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The Promise and Limits of Natural Normativity in a Neo-Aristotelian Virtue EthicsClewell, Timothy J. 15 April 2011 (has links)
In this thesis I distinguish between two conceptions of naturalism that have been offered as possible starting points for a virtue based ethics. The first version of naturalism is characterized by Philippa Foot’s project in Natural Goodness. The second version of naturalism can be found, in various forms, among the works of John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Rosalind Hursthouse. I argue that neither naturalistic approach is entirely successful on its own, but that we can fruitfully carve a path between both approaches that points the way to a positive ethical account. I then conclude with a brief sketch of what such a positive account of a virtue ethics may look like.
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The Metaphysics of GoodnessBerman Chan (10711287) 06 May 2021 (has links)
What is it for something to be good? Using the example
of an Ebola-like microbe, I argue that a merely kind-based account of goodness
is defective (Chapter 1). I offer instead an account that is both kind-based
and platonic (Chapter 2). On such an account, goodness turns out to be
non-natural (Chapter 3). However, non-naturalists can explain why the goodness
of an individual supervenes on its natural properties, by appealing to the
essence of the kind to which it belongs (Chapter 4).
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