The thesis, "General Sikorski and the Polish Government in Exile 1939-43: A Study of Polish Internal Émigré Politics in Wartime", seeks to examine the impact of Polish 'domestic' politics on wartime diplomacy in exile. Foreign policy naturally dominated the exile agenda, but this thesis considers the extent to which internal politics affected the Polish government's ability to pursue its wartime and post-war aims. The thesis considers whether internal divisions in exile and in the Polish resistance undermined national unity and diverted attention away from the war effort to the anticipated power-struggle after liberation. It assesses the degree to which domestic opposition hampered Sikorski's ability to achieve rapprochement with the USSR, the contribution his critics in the Polish army and wartime administration made to the collapse of his Soviet strategy and the extent to which Sikorski's policies failed because they constituted too blatant a contradiction of what the majority of Poles perceived as national traditions or national interests. It also considers whether his inability to impose his vision of post-war Poland on his compatriots destroyed the prospects of a new era of Polish- Soviet relations after liberation. Within this context, the thesis argues the impact of national history and tradition on exile foreign and 'domestic' policy. It assesses the consequences of key features of Polish interwar politics and society on politics in exile. It also examines the general nature of 'politics in exile', the interplay of Polish exile 'domestic' and foreign policy, and the nature and consequences of Sikorski's leadership. Sikorski came to power with a unique opportunity to unite the Poles in the fight for liberation. This thesis examines the impact on Polish history and the history of the Second World War of his failure to achieve this aim.