<p dir="ltr">The world is increasingly dependent on cyber-physical systems (CPSs), e.g., robotic vehicles (RVs) and industrial control systems (ICSs). CPSs operate autonomously by processing data coming from both “cyberspace”—such as user commands—and “physical space”—such as sensors that measure the physical environment in which they operate. However, even after decades of research, CPSs remain susceptible to threats from attackers, primarily due to the increased complexity created by interaction with cyber and physical space (e.g., the cascading effects that changes in one space can impact on the other). In particular, the complexity causes two primary threats that increase the risk of causing physical damage to RVs: (1) logic bugs causing undesired physical behavior from the developers expectations; and (2) physical sensor attacks—such as GPS or acoustic noise spoofing—that disturb an RV’s sensor readings. Dealing with these threats requires addressing the interplay between cyber and physical space. In this dissertation, we systematically analyze the interplay between cyber and physical space, thereby tackling security problems created by such complexity. We present novel algorithms to detect logic bugs (PGFuzz in Chapter 2), help developers fix them (PGPatch in Chapter 3), and test the correctness of the patches attempting to address them (PatchVerif in Chapter 4). Further, we explain algorithms to discover the root causes and formulate countermeasures against physical sensor attacks that target RVs in Chapter 5.</p>