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Human society comes in contact with the physical environment in two ways: Through economic appropriation of physical resources and through the symbolic appropriation of nature. The two 'ways' interact via the various interpreters of nature, who as they define nature create cognitive means for the appropriation of physical resources. / Using the theory of social networks of power the thesis examines the above interplay of economic appropriation and symbolic manipulation of the physical environment from the Stone Age to the Hellenistic times in a series of civilisations in Eurasia. It reasons that as we move from the Stone Age to pristine civilisations we encounter two phenomena: first, a process of variation in nature's interpretation due to social stratification. Second, interpretation of nature becomes the subject matter of elite groups, the literati, firmly attached to political elites. Yet, with the advent of the Axial Age nature's interpreters become increasingly autonomous and use metaphors of nature as means to reflect on political and social issues of the day. In turn, as we can see in the case of ancient Greece, various political elites start to use particular readings of nature to consolidate their ideological position vis-a-vis their rivals. Thus, Axial Age ideologies about nature move from passive interpreters of what exists to dynamic advocates of what should exist. / Thus, the wisdom of the major schools of political ecology is contested in four major issues: First, there has never been a single reading of nature, but many co-existing in geographical and social proximity. Secondly, there is no specific time when nature lost its sacredness. Instead, we detect a steady withdrawal of the divine from the physical environment starting with the emergence of reflecting thinking. Thirdly, the development of nature's symbolic attributes lies not only in its relationship to politics, but also on the internal dynamics, strength and weakness, of the discourse in itself as well as on the organisational capabilities of particular schools of thought. Lastly, economic exploitation as such does not depend on specific readings of nature. Rather, it depends on technological advances, the nexus of political and ideological social networks of power.

My thesis examines Thomas Hobbes's attempt to develop a mathematical account of nature. I argue that Hobbes's conception of how we should think quantitatively about the world was deeply indebted to the ideas of his ancient and medieval predecessors. These ideas were often amenable to Hobbes's vision of a demonstrative, geometrically-based science. However, he was forced to adapt the ancient and medieval models to the demands of his own thoroughgoing materialism. This hybrid resulted in a distinctive, if only partially successful, approach to the problems of the new mechanical philosophy.

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In this thesis I investigate the relationship between 'I' as principle of transcendental philosophy and its ordinary use as first-personal pronoun. This relationship is a central issue in the philosophy of J. G. Fichte. Fichte was concerned to secure the gains made by Kant's Critique against what he called the 'dogmatism of the so-called Kantians' as well as against the attack of the skeptics, by grounding philosophy in a first principle which he called 'I'. To say what Fichte means by 'I' is to give an account of his philosophy, for, according to him, nothing is to be assumed outside of this 'I'. For Fichte the dogmatism of the 'so-called Kantians' consists in the idea that even when the formal conditions of experience have been established, a non-conceptualized content needs to be given to the mind from outside in order to produce empirical knowledge. This way of conceiving empirical constraints of thought, according to Fichte, threatens the results of Kant's critical philosophy, because it is inconsistent with the theoretical spontaneity and the practical autonomy that are crucial to Kant's conception of reason. Fichte argues that adequate empirical constraints can only be deduced from within the 'I'. To do this we must radically rethink our received concept of an 'I', a rethinking which in essence has already been effectuated by Kant, and which Fichte merely wants to make explicit and bring to fruition. Adequate constraints can be seen to be generated internally, once we realize that the standpoint of the 'theoretical I' is derivative from the standpoint of the 'practical I'. A result of Fichte's emphasis on the practical aspect of reason is a heightened awareness of the concept of the individual person and its status vis-a-vis the 'I' as philosophical principle. To be consistent with his principle, and indeed to prove his point, Fichte must 'deduce' the 'I' as individual. / Fichte's repudiation of dogmatism bears striking resemblances to a contemporary reading of Kant associated with the works of P. F. Strawson and John McDowell. The crucial difference is that for these philosophers the concept of a person is taken as primitive, and hence as the starting point of philosophy. At Fichte's time this position was defended by Fichte's critic, F. H. Jacobi. In the thesis I develop a position in contrast with Fichte's idealism which I call a 'naturalism of second nature' and which I use as a conceptual foil to explicate Fichte's thinking. I argue that ultimately Fichte's project fails by his own standards, in that it fails to save what we normally mean by a moral individual. I argue that in order to conceive of adequate constraints on freedom, we need to make the concept of a person as a natural individual our point of departure.

Orientador: Fatima Regina Rodrigues Evora / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T00:17:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Guidi_Anastasia_D.pdf: 6241137 bytes, checksum: 54d0582388b5996406055e21750d086f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Apresentamos aqui um estudo da Astronomia nova, trabalho publicado pelo astrônomo alemão Johannes Kepler em 1609. O livro é composto na forma de uma narrativa histórica daquela que o astrônomo chamou sua guerra contra Marte, trabalho exaustivo de análise e interpretação dos dados previamente coletados pelo grande observador Tycho Brahe que teve como resultado a descoberta das duas primeiras leis dos movimentos planetários que levam o nome de Kepler. Mostramos que, à luz da Defesa de Tycho contra Ursus, tratado póstumo escrito por Kepler cerca de uma década antes da publicação da Astronomia nova, a estrutura narrativa desta última revela-se como a exposição de um método de pesquisa, segundo o qual o astrônomo percorreu o caminho que leva dos movimentos observados do planeta à determinação de seu percurso real em torno do Sol. Procuramos destacar os principais elementos constituintes deste método, reconstruindo o caminho que leva à descoberta da forma elíptica da órbita do planeta / Abstract: We present an exposition on the New astronomy, published by the german astronomer Johannes Kepler in 1609. The book is composed in the form of a historical narrative of Kepler's war on Mars, exhaustive work of analysis and interpretation of data relative to the planet previously collected by the great obderver Tycho Brahe, which resulted on the discovery of the two first laws of planetary motion that bear Kepler¿s name. We have shown here that in light of Tycho¿s defence against Ursus, posthumous work written by Kepler about a decade before the publication of the New astronomy, the historical narrative presented in the latter is the blueprint of a method, by means of which the astronomer derived the true orbit of Mars around the Sun from the observed motions of the planet. We have attempted to provide an account of the main elements of this method, reconstructing the path that leads to the discovery of the elliptical shape of the planet's orbit / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

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Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished