Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2010. / Vita. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references. / Counterinsurgency was a persistent and important challenge to military organizations in the second half of the 20th century and seems likely to continue to pose a challenge in the 21st century. This makes understanding how military organizations respond to this challenge both an important policy question and a fruitful area for academic research on military doctrine. The involvement of the United States and the United Kingdom in counterinsurgency in Kenya, South Vietnam, and Iraq are used to test four competing hypotheses on the origin and development of military doctrine. The four hypotheses are doctrine as rational response to environment, doctrine as product of civilian intervention, doctrine as means to deal with generic organizational desires and problems, and doctrine as product of organizational culture. This latter hypothesis is developed extensively by examining the professionalization of military organizations through professional military education, which has its origin in a certain set of experiences termed "the first war." The next three chapters detail the formation and evolution of culture and professional education in three militaries (U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and British Army). The case studies then test how these organizations responded in terms of doctrine and operations to the challenge of counterinsurgency in South Vietnam (U.S. Army and Marine Corps), Kenya (British Army) and Iraq (all three). It then presents, as an additional plausibility probe, a brief shadow case of Afghanistan and Pakistan (all three organizations, plus the Canadian and Pakistani armies). The evidence in these case studies indicates a strong role for organizational culture in military doctrine and operations when information from the environment is ambiguous (as it frequently is, especially in counterinsurgency) but that culture is substantially attenuated in effect when information from the environment becomes unambiguous. It then concludes by discussing both theoretical and policy implications and avenues for future research. / by Austin Long. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2013. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 69-77). / Excessive sodium consumption is both prevalent and very costly in many countries around the world. Recent research has found that more than 90% of the world's adult population live in countries with mean intakes exceeding the World Health Organization's recommendation, and that more than a million deaths every year may be attributable to excess sodium. This study uses a simulation model to estimate, for the first time, the cost-effectiveness of government interventions to reduce population sodium consumption in every country in the world. It reveals substantial heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness by country that has never before been identified, and illustrates, also for the first time, the sensitivity of intervention efficacy to the theoretical-minimum-risk exposure distribution of sodium intake. The study makes a number of additional contributions. It offers a comprehensive appraisal of the methodological strengths and limitations of the surveys, imputation models, randomized controlled trials, prospective cohort studies, meta-analyses, and simulation models that together constitute the evidence base for public health recommendations on sodium intake, as well as for this study's own analysis. These methodological issues, some raised for the first time, are evaluated systematically to allow the relative quality of each input to be assessed and to inform prioritization of further research. The study also uses economic theory to ground a discussion of the proper nature and scope of government policies targeting population sodium consumption, and presents an up-to-date survey of sodium reduction initiatives around the world. / by Michael William Webb. / S.M.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2014. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 255-279). / My dissertation reexamines the relationship between religious and political attitudes and challenges the conventional wisdom that religious identities are impervious to politics' influence. I not only identify the conditions under which religious identities affect political stances but also when political identities influence one's religious beliefs, practices, and identification. My research refutes the claim that religious sorting into the political parties-that seculars support the Democrats while the devout join the Republican ranks-explains the current polarized political arena. Partisans themselves help produce these religious gaps. Moreover, this finding should not come as a surprise to researchers. Combining insights from the religious and political socialization literatures, I create a novel, yet intuitive, theory about how partisanship can come to shape religious beliefs and behaviors. In brief, the distinct timings of the religious and political socialization processes create a window during which partisanship can. shape religious beliefs and behaviors. Political identities typically crystallize in adolescence and early adulthood, which is the very time when many people have distanced themselves from religion. As young people emerge into adulthood, however, they must decide whether to remain on the outskirts of religion or re-enter the religious sphere. Political identity, which for many has been solidified since young adulthood, can shape this new religious identity. The influence of politics is then continually felt, as an individual's resultant religious identification and practices are often stable throughout adulthood. To test my theory, I develop new survey measures of religious identification; use panel data to track changes in beliefs and practices over time; design randomized experiments to uncover how heightening the salience of one's partisanship subsequently influences reported identification with religion; and take advantage of natural experiments to see how changes in the political world subsequently impact religious practices. Using different data and analytic strategies, I consistently find the same results: there are times in an individual's life when political identities shape religious practices and beliefs, and there are other times when the reverse is the case. All told, my research presents a new way of thinking about the contemporary political and religious landscapes. / by Michele F. Margolis. / Ph. D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2017. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 244-260). / The oil industry has been an important source of industrial and technological development for countries like the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway but is mostly associated with a range of negative outcomes by the resource curse literature. Studies in this tradition assume that this industry has limited potential for creating local jobs, fostering a domestic supply chain, and interacting with research institutions. Instead, the oil industry is treated as a pure generator of easy rents that flow to governments, which unless they are constrained by good institutions, will turn resource wealth into negative economic and political outcomes. This study questions the core assumptions of the resource curse literature. It does so through a careful analysis of the industry's characteristics and the varying sources of rents, showing the existence of Schumpeterian (innovation) rents in natural-resource production. It then provides a theory that connects geological endowments to political incentives and predicts when natural resources lead to rent-capture or creation, the types of rules of distribution of oil wealth and institutional complementarities put in place to manage it, and the conditions under which policies to foster local economic participation are more likely to emerge (local content policies). The theoretical framework is then applied to the study of three countries that have similar background conditions but have different geological endowments - one traditionally rich in low-cost oil, which is Mexico, and others which are abundant in high-cost, hard-to-get O&G, which are Brazil and Malaysia. It shows that a change in the resource base pushed policymakers in Mexico to replace the rules of the sector with a constitutional reform that aligned incentives for long-term investments, attracted private capital, relied less on oil rents for public finances, and promoted local procurement. In Brazil and Malaysia, this study shows that the technically challenging aspect of producing oil and gas in those countries both enabled and incentivized a new type of distributive and industrial policy in the natural resource sector, politicizing supply contracts but also investing in domestic capabilities, innovation, and pockets of efficiency within the state bureaucracy. / by Renato Lima de Oliveira. / Ph. D.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science. Thesis. 1968. B.S. / Bibliography: leaves 93-94. / B.S.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1986. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Bibliography: leaves 306-311. / by Yale Martin Zussman. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 286-298). / Since the end of the Second World War, a norm of "border fixity" - a proscription of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory - has become prevalent in world politics. Such practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Has the international norm of border fixity made international conflict less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues have been among the major causes of war, many observers might assume that the norm of "border fixity" has made war less common. This dissertation argues that the opposite conclusion is true as far as socio-politically weak states - states that do not possess a reasonable level of legitimate and effective governmental institutions - are involved. In a world in which it is illegitimate to change international borders by force, and in which socio-politically weak states are widespread, international conflict and instability may actually be more common. The border fixity norm, moreover, perpetuates and exacerbates the weakness of already weak states thus making a significant decrease in conflicts unlikely. This dissertation examines the question of the effects of the international norm of border fixity by studying and comparing four cases. / (cont.) Two cases are taken from the era prior to the establishment of the border fixity norm: Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640 to 1740, and Argentina from 1810 to 1880. Two cases are taken from a world in which the norm of border fixity is present: Lebanon from 1943 to 2005, and Congo from 1960 to 2005. Despite some variations, the case studies and the comparison between them largely confirm the argument stated above: Border fixity perpetuates state weakness and, in regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, good fences often create bad neighbors. / by Boaz Atzili. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 313-330). / by Clifford Allan Bob. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-203). / Economic crises are such powerful socioeconomic disasters that, not surprisingly, they are usually explained by powerful socioeconomic pressures, such as global financial speculation, structural economic failure, or populist demands. This thesis, in contrast, identifies the crucial role of elite politics. From the 1950s through the 1980s politics inside a tiny circle of high Mexican officials made the difference between economic crisis (when the exchange rate crashes) and stability. In the 1950s and 1960s, competing grupos, or cliques, within the ruling party abided by a "cooperative" system. The grupo whose leader won the internal contest for presidential nomination, hence automatically won the election, would do better, but losing grupos retained important posts. Such assurance of political survival allowed elites to defend the political system's long-run interests, not just their narrow self-interests, and avoid economic crises. In the 1970s and 1980s, "struggle" emerged as power conflicts became all-or-nothing, erupting in massive expenditures, other economic gambles, and crises. Public spending soared in pre-election years (27 percent in 1975, 22 percent in 1981), when grupos vied to build support for their leader's presidential nomination. Slashing it in the actual election years (0 growth in 1976, 8 percent decline in 1982, excluding debt payments) was too late to avert economic crisis. Most studies of economic crises in developing nations focus on what went wrong - and find too many possibilities. By scrutinizing Mexico's economic stability in the 1950s and 1960s (when nations such as Brazil and Argentina suffered repeated crises), this thesis is better able to discover the critical characteristics of political success that later eroded. / (cont.) The relationship between state and society did not change; the system of elite politics did. Many interviews with high officials reveal how this system worked, and illuminate important facets of Mexican economic history. The more general lesson is that politics at the heart of the state is not just a small replica of society. While external constituencies endure, elite factions survive or die politically. How they handle mutual conflicts can have momentous effects on a nation. / by Jonathan King Schlefer. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references. / Vita. / The Polaris and Trident II SLBM weapon systems were developed by the U.S. Navy during periods of major strategic nuclear modernization, when national leaders were concerned about the vulnerability of U.S. Air Force land based nuclear forces to Soviet attack. Both Navy systems provided a superior alternative to bomber and ICBM weapon systems of the time, but only Polaris provoked innovative changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine. These cases of innovative and stagnant doctrine are compared and used to test the explanatory power of three competing theories of the sources of innovative military doctrine. The three theories hypothesize independent, explanatory roles for civil-military conflict, intra service bargaining, and interservice competition. The first case shows a strong causal link between intense interservice competition, a Navy decision to develop Polaris as an alternative to Air Force land based forces, and an ensuing improvement in the survivability of those land based forces. The second case shows a somewhat weaker correlation between institutionalized interservice cooperation, a Navy decision to develop Trident II as a complement rather than an alternative to land based forces, and the absence of any ensuing improvement in the survivability of those forces. Thus, Polaris caused an innovative change in nuclear doctrine while Trident II did not, and the cases show that differing patterns of interservice relations had more to do with these outcomes than civil-military or intraservice relations. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the sources of different patterns of interservice relations, and argues that civilian defense leaders can manipulate interservice competition to cause doctrinal innovation. / by Owen Reid Cote, Jr. / Ph.D.