Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Subject: This study attempts to determine whether Air Component Commands are capable of developing effective airpower strategy. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed Jan. 31, 2006). "June 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-67). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Daniel Moran. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-67). Also available online.

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This dissertation seeks to explain why states sometimes produce disintegrated wartime grand strategies; doing so is of both scholarly and policy importance because wartime grand strategy is a key component of military effectiveness, and therefore has a vital role to play in military victory or defeat. To do so, this dissertation explores the link between militarism, civil-military bargaining, and the formation of integrated—or disintegrated—grand strategy. I hypothesize that civilians and military leaders possess divergent preferences over the use of force that are exogenous to any one conflict, and represent enduring, rational preference divergences between civilian and military positions on the use of force. Under conditions of militarism, defined as high levels of societal admiration for the military, the civil-military bargaining space will be distorted in favor of military preferences, with the military having more power in the civil-military negotiating process due to its potentially outsized ability to shape public opinion compared to civilians. This will lead to the formation of disintegrated grand strategy—one which does not balance civilian and military preferences—which has been shown in the literature to be linked to reduced military effectiveness. I provide evidence for my hypotheses in the form of two case studies which are examined via process-tracing methodology—the United States performance in the 1991 Gulf War, and the United States performance in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I conclude that under conditions of militarism, states produce disintegrated wartime grand strategies.

The origins of the just war theory date back to medieval times, with the early Catholic scholars, Augustine and Aquinas, and have continued into modem times, with revisions of the theory by Elshtain and Walzer. So why is a new just war theory needed? The primary problem with the old theories is not the concept of the theory itself, but the questions that prior theories of just war leave unanswered. The just war theory of today continues to be unspecific, and does not deal with contemporary issues, such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and discrimination between combatants and noncombatants in an age of airborne warfare. In the years since September 11 th, and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq sans the support of the United Nations, the concept of the just war has gained prominence in political theory and commentary. In a twofold manner, this thesis deals with the problems left unanswered by current just war theory. First, a new just war theory is proposed, which addresses many of the abovementioned issues that remain unsolved by former theories. Second, this theory is tested through application to the 1991 Persian Gulf War; the decade after the war in which economic sanctions were placed against Iraq; and the three-year period directly after the September 11th attacks, in which the world again entered into conflict with Iraq. The classic just war theory template is used, with the war and the decade-long period following it classified under the traditional jus ad bellum (just cause ),jus in bello (just conduct), and conclusion categories. The post September 11th period is dealt with using the jus ad bellum template, as a precursor to the 2003 Iraq War. This thesis tests the applicability of the new just war theory in the face of modem wartime considerations, such as advanced weapons technology, wartime military conduct, military occupation, and civilian welfare. The new just war theory has been designed to take these issues into consideration, and as such, it accommodates the just limitations of war (what a state can and cannot do in the course of a conflict), while still defining what is and is not a just cause to go to war. There is also new consideration given to the conclusion of the war, and specifically, the rights and responsibilities of both the occupied and the occupying parties, as well as the issue of rebuilding and recovery in the country or countries involved in the conflict. These are considerations that are new to war, and were not considered previous to the past century of conflict. As such, older just war theories do not adequately discuss these responsibilities, and the new theory strives to fill this gap.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2009. / Adviser: Terri Fine. Includes bibliographical references (p. 120-123).

Thesis (M.A.A.S.) -- Air University, 2004. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on April 24, 2009). "June 2004." Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-91).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.