Diss.--Universität Hamburg. / Bibliography: p. 176-180.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Madras.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 1999. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 266-269). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR51734

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, 2017 / Any comprehensive theory of the realist position in metaethics must be equipped with a version of moral ontology. Metaethical theological voluntarism, which purports that supernatural facts, i.e. commands issued by a divine being, determine moral states of affairs, has been accused for a long time of rendering morality ‘arbitrary’. Implicit in this widely-accepted objection is the idea that a moral theory cannot have an arbitrary ontological foundation because then anything could have been right or wrong. This paper gives a detailed analysis of this objection that theological voluntarism is arbitrary and makes the case that a commitment to avoiding arbitrariness imposes constraints on the formulation of a moral theory. In particular, this paper argues that accounting for such a commitment decreases the significance that natural facts play for moral theories that maintain a naturalist account of moral ontology. / XL2018

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 466-494). Online version available via Dissertation Abstracts.

This thesis is a study of some recent issues and arguments in the debate over freedom and determinism. Most of the philosophers whose work I examine are sympathetic to the doctrine known as compatibilism, according to which determinism poses no threat to the freedom of action. / In chapter I, the introduction, I discuss some basic notions and offer a brief survey of the discussion of freedom and determinism between 1930 and 1970. In chapter II, I examine an influential recent attack on the principle that an agent is responsible for his actions only if he could have done otherwise. In chapters III and IV, I discuss the emergence of explanation as a major issue in the free-will debate. In III, I criticize the claim that mechanistic explanations are compatible with intentional ones. I conclude by identifying some major outstanding problems.

The introduction deals with the state of philosophy and science at the time McKinney constructed his theory. It introduces McKinney, his books and their public reception to the reader. Chapter One closely follows the development of McKinney's arguments as he expounded them in his first philosophical work, “The Challenge of Reason”. Chapter Two outlines the challenge McKinney had convincing his audience that his theory was noteworthy. Chapter Three reflects the problems of the modern view of knowledge as described in Chapter One and examines its historical development commencing with Socrates. Chapter Four discusses the 'tension of temperaments', a fundamental aspect of McKinney's theory where individual differences have an important part to play in the initiating of original consciousness. Chapter Five asks the question: What is reason? Here I examine the concept of reason from many angles, especially those that infer reason is a Universal. Chapter Six focuses on modern science. Chapter Seven discusses the three phases of human evolution as McKinney describes them in “The Challenge of Reason”. Chapter Eight explores the topic of pain. Chapter Nine is related to aggression and follows on logically from the discussion of pain covered in the previous chapter. Chapter Ten is about amateur philosophy and deals with the attitude of philosophers and scientists towards knowledge. Chapter Eleven deals with the problem of language. Chapter Twelve deals with the modern crisis of feeling and thought. It attempts to observe how McKinney's theory might extend to the everyday world. Chapter Thirteen is my last word on the subject of McKinney's philosophy. It is a brief personal expression of what I think McKinney is attempting to say. I have included an appendix, which expresses McKinney's ideas, mostly using his own words. / Thesis (PhD)--University of South Australia, 2005.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2008. / Title from title screen (viewed February 23, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of Studies in Religion, Faculty of Arts. Degree awarded 2008; thesis submitted 2007. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis--Munich. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 406-422) and index.