<p> In <i>Surviving Death</i>, Mark Johnston claims we can trace the persistence of others and ourselves in simple and offhand ways that are criterionless--that do not depend on the use of sufficient conditions for cross-time identity. According to Johnston, we offload the question of persistence onto substances. Furthermore, Johnston claims, if we are able to trace others and ourselves by way of offloading, then neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity fail. According to Johnston, personal identity depends on how concern is directed rather than psychological continuity. </p><p> In this thesis, I respond to Johnston's arguments against neo-Lockeanism presented in <i>Surviving Death</i>. I argue that Johnston's account of offloading misinterprets research in cognitive science and developmental psychology. While we may trace some objects non-conceptually, it is implausible that we could trace persons in the manner Johnston claims. In addition, I argue that Johnston's concern based account of personal identity is problematic. </p>

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-11, Section: A, page: 4727. Adviser: Jonathan Waskan. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-269) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université de Sherbrooke (Canada), 2008. / Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 1 février 2007). In ProQuest dissertations and theses. Publié aussi en version papier.