamental de l’Union africaine, l’Organisation continentale panafricaine. Cet objectif constitue désormais une fonction juridique essentielle pour laquelle a été mise en place au sein de l’Organisation un mécanisme approprié : l’architecture de paix et de sécurité (APSA). Bâtie sur une articulation juridique actualisée, au cœur de laquelle se trouve le Conseil de paix et de sécurité, cette fonction se trouve placée dans des conditions juridiques, devant permettre à l’Union africaine d’agir efficacement dans les situations d’atteinte à la paix, à la sécurité et à la stabilité. Plus d’une décennie après la mise en place de la nouvelle Organisation, le caractère fondamental de cette fonction pousse dès lors à s’interroger sur sa place exacte, à la lumière des capacités de l’Organisation à l’assurer à l’épreuve des faits. Cette interrogation éclaire les conditions d’émergence de la fonction mais place sa dynamique de mise en oeuvre dans un contexte ambivalent marqué tout à la fois par le caractère extensif des compétences de l’Organisation dans ce domaine mais également par la portée limitée de celle-ci face à la multiplication des conflits. / The Promotion of Peace, security and stability is a fundamental objective of the African Union, the Pan African continental organization. This aim is a now a core legal function for which has been established an appropriate scheme within the Organization: the Architecture of Peace and Security in Africa (APSA). Within an updated legal articulation, at the heart of which is the Peace and Security Council, this function is placed in legal conditions that must allow the African Union to act effectively in the cases of breach of peace, security and stability. More than a decade after the establishment of the new organization, the fundamental nature of this function, pushes therefore to question its proper place, in light of the capacity of the Organization to ensure it, at the facts test. This question illuminates emergence conditions of this function but identifies also an ambivalent dynamic in its implementation, marked at once by the extensive nature of the competences of the Organization in this area but its limited scope when facing increasing conflicts.