This thesis shows that citizens whose policy concerns are higher on political elites' agendas are more likely to be satisfied with democracy and to vote in elections. It develops a theoretical framework to explain the influence of the previously neglected variable priority congruence on democratic satisfaction and turnout and provides empirical evidence for it. The thesis thereby makes significant contributions to our knowledge about the ingredients of democratic legitimacy. Previous research shows that political representation, as measured by proximity between citizens' and elites' policy positions, is linked to democratic satisfaction. In this thesis, it is argued that congruence in priorities has a similar effect because citizens are likely to perceive elites who emphasise their concerns as responsive to societal needs and public opinion. The empirical analyses suggest that democratic satisfaction is indeed influenced by priority congruence, yet less so amongst more politically sophisticated individuals as well as in younger democracies and countries with lower levels of democracy and governance. These differences are probably due to variation in citizens' expectations towards elite behaviour and the democratic system. Elite attention to citizens' concerns moreover influences their decision to turn out in elections. If voters' issue priorities are salient in the campaign, they are likely to perceive the election to be more important. Moreover, they will find it easier to evaluate parties and make their vote choice. These mechanisms are shown to be less relevant amongst partisans, since party attachment mobilises voters and facilitates their vote choice. Again, previous policy-based explanations of turnout focus on positions, largely ignoring priorities. The hypotheses are tested through statistical analysis of data from voter and candidate surveys as well as media content analyses. The data come from all 27 European Union countries in 2009, whereby several hypotheses are only tested in Germany due to data availability.

Cette thèse se compose de trois essais sur le rôle des institutions dans le processus de développement. Le chapitre 2 examine dans quelle mesure l'existence de régimes multiples est associée à la qualité des institutions d'un pays, et analyse la différence de rôle joué par les institutions politiques et économiques dans le processus de croissance. Les résultats indiquent que les institutions économiques sont les causes immédiates et ont un impact direct sur le taux de croissance. Les institutions politiques sont les causes profondes, et sont donc les éléments qui déterminent dans quel régime de croissance se trouve un pays.Le chapitre 3 réétudie la problématique de la malédiction des ressources naturelles. Il teste l'hypothèse que l'effet de l'abondance en ressources naturelles sur le taux de croissance dépend du régime de croissance dans lequel le pays est inclus. Les résultats montrent un régime de bénédiction où les ressources naturelles favorisent la croissance et un régime de malédiction où les ressources naturelles ne stimulent pas la croissance. En outre plus de démocratie augmente la probabilité pour qu'un pays donné appartienne au premier régime. Le chapitre 4 teste si les différences de priorités politiques entre les hommes et les femmes, ou si les caractéristiques à l'échelle du pays telles que la qualité des institutions expliquent l'écart au soutien à la démocratie entre ces deux groupes d'individus. L'étude a montré que le contexte institutionnel du pays dans lequel les femmes vivent joue un rôle primordial. / This dissertation consists of three essays on institutions in the process of development. Chapter 2 considers to what extent the existence of multiple regimes is associated to the quality of institutions in a country, and analyses the difference of the role played by political and economic institutions in the growth process. The results indicate that economic institutions are proximate causes and have a direct impact on the growth rate. On the other hand political institutions are deep causes, and thus are the key determinant for which growth regime a country belongs to. In chapter 3, I re-examine the question of the resource curse. I test to which extent the impact of natural resources on the growth rate depends truly on the growth regime to which a country belongs. I find two different growth regimes. One is a resource-blessed regime in which natural resources increase signicantly the growth rate. The second one is a resource-cursed regime in which natural resources do not stimulate the growth rate. The analysis of the determinants of whether a country belongs or not to the blessed resource regime indicates that high level of democracy increases the probability for a given country to belong to this regime. Chapter 4 tries to understand and to provide potential explanations to why women are less supportive of democracy than men in Sub-sahara Africa. We test whether this gap is due to individual differences in policy priorities or to country-wide characteristics. The results support that in Sub-sahara Africa the gender gap in support for democracy disappears in countries with high level of the Human Development Indicator and of political rights.