Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1985. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 433-459).

M.A. / This thesis assumes three main objectives: Firstly, the author recognises the problematic status of Henry Odera Oruka's classification of the Trends African philosophy. Oruka's classification displays inherent presuppositions that are recognised as being damaging to the discourse of African philosophy. The main problems that are highlighted with respect to Oruka's classification can be summarised as follows: The assumption of a linear pattern, presenting the Trend of Ethnophilosophy as the lowest station in the classification by virtue of its "traditional" manifestation, assuming thereby that philosophy in Africa is "developing", in an evolutionary manner, into a higher, more Western-like paradigm. The classification is recognised as being simplistic in form, thereby not allowing an interval for growth or dynamism. The designations of various of the Trends are recognised as being problematic. Oruka's exclusion of two significant Trends is critically addressed. In view of the problematic nature of Oruka's classification, a suggestion as to the revised classification of the discourse is made. Secondly, the author has recognised problems pertaining to the commonly assumed interpretation of African philosophy. She thus contextualizes the Trends in African philosophy in relation to the history of the African continent, specifically in terms of colonialism and the intellectual justifications given by the thinkers of the Enlightenment to the colonialist movement. In considering the various manifestations of the Trends, the author deems it significant to note that each of the Trends reacts and responds to the debased assumptions of the colonialist movement, and asserts the propensity of the African mind in reaction to the European assumptions of African intellectual backwardness, which served as the justification for the colonialist domination of Africa. In relation to the reactionary nature of African philosophy as discourse, the author recognises a further attribute, that of the reformationary capacity of African philosophy in relation to the injurious effects of colonialism on the African continent. Through its reformatory capacity, African philosophy addresses and attempts to reform the debilitating effects of colonialism on the African mind, namely the crises of inferiority, identity and alienation. In order to achieve its effectiveness as a philosophy of liberation, the author suggests the creative negotiation of modern and traditional modes of being.In the third instance, the author considers whether there are not significant definitional forms of philosophy which emanate from the African discourse. In this, the author recognises that each of the Trends presents its own unique definition of what philosophy is, and how philosophy should be interpreted if it is to be regarded as African. Ethnophilosophy and Sage Philosophy are recognised as presenting a traditional, that is, indigenous form of philosophy. Universalist Philosophy is recognised as emanating from the Western discourse, and presents African philosophy with a universalist definition of philosophy. Negritude and African Political Philosophy are recognised as presenting a philosophical perspective that engenders an emancipatory frame of mind. Hermeneutical African Philosophy utilises the concepts of "deconstruction" and "reconstruction" in order to "decolonize", that is, rid the African mind of the debilitating effects of colonialist subjugation, domination and suppression.

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (by Coursework & Research Report) in Philosophy, Johannesburg, 2017 / This research aims to indicate the sense in which African conceptions of personhood can be considered gendered, ableist and anti-queer. In making the case for this, I look at the Force Thesis, Shadow Thesis and Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “normative conception of persons”. I argue that each of these theories marginalizes at least one of the categories of gender, people with disabilities or queer people in their account of personhood. Therefore, I conclude that they should be rejected as plausible theories of personhood insofar as it can be argued that inclusive theories of personhood are preferable. Namely, theories of personhood that consider gender, people with disabilities and queer people. / XL2018

No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

Panel 1. Penser avec Cheikh Anta Diop / Eyene Essono Auguste -- Panel 2. Diaspora kémite / Léandre Serge Moyen -- Panel 3. L'exégète-lire et faire lire / Benjamin Ngadi -- Panel 4. Parole du poème / Taba Odounga Didier -- Panel 5. Paroles d'intellectuels / Ibraima Diakhaby -- Panel 6. Tensions et controverses / Eyene Essono Auguste. / "Cahier de l'Institut Cheikh Anata Diop." Includes bibliographical references (p. 114-[117]).

Panel 1. Penser avec Cheikh Anta Diop / Eyene Essono Auguste -- Panel 2. Diaspora kémite / Léandre Serge Moyen -- Panel 3. L'exégète-lire et faire lire / Benjamin Ngadi -- Panel 4. Parole du poème / Taba Odounga Didier -- Panel 5. Paroles d'intellectuels / Ibraima Diakhaby -- Panel 6. Tensions et controverses / Eyene Essono Auguste. / "Cahier de l'Institut Cheikh Anata Diop." Includes bibliographical references (p. 114-[117]).

This thesis attempts to reconcile Western and African philosophy with specific reference to the issues of rationality, culture and communitarianism. It also discusses the post-Enlightenment, Western philosophical concept of liberal "atomism" and the primacy of the individual and the emergence of a communitarian critique in response. This thesis intends exploring how Western notions of individuality and the communitarian response can be reconciled with contemporary African philosophy and African communitarian thought in particular. To do this, it is necessary to explore the problem of liberal individualism and how African communitarianism might reinforce the Western communitarian critique. African communitarianism has a processual understanding of personhood that underpins its conception of the Self. In contrast to this view, Western communitarianism has a relational conception of the individual Self. Thus, this thesis argues that African communitarianism has a more profound understanding of the constitution of the Self. To demonstrate these claims, this study discusses notions of rationality which inform each of the philosophical traditions. This will enable a comparative analysis of the above-mentioned philosophical traditions with the intention of uncovering the concepts that provide the platform for their reconciliation.

In this dissertation I sketch a conception of personhood as understood from within an Afrocommunitarian worldview, and argue that this understanding of personhood has implications for understanding the concept of reconciliation. Understanding ‘being human’ as a collective, communal enterprise has implications for how responsibility, justice, forgiveness and humanization (all cognate concepts of reconciliation) are conceptualized. In line with this understanding of reconciliation and its cognate concepts, I argue that the humanization of self and other (according to the Afrocommunitarian understanding of personhood) is required for addressing the ‘inferiority’ and concurrent ‘superiority’ racial complexes as diagnosed by Franz Fanon and Steve Biko. These complexes reach deeply within individual and collective psyches and political identities, and I argue that political solutions to protracted conflict (in South Africa and other racially charged contexts) which do not address these deeply entrenched pathologies will be inadequate according to an Afrocommunitarian framework.

<p>In 1998 the University of the Western Cape together with the University of Cape Town, and the Robben Island Museum introduced a Post-graduate Diploma in Museum and Heritage Studies. This programme was innovative in that not only did it bring together two universities in a programme where the inequalities of resources derived from their apartheid legacies was recognised, but it also formally incorporated an institution of public culture that was seeking to make a substantial imprint in the post-apartheid heritage sphere as part of its structure. In 2003 this programme attracted substantial funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and was rebranded as the African Program in Museum and Heritage Studies (APMHS). While this rebranding of the programme might seem to be innocently unproblematic and commendable as part of the effort at re-insertion of South Africa into Africa after the isolation of apartheid, an analysis of the concepts employed in the rebranding raises serious theoretical, conceptual, and disciplinary questions for heritage studies as an academic discipline and for its connections with other fields, especially the interdisciplinary study of Africa. What are the implications of a programme that brings together the concepts of ʹAfrican-Heritage-Studiesʹ? Does the rebranding signify a major epistemological positioning in the study of Africa or has it chosen to ignore debates on the problematic of the conjunction of the concepts? This study address these issues through a historical and philosophical analysis of the programme, exploring how it was developed both in relation to ideas of heritage and heritage studies in Africa and, most importantly by re-locating it in debates on the changing meaning of&nbsp / ʹAfricaʹ in African studies.</p>

<p>In 1998 the University of the Western Cape together with the University of Cape Town, and the Robben Island Museum introduced a Post-graduate Diploma in Museum and Heritage Studies. This programme was innovative in that not only did it bring together two universities in a programme where the inequalities of resources derived from their apartheid legacies was recognised, but it also formally incorporated an institution of public culture that was seeking to make a substantial imprint in the post-apartheid heritage sphere as part of its structure. In 2003 this programme attracted substantial funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and was rebranded as the African Program in Museum and Heritage Studies (APMHS). While this rebranding of the programme might seem to be innocently unproblematic and commendable as part of the effort at re-insertion of South Africa into Africa after the isolation of apartheid, an analysis of the concepts employed in the rebranding raises serious theoretical, conceptual, and disciplinary questions for heritage studies as an academic discipline and for its connections with other fields, especially the interdisciplinary study of Africa. What are the implications of a programme that brings together the concepts of ʹAfrican-Heritage-Studiesʹ? Does the rebranding signify a major epistemological positioning in the study of Africa or has it chosen to ignore debates on the problematic of the conjunction of the concepts? This study address these issues through a historical and philosophical analysis of the programme, exploring how it was developed both in relation to ideas of heritage and heritage studies in Africa and, most importantly by re-locating it in debates on the changing meaning of&nbsp / ʹAfricaʹ in African studies.</p>