acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

I argue here that contractual theories model moral reasoning, and more specifically, they model empathy. Contractual theories aim for hypothetical agreement, and this project requires the identification of reasons that are suitable for the public justification of principles to guide interaction. Thus, the kind of reasoning that contractual theories model is empathetic reasoning and empathetic choice. I defend 'modular' view of empathy that emphasizes both the cognitive and affective features and processes of empathy. Empathy involves appreciating another person's emotion, which is to say it involves an affective understanding of another person's evaluations (by recognizing her feelings and thoughts as justified from her perspective) but not necessarily approving of that person's evaluations. The kind of empathy relevant to contractual theories is the perspective-taking kind. I distinguish between immersed, projective, and dual perspective empathy as the kind that are modeled in contract theories The last three chapters illustrate how the contract theories of Rawls, Harsanyi, and Gauthier model empathy. Each of these theories use what I call an IRC (an idealized rational choice circumstance) to explain why a rational agent would agree to the principles. I argue that the deliberations of such an agent model empathy, though they are not equivalent to our empathizing, which we do when we take up the perspective of an IRC. I show how Gauthier's Archimedean Point models projective empathy, for the rational agent takes up each person's perspective as a rational agent. But contractualism justifies morality from the perspective of 'rational agency' that people must 'identify with,' and this conflicts with the perspective of moral reasoning. The rational agent in Harsayi's IRC, the equiprobability model, uses projective and immersed empathy to make interpersonal comparisons of utility which are required for calculating overall average utility. The constraints on Rawls' Original Position generate the requirement of reasonableness, which means that the deliberations of the parties model dual perspective empathy, not benevolence (as Rawls suggests). The Original Position constraints require us to empathize with (not be benevolent to) others when we take up the perspective of the contractors in the Original Position / acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

One of the most important of factors in the experienced world is value. Whitehead accordingly grants it a central place in his categoreal scheme. However, Whitehead and the Whiteheadians have been nonexplicit in the interpretation of the concrete moral situation which dominates our daily lives The thesis of my dissertation is that Stephen Pepper has offered the outlines of an ethics qualified to fill this gap in Process Philosophy. The system advanced is the ethical theory contained in Pepper's works The Sources of Value and Ethics, the Social Adjustment Theory It is demonstrated that this theory has important logical connections to the process metaphysics outlined in Process and Reality and the Whiteheadian axiological cosmology found in Neville's The Cosmology of Freedom In the final suggestion of an ethic for process metaphysics, The Social Adjustment Theory is expanded with God conceived as the ultimate selective system, a possibility which Pepper had envisioned, and one which accords with Whitehead's Theological Cosmology / acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu

acase@tulane.edu