Submitted by Reginaldo Soares de Freitas (reginaldo.freitas@ufv.br) on 2017-03-10T19:02:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1837381 bytes, checksum: 94fe5b40429b19fe477856078f09c32d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-10T19:02:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 texto completo.pdf: 1837381 bytes, checksum: 94fe5b40429b19fe477856078f09c32d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-01 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / A Teoria Econômica dos Ciclos Politicos Orcamentários argumenta que o politico se utiliza da manipulação das variáveis econômicas para se manter no poder, tendo implicações no orçamento público. O objetivo geral deste trabalho é investigar o oportunismo politico-econômico nos municípios brasileiros, inquirindo sobre os efeitos dos ciclos politicos na situação fiscal e as motivações do oportunismo politico-econômico. Para alcançar o objetivo geral são construídas três hipóteses de trabalho. A primeira hipótese é de que existe oportunismo politico-econômico na execução orcamentária dos municípios brasileiros, o que impacta a situação fiscal. No Capitulo 2 é analisada a existência dos ciclos politicos orcamentários nos municípios brasileiros e estimados os efeitos dos ciclos politicos orcamentários na situação fiscal dos municípios brasileiros entre 2006 e 2015, dentro do contexto da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal, utilizando modelos de dados em painel dinâmico com incorporação de defasagem espacial. Os resultados confirmam a hipótese de que existe oportunismo politico-econômico na execução orcamentária dos municipios brasileiros, e que os ciclos eleitorais estão acompanhando as regras estabelecidas pela Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal. A segunda hipótese é que punições previstas em normas sociais não inibem o oportunismo politico-economico. No Capitulo 3 investiga-se como as punições previstas em normas sociais infiuenciam o oportunismo politico-econômico. Para tal, foi conduzido um experimento de campo Via online, com a participacao de 137 respondentes. Os resultados apontam que as normas sociais não inibem o oportunismo politico-economico. A terceira hipótese o oportunismo politico-econômico é condicionado pela expectativa do policymaker de que não será punido. No Capitulo 4 propõe-se um modelo teórico do oportunismo politico-econômico a luz da economia comportamental / The Theory of Political Budget Cycles argues that political using the manipulation of economic variables to remain in power, with implications for the public budget. The aim of this study is to investigate the political and economic opportunism in Brazilian municipalities, inquiring about the effects of political cycles in the fiscal situation and the motivations of the political and economic opportunism. To achieve the overall goal are built three working hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that there is political and economic opportunism in budget execution of municipalities, which impacts the fiscal situation. Chapter 2 analyzes the existence of political budget cycles in Brazilian mu- nicipalities and estimated the effects of political budget cycles in the fiscal situation of municipalities between 2006 and 2015, within the context of the Fiscal Responsibility Law. When estimating data models in dynamic panel with spatial lag merger. The re- sults confirm the hypothesis that there is political and economic opportunism in budget execution of municipalities, and that electoral cycles are following the rules established by the Fiscal Responsibility Law. The second hypothesis is that punishments provided for in social standards do not inhibit the political and economic opportunism. Chapter 3 is investigated as the punishments provided for in social norms influence the political and economic opportunism. To this end, a field experiment was conducted via online, with the participation of 137 respondents. The results show that social standards do not inhi- bit the political and economic opportunism.The third hypothesis political and economic opportunism is conditioned by the expectation of policymaker that will not be punished. In Chapter 4 we propose a theoretical model of political and economic expediency in the light of behavioral economics and is simulated the factors that influence the political agent in the decision of political and economic expediency. an agent model is proposed, with the political, the states and voters. The simulation results show that, by the availability heuristic, politicians do not feel constrained by the punishment of political and economic expediency, given that the probability of these punishments occur is small and long-term, while decisions are short-term.The main results of the study indicate that political budget cycles occur in Brazilian municipalities and that fiscal rules can be a source of mitigation for them. However, for fiscal rules to be effective, punishments imposed by law must be greater than the benefits of action, as should the trade-off of the time between political- economic opportunism and punishment. The type of punishment can be an incentive for the continuity of the political budget cycles.