<p> This research examined the House General Aviation Caucus during the 113^th Congressional Session. Caucuses, or Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs) have been shown to indirectly impact the legislative process. This research specifically examines the operations of the House General Aviation Caucus, its impact in Congress, and its impact on the general aviation industry. Data included interviews of House General Aviation Caucus members and general aviation industry leaders. The outcomes of the research confirm the positive impact of the caucus in Congress and in the industry.</p>

<p> For the past several decades income and wealth inequality in the United States have increased dramatically, but policies to reduce inequality are often not politically feasible. Many scholars see this state of affairs as a &ldquo;paradox,&rdquo; arguing that, in a well-functioning democracy, an increase in economic inequality ought to lead to increased support for redistributive governmental programs aimed at reducing it. Research since 2008 attempts to explain this apparent paradox by arguing that although Americans are acutely concerned about economic inequality the continued lack of government action is due to structural barriers that prevent policy from reflecting the &ldquo;will of the people.&rdquo; However, methodological problems cast doubt on these conclusions. </p><p> I make use of analytic methods that address these issues and show that, despite the claims of past research, there is no politically meaningful relationship between Americans concerns for inequality and their desire for the government to take action. I first use a form of dynamic factor analysis to develop a measure of national concern for inequality over time and then use this new construct to answer the question which underlies previous work: when Americans become more concerned about inequality, do they subsequently become more supportive of government action? Using an error correction model I find that an increase in national concern for inequality concern does not lead to increased support for more government intervention in the economy. </p><p> My results suggest that even when Americans become especially outraged over economic inequality, there is no guarantee that they will flock en mass to liberal parties and policies for answers. During periods of heightened concern for inequality the &ldquo;will of the people&rdquo; may in fact be more likely to support reduced government intervention in the economy. I argue that, in order to truly understand the political implications of American views on inequality, researchers and advocates should stop assuming that concern for inequality is necessarily associated with liberal policy views, and start exploring the ways in which different policies and ideological positions can be coupled to the problem of inequality at different times, and for different people.</p>

<p> This dissertation analyzes the complex interrelationship between mass preferences and public policies. Using a range of public policies enacted in the U.S. at both the federal level and in the states we explore two related questions. First, through a comparison of policy outcomes and corresponding preferences we assess the degree to which public policies in U.S. states reflect constituent preferences. Second, using experiments embedded in public opinion surveys we demonstrate how the range of viable policies that are discussed in everyday political discourse feed back to mass preferences. </p><p> In Chapter 1, we introduce a new framework to compare the ideological orientation of public policies to mass preferences both within and across U.S. states. The approaches that have so far been employed in empirical research on this important question fall short for two reasons. First, they fail to quantify the degree to which policies are more or less liberal than preferences. Second, they do not assess the heterogeneity of preferences within jurisdictions, and thus do not consider how the quality of representation depends on the level to which policy decisions are delegated. Here we overcome both of these problems by generating estimates of Americans&rsquo; preferences on the minimum wage, which are measured on a scale that is comparable to observed policies and describe low levels of geographic aggregation. </p><p> Using these estimates, we demonstrate that most people are poorly represented by state minimum wage laws for two reasons. First, in each state, the minimum wage is much lower than the average rate preferred by state residents, leading to a pronounced bias against the preferences of the poor. Second, because preferences vary within states to a great deal, they are difficult to match by a single policy even in the absence of an overall policy bias. While minimum wage laws in the U.S. are typically set by elected officials and cover entire states, our results show that policies brought about by direct democratic institutions and at more local levels reflect preferences substantially better. These findings suggest that standard data and measures yield incomplete evidence about the relationship between public opinion and policy in the U.S. </p><p> Chapter 2, expands this framework to assess representation in issue domains where individual policy outcomes cannot be mapped onto an ideological scale. Following recent advances in the study of dyadic representation, we utilize the technique of joint scaling to simultaneously estimate the ideological content of policy outcomes and issue-specific attitudes underlying individual policy preferences on the same scale. We apply this method to study how well abortion and gun control laws enacted in U.S. states represent corresponding mass preferences. </p><p> We find that in the context of both issue domains policy outcomes are far removed from average preferences in the states for two reasons. First, both abortion and gun control laws exhibit a pronounced nationwide conservative bias leading to overly restrictive abortion laws in nearly all states and overly lax gun laws in every state. Second, while the conservatism of policy outcomes in the case of both issues is strongly associated with corresponding mass preferences across states, this relationship is best described as <i> hyper-responsive</i>. Relatively small preference differences across states are magnified into enormous variation in state laws. We demonstrate that a relatively broad range of <i>nationwide</i> policies would outperform the current status quo in terms of ideological divergence. </p><p> Chapter 3 presents a new theoretical framework to study the formation of policy preferences that accounts for the notion that choices between policies depend on the ideological range of alternatives that are salient in the ideological discourse. In particular, following the psychological literature on range effects, we argue that the introduction of policy alternatives that are far from the political mainstream can re-structure voter perceptions of where alternatives lie in the ideological space. </p><p> We provide strong support for the observable implications of this theory based on six survey experiments using a variety of policy contexts and samples. In particular, we find that the introduction of extreme alternatives into the public discourse makes mainstream policies on the same side of the spectrum look more centrist in the public eye, thus increasing support for these moderate alternatives. We discuss the implications of these findings for both theories of opinion formation and substantive debates on political extremism.</p><p>

The primary research question that guides this dissertation is: What is the relationship between neoliberalism and welfare governance? In contrast to the idea that market reforms bring the destruction of social welfare provision, I argue that market reforms are actually accompanied by new practices of—public and private—giving. An analysis of a wide range of welfare institutions and their practices, ethics and ideas about poverty, equality and generosity in Turkey highlights that processes of economic liberalization produce new paradigms of welfare governance, instead of dismantling it. This dissertation utilizes interpretive and ethnographic methods through a case-study of state and non-state social service provision in Turkey in order to answer this question. During a 14-month fieldwork in Turkey between June 2009-August 2010 I participated in the volunteer meetings, fundraising events and assistance distribution days of religious and secular charity organizations, met with the volunteers, teachers and beneficiaries of university social responsibility programs and corporate philanthropy projects. The empirical data consists of 72 in-depth (structured as well as open-ended) interviews with a range of informants, archival materials concerning the historical evolution of social policy in Turkey from 1930 to 2010 and other brochures, pamphlets and media artifacts related to welfare policy. Accordingly, this dissertation presents two main arguments. First, it posits that, market reforms instead of destroying welfare structures and cultures, actually create a humanitarian notion of welfare, which I define as welfare humanitarianism. Second I argue against the diffusion hypothesis which claims that neoliberal technologies of governance travel from the global to the local. In contrast, this dissertation emphasized the local production of neoliberalism. Such an analytical perspective highlights the ways in which neoliberal modes of governance shape and is shaped by local political projects. Lastly, by comparing how secularist and Islamist political groups have discussed the topic of `social policy' in Turkey, I argue that instead of a `divide', these two political constituencies are actually bound by a shared understanding about state, society and economy.

<p> Multiple studies have documented the growing controversies in school nutrition public policy. Less is known about the political ideologies, beliefs and diverse perspectives coming from conflicting values and their influence on policy acceptance. Key issues examined are: Does the average US citizen filter their impressions of policies through their core beliefs, values and politics? And, in general, what policies, interventions, and regulations do conservatives and liberals favor?</p><p> Utilizing a sequential mixed methods design, Phase I included a survey given to 201 people with both a multi-item closed ended section and an open-ended section. Statistical analysis was performed on the quantitative survey data, with pattern matching and documentation of outliers providing analysis of qualitative data. Findings in Phase I were used to develop questions for Phase II where 8 focus groups--California, North Dakota, Iowa, Connecticut and Florida--shared perspectives on nutrition public policies.</p><p> Regression analysis showed political ideology statistically significantly predicts perceptions toward ease of implementation, (<i>p</i> &lt; .001) and efficacy, (<i>p</i> &lt; .001). Beliefs and values about personal responsibility versus government responsibility is at the heart of the debate. This research shows core beliefs, values and political ideology affects preference for more or less government regulations and acceptance of local versus public policies. This is some of the first research to suggest the theory of <i>Politics of Values</i> for how people view nutrition public policies through a lens of core beliefs, values and political ideology. Evidence presented suggests this is one way people make sense of nutrition public policies, affecting perceptions and acceptance of nutrition and other policies.</p><p> Implications from this study include, regardless of political ideology, the general public sees local as better. Public policy makers are not perceived as agreeing with the consensus toward local proposals for improving school lunch nutrition. Findings suggest a general consensus for strong evidence-based research on which to build nutrition policy.</p>

<p> Given the terrifying potentialities linked to global warming, some have suggested that the only means of abating a worst-case scenario is to double down, so to speak. Geoengineering is the intentional manipulation and augmentation of the global climate system. Critics and enthusiasts have commenced a lively debate around this complex issue, and scenarios have recently emerged as a constitutive practice to confront the uncertainties permeating research, implementation, and prospective governance. Using a synthesis of critical political frames to engage with a range of geoengineered imaginaries, this dissertation employs both textual and practice-based modes of research to argue that there are more dynamic and efficacious means to engage people in thinking through the radical possibilities and postnormal potentialities inherent to geoengineering. Turning to games and deploying play as a modality for experimentation, this dissertation assembles a design for exploring the core themes of the debate and enacting an embodied politics for geoengineering. <i>GeoFutr</i> is an alternative futures-driven gaming platform designed to critique, create, and ultimately contest geoengineered imaginaries.</p><p>

<p> Voter-identification (ID) proponents claim that requiring voters to present photo-ID cards prevents fraud. Supported by a comprehensive empirical review, voter-ID opponents argue that significant voter fraud is nonexistent and that such restrictive laws suppress turnout of historically disenfranchised peoples. By analyzing testimonial letters to a state-legislature committee hearing, I show how repeating the false truth-claims can produce wide acceptance, through outright deception and cognitive biases. Focusing on the State of Kansas, my paper asks, &ldquo;How do proponents of strict voter-ID laws frame their cases for relevant legislation?&rdquo; and &ldquo;Where does the research originate that they cite in state legislative hearings to support their claims?&rdquo; From a content-analysis method of tallying critical words, phrases, and concepts, I tailored a discourse-analysis (DA) discipline. While analyzing grammatical structures, I focused more on the specific social, cultural, and political significances. Using terms and phrases such as &ldquo;Those&rdquo; &ldquo;diseased&rdquo; &ldquo;Others&rdquo; are &ldquo;stealing <i>Our</i> way of life,&rdquo; the political DA reveals that voter-ID proponents dehumanize the alleged perpetrators of voter fraud (often referenced as &ldquo;illegals&rdquo;). My five primary findings reveal how voter-ID proponents bolster their claims: arguing that their opponents willfully undermine democracy with voter fraud; fostering solidarity, dividing &ldquo;Us&rdquo; from the fraudulent voting &ldquo;Others&rdquo;; cultivating racism; manipulating legislators with urgent warnings; and buttressing their arguments with anecdotes, biased sources, and demonstrable lies. By revealing the persuasive powers of such discursive techniques, my paper provides a qualitative, critical nuance to the quantitative studies that address voter fraud.</p><p>

<p> Despite the absence of a binding global climate agreement, many advanced economies have enacted or attempted major national climate reforms over the past two decades. What accounts for variation between countries in the timing and ambition of these national climate policies? In this dissertation, I draw on literatures from comparative political economy, public policy and environmental politics to develop a new theory of climate policy conflict that explains national climate policymaking trajectories across advanced economies.</p><p> My argument proceeds in two parts. First, I detail a recurrent pattern of climate policy conflict that I describe as the <i>logic of double representation</i>. When the climate threat emerged in the late 1980s, this new issue exposed latent differences in the material interests of otherwise similar economic stakeholders, particularly labor and business actors. As a result, climate policy opponents became embedded in both left-leaning and right-leaning political coalitions. In political systems where organized labor was allied with the largest left-wing party and emissions-intensive businesses were allied with the largest right-wing party, a `double representation' of emissions-intensive economic interests resulted. In these cases, parties on both sides of the ideological spectrum had factions representing the interests of carbon-intensive constituencies within climate policy debates. This dynamic privileged carbon polluters' voice in climate policymaking.</p><p> Second, I argue there is an interaction between these cross-cutting climate policy preferences and domestic political institutions. Domestic political institutions can either strongly or weakly reinforce the logic of double representation, depending on carbon-dependent economic actors' access to climate policy design. This access is shaped by policymaking institutions, for instance through corporatist links between economic stakeholders and policymakers. Access is also a function of political organizations, for instance through historically contingent links between labor or business associations and political parties. I show how carbon-dependent economic actors' differential access to climate policy design creates two distinct causal pathways that can both lead to climate policy enactment. The first pathway occurs when carbon polluters control climate policy design. In this pathway, producer-friendly climate policies are enacted with little political conflict. The second pathway occurs when carbon polluters have more limited influence on climate policy design. This pathway leads to less producer-friendly policies and greater political conflict. I then show how institutional differences between countries condition the prevalence of these two pathways, helping to explain cross-national differences in national climate policies' timing and content.</p><p> I develop and test this account of national climate policy conflict using detailed qualitative analysis of climate politics in three advanced economies: Norway, the United States and Australia. In each case, I process-trace the dynamics of political decisionmaking on national climate reforms from the emergence of climate change as a political threat in the 1980s to the present. This analysis draws from 101 semi-structured interviews across all three countries conducted between 2013 and 2015, including conversations with former heads of state, party leaders, cabinet ministers, elected officials, senior bureaucrats, business executives, labor leaders, and environmental advocates. The analysis also draws from government documents, stakeholder publications, media reports and archival records. Finally, I probe the generalizability of my analysis by testing whether the causal processes identified within the dissertation's three primary cases extend to two shadow cases: Germany and Canada.</p><p> To date, many climate policy proponents have focused on international institutions to facilitate climate policy cooperation. However, my distributive-institutional account of national climate policymaking suggests that climate policy inaction is less rooted in the absence of a binding global agreement and instead results from domestic distributive conflict over climate policymaking. The presence of a global climate agreement will not automatically bridge domestic divisions. Instead, efforts to manage the global climate crisis should recognize that climate policymaking requires a fundamental renegotiation of the economic institutions that structure advanced economies. Understanding the conditions under which climate policy advocates can win in distributive climate conflict will involve moving beyond economic frames in evaluating the efficacy of climate reforms, rethinking the importance of collective action institutions to climate risk mitigation, and tailoring policy instruments to strategically address carbon polluters' differentiated influence on climate policy design.</p>

<p> The United States national strategy for Countering Violent Extremism is broadly written and currently does not provide the framework necessary to combat homegrown violent extremism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. The threat of foreign terrorist organizations targeting the United States through a 9/11-style attack has become overshadowed by the threat of homegrown violent extremists and lone-wolf attacks. The purpose of this thesis is to gain a comprehensive insight into how intervention is used within the context of a counter-terrorism preventative strategy. How can intervention be used to disengage radicalizing individuals whose expression of extremist ideology involves committing violent acts? Furthermore, it is anticipated that the most appropriate methods for applying such an intervention program, in the pre-criminal space, can be most successful through interagency collaboration and a Whole Community approach. Such a system leverages partnerships between local, state, and federal government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and community-driven initiatives. This paper analyzes specific case studies of socio-political landscapes, individuals who have radicalized to violent extremism, and intervention programs from Denmark, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The results of the analysis provide recommendations for implementing a nation-wide intervention program in the United States. </p>

<p> This dissertation examines the conditions that facilitate or impede the transformation of land rights from common to individual property. It does so by focusing on cotton-growing areas of Tajikistan, which exhibit substantial variation in patterns of land tenure arrangement. Specifically, the project addresses the following questions: Why, despite efforts by state and international organizations to support land reform, some, but not other, farmworkers established individual tenure by withdrawing their land shares from collective peasant farms? Why do some cotton-growing areas have more agricultural land held in family farms, whereas other areas in collective peasant farms? Drawing on the distributional theory of property rights, I argue that to understand why land tenure reform has unfolded as it did in Tajikistan, one has to consider the effect of land reform strategy, land allocation formula, observable resources such as off-farm income, and reliability of access to water and its interaction with the level of labor supply. These factors affect the bargaining power of Soviet rural elites-turned-managers of collective peasant farms, who resist land subdivision, and Soviet farmworkers-turned-shareholders, who prefer land individualization, and as a consequence cause much of the variability one observes in patterns of land redistribution. Predicated on qualitative (interviews and participant observations), and quantitative (multilevel linear and logistic models) methods of analysis, the findings of this dissertation have implications for the literature on property rights, decentralization, and the postcommunist literature on land reform, and generate policy implications that might be relevant to government and international organizations involved in promoting land reform in Tajikistan and other developing countries.</p>