Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 196 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 185-196).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-133).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-88).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains x, 124 p.; also includes graphics Includes bibliographical references (p. 118-124). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

There is a great deal of work on campaign finance at the national level, however, state level research is sparse. My dissertation fills this void in the literature by examining the motivations of contributors to state legislators. The literature discusses two major motivations of contributors universalistic contributors, who hope to influence election outcomes, and particularistic contributors who hope to influence legislative votes. The primary hypothesis is that proximity to the general election is the primary factor in explaining contribution patterns in state legislatures; however, proximity to a legislative vote of interest to the contributor will also be significant in explaining contribution patterns. Additionally, the dissertation examines the impact of session limits on contribution patterns. I use campaign contribution data collected by the National Institute on Money in State Politics and select twenty-five bills in nine states to test the primary hypothesis. I use a contributor fixed effects model to test for increased or decreased levels of contributions for each contributor, given the proximity to the election and legislative votes important to the contributor. The results indicate that contributions increase across all states in the two months prior to the general and primary elections, and that proximity to the election is the most important factor in explaining campaign contributions in state legislatures. In 32% of all cases in the study, there was direct evidence of interest groups attempting to influence the outcome of legislative votes. Additionally, an increase in contributions close to a major legislative vote occurred in 77% of the cases without session limits, indicating that interest groups are highly active in attempting to influence policy outcomes. An additional examination of contribution patterns indicates that PACs shift their contributions to the beginning of the legislative session when faced with session limits. My research contributes to our understanding of the motives of campaign contributors and their actions when faced with legal restrictions on their contributions. This research, therefore, allows campaign finance reformers to make better reform decisions.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 226-244).

During the past two decades business has become increasingly active in the political process, and scholars continue to debate the extent to which this activity is organized. This fundamental issue is addressed by examining corporate political activity within the context of resource dependence and class cohesion theories. Political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions, this study's measure for corporate political activity, are structurally analyzed to determine if either resource dependence or class cohesion theory explains the forces which drive business participation in the U.S. public policy process. The rationale which forty-two diverse corporate PACs exercise when selecting which congressional campaigns to support during two election cycles is explored. Resource dependence theory contends .that a firm's behavior is a function of its dependence on the environment for resources. Successful firms attempt to manage this external dependence by controlling or manipulating their environment corporate involvement in politics, therefore, will reflect a firm's dependence on the government for sales, subsidies or regulation. The regulatory environment in which a firm operates is this study's measure of resource dependence. Conversely, class cohesion theory argues that a firm's political activity is a function of its top management's inclusion in a network of corporate elites. Board members and chief executives from the nation's largest corporations coalesce to advance a political agenda which is compatible with the overarching goals of the business community rather than the parochial goals of an individual firm or even industry. Interlocking directorates, professional association memberships, shared educational experience and geographic proximity of headquarters locations are this study's indicators of a corporate elite network. Two categories of analytical methodology are applied. Multidimensional scaling maps corporate patterns of support for congressional candidates based on a PAC contribution proximity measure. These patterns are subsequently subjected to discriminant analysis, canonical correlation, regression and chi-square analysis to test for Resource Dependent and Class Cohesive political behavior. The results are conclusive: Support of selected congressional campaigns is more likely fueled by fragmented business interests, as resource dependence theory suggests, rather than the collective motives of a corporate elite. In fact, no support emerged for class cohesion theory as an explanation for the observed patterns of intercorporate relations. Further, a corollary proposition that PAC activity will vary with the ideology of White House administrations is not supported. Rather, PAC contribution patterns do not vary significantly between the Carter and Reagan administrations. This research renders four significant contributions to scholarship: 1. It provides empirical evidence to clarify a central issue in business-government relations, i.e., the atomistic or collective nature of corporate political activity. 2. It introduces a rigorous mathematical technique to the business-government relations discipline. 3. It indirectly addresses an ongoing scholarly debate over the role of interest groups in a democracy. 4. It indirectly addresses the current public policy debate over campaign finance reform.

In a time when record numbers of dollars are being spent on campaigns the unregulated dollars are flowing faster than ever. Hundreds of millions of dollars in independent expenditures are being used for “issue advocacy”, print and broadcast advertising, which does not expressly endorse or oppose a candidate for office. The one-time campaign finance ceiling has become the campaign finance basement. Individuals are able to give unlimited dollars to 527 organizations, which function outside of all campaign finance regulation and provide a new path for the flow of political dollars. Since the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act, federally regulated lobbyists and PACS are being edged out of the political dollar due to contribution limits. It is in 1996 that we witness the birth of 527 organizations and the flourishing growth of soft money spending in the campaign process.