[Abstract]: China’s enormous size and stature as a new hub of economic growth in tandem with its military modernisation make China a rising power. The strategic consequences of China’s economic growth synergised with its military muscles are multiple and profound, especially, for the neighbours in its conflict-prone periphery. The aim of this dissertation is not only to assess the importance and complexities of conflicts in the periphery of China, but also about the necessity for the neighbours to coexist with a more powerful China. At the same time, in the Chinese geopolitical context, domestic stability and hence, the CCP’s legitimacy has been perpetually paramount, and external threats or conflicts are usually perceived in the context of aggravating domestic and international stability, thereby hampering its strategic aim of achieving global economic command and power-projection military capability.With the dawn of 21st century, China is grooving to an exuberant global beat, the intensity of conflicts along China’s periphery has dimmed to such an extent that its political, economic, and social order will probably not disintegrate into chaos in the near future. Instead, China’s rapidly growing economic capacity and its soaring prestige in faraway capitals like Washington and Paris has meant an expansion of Chinese “soft power”, i.e., an assertive China with an ability to get what it wants by attracting and persuading others to adopt its goals, instead of blunt economic and military coercion. And, China could reasonably be expected to manage most, if not all, the conflicts in its periphery to its own advantage. These include: efforts to augment its military capabilities in a manner commensurate with its increased economic muscle and acquire new allies and underwrite the protection of others in its periphery. It is unlikely that the PRC will actually acquire new or reclaim old territory for China’s resources or for symbolic reasons by penalizing, if necessary, any opponents or bystanders who resist such claims. While it may wish to redress past wrongs it believes to have suffered; or attempt to rewrite the prevailing international “rules of game” to better reflect its own geostrategic interests; or in the most extreme policy choice, perhaps even ready itself for preventive war or to launch predatory attacks on its foes on the pretext of the “cult of defence,” – all of which have been seen as the bedrock of the contemporary China’s strategic culture, however, it is iiprobable that China will not pursue these at the cost of its future economic and/or social security agenda.

The main concern of this thesis is the development of political and economic relations between the PRC and the KSA. The relations that officially developed after the establishment of diplomatic relations are the focus of analysis of the thesis. By examining the historical and statistical data, the thesis assesses the factors that have cultivated and maintained the Sino-Saudi political and economic relations, as well as the implications of these bilateral links. In analysing the relations, a theoretical conception of complex interdependence has been used. The thesis first provides background on China’s policy towards the superpowers and the Middle Eastern countries between 1949 and 1989, and looks at how China and Saudi Arabia related to each other over this period. The thesis then argues that over the first decade (1990-2000) of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations, the two countries began to lay the basis for complex interdependence between them. It highlights a number of characteristics of complex interdependence which came to exist. The thesis then goes on to examine whether, in the second decade (2001-2010) of bilateral relations, an intensification of complex interdependence ensued. The complex interdependence approach links closely with constructivist theory in terms of how this thesis is conceived. The thesis argues that China and Saudi Arabia between 1949 and 1977 shared an understanding that their ideological positions made official links between them impossible. Over the course of the following twelve years, this understanding gradually changed. The change laid the basis for the development of diplomatic relations in 1990. In the years between 1990 and 2010, the policy responses of China and Saudi Arabia to major regional events exhibited a commonality of perception. This underpinned the development of the relationship. To identify clearly the growth of Sino-Saudi relations, the thesis is divided into three time periods: 1949-89; 1990-2000; and 2001-10. The time period 1949-89 has three distinct phases: 1949-65; 1966-77; and 1978-89. The 1949-65 and 1966-97 periods are characterised by the absence of state-to-state relations between the PRC and the KSA. However, unofficial contact between Muslims on mainland China and Saudi officials and leaders was established and largely maintained. State-to-state contact only existed between the KSA and ROC governments, which shared broadly anti-Communist sentiments. During the 1978-89 phase, hope for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the KSA was high. Some intergovernmental contact was initiated, direct communications between the leaders of the two countries were enhanced, and a joint endeavour towards the development of diplomatic ties was pursued. The 1988 missile deal smoothly accelerated the process of developing these ties. In the 1990-2000 phase, four decades after the establishment of the PRC, Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations were established. The establishment of these diplomatic relations was daunting for the ROC, which wanted to preserve the diplomatic recognition that the KSA had granted it for the preceding 45 years. The strenuous efforts of the ROC to prevent a dramatic shift of diplomatic recognition to mainland China were in vain. The 1990-2000 phase was marked by significant growth in the newly established Riyadh-Beijing diplomatic relationship. Economic interests were at the heart of the agendas of the leaders and officials of the two countries. They began to enhance co-operation and to sign agreements related to various aspects of their bilateral relations. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Oil Co-operation was concluded in 1999. The value of Sino-Saudi total trade rose by 643 percent between 1990 and 2000 and the volume of Saudi oil exports to China increased by 6,721 percent between 1991 and 2000. After nearly ten years official diplomatic relations were established, President Jiang Zemin viewed the development of bilateral relations as impressive, while Crown Prince Abdullah seemed to suggest that there was now “an intimate relationship” between the two countries, saying that he considered the PRC to be the KSA’s closest friend. The period 2001-10 is also sub-divided into two phases: 2001-05 and 2006-10. This period exhibits the three characteristics of complex interdependence that Keohane and Nye (2000) put forward in their scholarly work: multiple channels, the minimal role of military force, and the absence of a hierarchy of issues. Security issues were largely excluded from Sino-Saudi bilateral relations, while economic interests dominated the agendas of the two countries. In the first phase (2001-05), high-level officials continued to play a leading role in bilateral economic relations. They consistently called for the participation of the private sector in expanding Riyadh-Beijing economic ties. The value of Sino-Saudi total trade continued to climb, reaching USD16.1bn in 2005, and the PRC’s oil imports from the KSA reached 22.2 million tonnes in the same year. Some joint investment projects that involved the participation of Chinese and Saudi companies in the hydrocarbons sector were successful. With regard to the construction industry, Chinese companies won four construction projects from the Saudi Arabian cement industry. The second phase (2006-10) was marked by substantial advancement in Sino-Saudi relations. Following the exchange visits of the state leaders in 2006, bilateral contacts expanded rapidly. The visits led to the formulation of more strategies, with the intention of cementing the relationship, increasing contact and concluding more agreements. The Chinese leaders called for “strategic co-operation”, “a friendly and co-operative strategic partnership”, and “strategic friendly relations”, specifically referring to economic co-operation. This second phase saw Sino-Saudi total trade increase to USD 33bn in 2009, and the volume of PRC oil imports from the KSA reached a peak of 41.8million barrels in the same year. With regard to the hydrocarbons joint ventures, in which investments were jointly made by Saudi ARAMCO and Sinopec, the projects in Quanzhou and Rub’ Al-Khali were good examples of the strong co-operation between PRC and KSA companies. The Quanzhou plant launched operation in 2009, and the gas-exploration project in Rub’Al-Khali engaged in drilling for another three years (its operation began in 2004). The achievement of SINOPEC SABIC Tianjin Petrochemical Co., Ltd, as part of the Tianjin petrochemical project, is another example of such co-operation. In non-hydrocarbons joint ventures, mutual investment increased exponentially, particularly in the mining sector.

This thesis deals with the issue of actual state of bilateral relations between the EU and the PRC. The aim of this thesis is to answer question, whether diversity of actorness which occurs in cooperation between the EU and the PRC affects current form and content of their bilateral relations. The theoretical part applies two different approaches to the topic of actorness --theories of international relations and the theory of international law. The empirical part is based on an analysis of particular primary documents, adopted by these two parties. At first is performed an analysis of the EU external relations with the PRC in terms of their historical development which is followed by SWOT analysis which determines current content and form of their bilateral relationship. Based on research findings from this SWOT analysis the thesis suggests ten recommendations for EU-PRC relationship.