The aim of this paper is to analyze Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar in the Middle Period. The paper examines the thesis that grammar is not responsible for reality. It investigates the role that rules play in this context and how they determine meaning. Special focus shall be put on arbitrary rules. Therefore, we shall develop a thesis of vagueness with special emphasis on perspicuous representation. / Este trabajo analiza la propuesta wittgensteiniana acerca de la gramática filosófica en el período intermedio. Se estudia la tesis general de que la gramática no es responsable de la realidad. Seguidamente, se analiza el papel que juegan las reglas y cómo determinan el significado. Se indaga acerca del papel arbitrario de las reglas. Para ello se desarrolla la tesis de la vaguedad y el papel que juega la representación perspicua.

The aim of the work is to present the possibilities of ethics in late Wittgensteinian framework. In course of the investigation will be presented: (1) early Wittgensteinian ethics, (2) late Wittgensteinian anti-foundationalism and (3) its consequences for analytical meta-ethics - it will be argued (a) against epistemologization of ethics and (b) for need of more complex understanding of ethics, by which traditional meta-ethical disputes of realism with anti-realism and of cognitivism with non-cognitivism will be overcame -, which will result in (4) development of late Wittgensteinian ethics. Ethics will be presented as consisting in ethical ways of seeing of the world, through which various phenomena arise as ethically relevant and late Wittgensteinian ethical investigation will be developed as clarification, cultivation and enrichment of our ethical ways of seeing in overall - partially subjective and partially intersubjective - context of language, life forms and life stories from which they arise. Keywords Ethics, meta-ethics, Wittgenstein, anti-foundationalism, truth in ethics, aspect seeing, perspicuous representation, ethics as clarification, life forms