Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-06, Section: A, page: 2487. Adviser: Richard L. Schacht. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 276-281) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

This dissertation examines the relationship between the concepts of ethics and politics in political theory. It does so by asking how conceptions of subjectivity result in formulations of ethics and politics and what this means for how ethics and politics relate to one another. It identifies two major trends in political theory: The prioritization of ethics over politics, and the prioritization of politics over ethics. It identifies Kant and Rawls as exhibiting the former trend and Marx and Arendt as exhibiting the second trend. Parts I and II deal with these two trends, respectively. In each it is shown that when a theory of the political either ethics or politics is placed in a position of primacy over the other, i.e., when one concept is defined as merely subordinate to, or derivative of, its compliment concept, this results in internal tensions that undermine the stated aims of that theory of the political. Part III claims that Levinas offers an alternative formulation of the relationship between ethics and politics. What sets Levinas apart from the preceding theoretical accounts is the dual character of the subject as ethically and politically responsible. The subject between ethics and politics is, then, the active location of the interplay between ethics and politics. Their relation is found in the active, embodied political subject.

<p> The mental causation literature tends towards certain presuppositions, including the tacit endorsement of physicalism, causal closure, and reductionism. Insofar as justification for these philosophical positions is offered at all, it is typically claimed that they are grounded in actual scientific practice. However, there are good reasons to believe that actual science does not support these philosophical positions. In this work, I consider some reasons to deny physicalism and causal closure, and critically present and evaluate pluralistic alternatives to reductionism. In light of this discussion, the problem of mental causation takes on an interesting and promising new form. </p>

published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

One of the distinctive ideas of contemporary liberal political philosophy is that the separateness of persons is somehow normatively momentous. A proper respect for separateness is supposed to lead us not only to reject aggregative theories such as utilitarianism, but to embrace some particular positive theory about the sorts of obligations and claims we have amongst each other. Typically, philosophers have focused on the way in which the separateness of persons is important to matters of distribution. Given the intuitively unjust distributions often sanctioned by utilitarianism, such a focus makes sense. Much of the contribution of my dissertation, however, is to argue that separateness is relevant not just as a fact about persons as beneficiaries, but perhaps even more fundamentally, as agents. Chapter one explores the connection between respect for the separateness of persons and liberal theory, with reference to the cases of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Chapter two defends the reasonableness of respect for separateness against the metaphysical critique of Derek Parfit. Chapters three and four spell out the main idea of respect for separateness as agents. Chapter five examines applies this analysis to free markets, and argues that while separateness provides some grounds for criticizing markets, it also provides some interesting, non-efficiency based grounds for praising them.

I am currently enjoying a number of experiences: I can hear the sound of a dog barking in the distance, I can feel the pressure of my feet on the floor, and I can smell freshly brewed coffee. These experiences don't simply occur at the same time, they also seem to be unified in a certain way. More generally, it is often said that consciousness is necessarily unified. This claim raises three questions: (1) What exactly does it mean? (2) Is it true? (3) What implications does it have? Chapters one and two are concerned with the first question: what does it mean to say that consciousness is unified? I develop a conception of the unity of consciousness that is both substantive and plausible. I call this conception the "unity thesis". Roughly, the unity thesis says that any pair of experiences that a single subject of experience has at the same time must be contained within a single fully unified phenomenal field: they must have a conjoint phenomenology. Chapters three and four are concerned with the second question: Is consciousness necessarily unified? In chapter three I tentatively endorse an inconceivability-based argument for thinking that they are not. Of course, a priori arguments against the possibility of disunified subjects must be weighed against empirical considerations. In chapter four I examine the evidence for thinking that some people actually are disunified subjects, focusing mostly on the split-brain syndrome. I argue that empirical arguments against the unity thesis are inconclusive. Chapters five and six are concerned with the third question: what implications does the unity of consciousness have? In chapter five I argue that the unity thesis places constraints on our account of state consciousness: if the unity thesis is true, then certain influential accounts of consciousness are false. In chapter six I argue that the unity thesis also constrains our account of the self: if the unity thesis is true, then we need to think of the self in phenomenal terms.

A common criticism of global institutions is that their rules disproportionately favor the political and economic interests of powerful states over those of weaker states. This dissertation consists of three essays that each deal with a specific application of the criticism. In the first essay, I examine the question of whether international human rights law should include a human right to democracy. Joshua Cohen and Charles Beitz offer two kinds of argument for thinking that it should not. First, protecting a human right to democracy would permit outsiders to intervene in domestic political arrangements in objectionable ways. Second, democracy presupposes a conception of persons as equals that cannot be shared internationally. I argue that both these arguments would prove too much: they would rule out from the human rights corpus rights that clearly seem to be human rights. Building on this conclusion, I offer a positive argument for recognizing a human right to democracy. In the second essay, I explore the objection that global economic institutions sustain unacceptable degrees of inequality. On one skeptical response, the rules of global economic institutions are justifiable insofar as states have consented to them. I argue that specific features of global economic institutions make this view implausible. I then articulate several reasons for thinking that inequalities sanctioned by global economic institutions are objectionable. It turns out that the prominent philosophical debate on whether Rawlsian egalitarianism should be globalized addresses one but not the other of these reasons. In the third essay, I examine the practice of universal jurisdiction, which allows states to exercise jurisdiction over a narrow range of international law violations regardless of where, by whom, or against whom the violations occur. On the standard justification for this exceptional category of jurisdiction, what makes the exception justifiable is the moral heinousness of the relevant violations. This justification, I argue, can explain neither the narrow subject matter nor the expansive scope of universal jurisdiction. I offer an alternative justification on which universal jurisdiction is justifiable as a way of filling enforcement gaps to which some but not other international legal norms are prone. / Philosophy

Life is challenging. Philosophy is, among other things, a response to the challenges of life. Among the methods of philosophy is rational reflection on the nature of reality and the significance of life. This conceptual aspect of philosophy is very powerful, but it has its limitations. If correctly interpreted, it can be a great indicator of the way; if wrongly appreciated, it can be an obstacle to understanding. Concepts can reveal but they can also conceal. In particular, concepts can generate a mistaken view of the nature of the finite individual, a view in which the finite individual is supposed to be self-contained and independently real. In truth, supposed finite individuals are without concrete boundaries, and are dependent upon a larger reality. The Totality is the whole of this larger interdependent reality. The Totality is not a simple unity, but rather, an extended order of dependence. This order of dependence is the basis for the directionality of time and the openness of the future. Each moment is eternal, neither arising nor ceasing. Even so, since the earlier is independent of the later, the future, which is just the later relative to any moment, is not strictly determined. This means that creation is in a sense ongoing, and we all play a role in the making of reality. In recognizing the deep interconnectivity of reality, one sees one's ultimate non-difference from supposed others. Concern for others then arises spontaneously. This is the ultimate ground of ethics. Through recognizing and acting upon this truth, our deepest fulfillment and happiness is achieved.

This study examines the relationship between the frequency of technology use and the tendency of child welfare workers to exhibit engagement behaviors with their clients. This study was based on the premise that increased technology use is negatively associated with the quality of direct human interactions. The design of this study is descriptive and quantitative in nature. To identify and describe the potential relationships between demographic, technology use, and engagement variables, numerical data were collected through an anonymous 46-item survey. A multiple regression analysis approach was used to analyze the data gathered in this study. The researcher found that the frequency of technology use has no significant relationship with how participants perceive themselves as engaging their clients. An unexpected finding yielded by this study is that the child welfare workers under study utilize technology so frequently that it becomes apparent they have little time left to have direct client contact and consequently limited opportunities to engage clients. Taken together, these findings suggest that while technology use has no significant relationship with workers' tendency to exhibit engagement behaviors during client interactions, it may be negatively associated with the frequency of opportunities workers have to exhibit those behaviors.

This study examines the impact of welfare reform on Georgia Temporary Assistance to Needy Family (TANF) recipients’ labor force entry and self-sufficiency following passage of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act(PRWORA) of 1996. The study was based on the premise that the use of the cultural explanations of poverty theoretical framework was deficient in explaining the impact of welfare reform on Georgia TANF recipients’ and based on a review of the existing literature and the experiences of Georgia leaver cohorts at multiple time points. A longitudinal case study analysis approach was used to analyze data gathered from Georgia leaver studies from 1997 to 2007 to provide a secondary analysis of the impact of welfare reform on Georgia’s welfare recipients’ entry into the labor force, workforce attachment, household earnings and the ability to lift their families above the poverty level. The researcher found that the political-economic structure of poverty theories should be the theoretical framework used to explain how welfare reform has impacted Georgia’s TANP leavers following the passage of the PRWORA. This study’s findings and the researcher’s review of the literature reveal that in order for Georgia’s TANF population to maintain an acceptable standard of living, they will need access to job opportunities, expanded safety net programs, and increased wages which are strategies that are purported by political economic structural theorist. In turn, this information should be used to inform programmatic and policy changes that will best meet the needs of those transitioning into the labor force and self-sufficiency.