Thesis--Washington University. / Microfilm of typescript. Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms, 1975. 35 mm. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 286-294).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 260-266). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (MA)(CrWrtg)--University of Melbourne, School of Culture and Communication, Faculty of Arts, 2009. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (p. 85-88)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / Typescript. Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 299-307).

Thesis (Honors)--University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 364-371).

No description available.

Gregory Vlastos claims that in the Gorgias Socrates is confident that the elenchos is the only and the final arbiter of moral truth. Traditionally, the object of elenchos has been viewed as not one of moral truth, but one of simply revealing to Socratic interlocutors confusions and muddles within themselves, thereby jarring their unquestioning adherence to some moral dogma. On Vlastos' view, however, Socrates claims that he proves by elenchos that an interlocutor's thesis is false. How can he, when in point of logic all he has proved is that the thesis is inconsistent with the agreed-upon premises in that argument whose truth Socrates does not undertake to establish? While Vlastos attempts to solve what he calls "the problem of elenchos" with all the ingenuity that we have come to expect from him, I argue that there are two major obstacles in his way. First, elenchos is not the only arbiter of moral truth in the Gorgias Socrates has a number of other reasons for believing certain things, but according to Vlastos, Socrates looks to elenchos, and to nothing but that, for the truth of his beliefs. I argue that, first, Vlastos' characterization of elenchos is unsatisfactory, for on his criteria it is difficult to distinguish it from other kinds of arguments. This in turn seriously hampers a proper evaluation of elenctic arguments. I then show that at least in this dialogue Socrates has certain religious beliefs that he holds without relying on elenchos, and so elenchos is not the only avenue for acquiring moral knowledge. Under Vlastos' correcting lenses, Socrates emerges also as a morally upright philosopher who would never knowingly conduct fallacious arguments. I argue that Socrates cheats at elenchos, and he does so in order to win over his interlocutors. I conclude that because of certain assumptions Vlastos makes about the character of the model philosopher and the model method, he exaggerates the strength of elenchos. If I am right, the Gorgias is witness to, not the power of elenchos as Vlastos would have us believe, but its limitations.

Thesis (MA (English))-University of Pretoria, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

In this project, I focus on the function of the "amtal" or test of definition or destruction, in Frank Herbert's Dune. It is my argument that these tests "to destruction" determine not only the limits or defects of the person being tested, but also - and more crucially - the very limits and defects of the definition of humanity in three specific cultural spheres within the novel: the Bene Gesserit, the Fremen, and the Faufreluches. The definitions of "amtal" as well as "humanity," like all definitions, are somewhat fluid, changing depending on usage, cultural context, and the political and social needs of the society which uses them. Accordingly, Dune remains an instructive text for thinking through contemporary and controversial notions about the limits of humanism and, consequently, of animalism and posthumanism. / by Adella Irizarry. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2013. / Includes bibliography. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / System requirements: Adobe Reader.