In recent decades, the politics of recognition has become an important theme in political and social theorizing about justice and freedom. The desire for recognition, that is to say, the desire to have the approval, esteem, consideration or respect of those around us, whether as individuals or members of social groups, has in fact been described as a vital human need. The distribution of rights and obligations, wealth and resources, all turn on the theme of recognition; failures to recognize the humanity of others or their particular identities as worthy of respect or esteem often result in political and social outcomes that are deeply unjust. The central idea behind these debates is that an individual’s identity – her self-understanding of who she is – and her social and political standing in any organized community – the rights she has and the protections she possesses under the law – are all in part shaped by the recognition or misrecognition of others. As Charles Taylor describes it, a social and political world that reflects back to individuals a demeaning picture of themselves can lead to severe psychic damage and cause real harm; a political society that simply refuses to recognize the identities of certain groups of individuals as having any standing at all can result in radical denials of the basic rights individuals are entitled to as members of a political community. Indeed, many of the major cultural, ethnic, racial, gender and religious movements of the last decade are seen by scholars as organized around the principle of recognition – the struggle to have one’s identity be recognized by others as worthy of respect. In trying to make sense of the politics of recognition, scholars have, for the most part, turned to Hegel’s account of the struggle for recognition for guidance. His most prominent remarks on this subject occur in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where he discusses the struggle for recognition through what is famously known as the master-slave dialectic. While Hegel certainly offers an extremely sophisticated and important account of the subject, and although many have shifted the debate to other areas of Hegel’s corpus, the general neglect of philosophical treatments on this issue by other thinkers in the history of thought is regrettable. In this dissertation, I examine some of the most important precursors to Hegel on this subject, arguing that they did indeed take the struggle for recognition seriously. Moreover, I hope to show that their reflections on the subject are themselves important and worthy of consideration, not only historically, but also for how we might think about the struggle for recognition today. This dissertation focuses on the social and political thought of Bernard Mandeville, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. It has two main aims. First and most principally, I aim to throw new light on each of their political philosophies by examining their ideas through the lens of the struggle for recognition. Each of them, I will argue, in varying ways set the desire for recognition at the centre of their thought. Second, I attempt to account for the continuities and discontinuities of between their views on the subject.

This thesis explores the relationship between Thomas Hobbes and English deism. It seeks to show that Hobbes's work had a significant influence upon subsequent deists, namely, Charles Blount, John Toland, Matthew Tindal, and Anthony Collins. The thesis shows that these deists were influenced by certain distinctively Hobbesian anticlerical ideas, such as his biblical criticism, his materialism and determinism, his scepticism towards present revelation, and more. The deists, who were motivated by a similar form of anticlericalism, found in Hobbes a particularly resourceful ally. Furthermore, this thesis explores how some of Hobbes's political ideas influenced the deists: particularly his concerns regarding the dangerous role that priestly interests played in society and the instability that they generated. This thesis thus argues that Hobbes can be seen as a major influence upon English deism. Secondly, it offers an examination of Hobbes's concepts of God and reason. It shows that whilst Hobbes's accounts of God and reason were multilayered and at times perhaps underdeveloped, they contained significant elements that anticipated the later positions of the deists. Finally, this thesis argues that for Hobbes, the rational potential of humankind, implanted by God, could be cultivated and fulfilled once peace and security are guaranteed. Thus, this thesis attempts to recover some of the more utopian aspects of Hobbes's thought. It concludes that both Hobbes and the deists were part of a project of enlightenment, but one which was not aimed against religion as such. They attempted to liberate natural reason from the darkness of corrupt clerics and their false doctrines: this was an anticlerical enlightenment that was partly initiated by Hobbes and developed significantly by the deists.

周濂. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2005. / 參考文獻(p. 217-224). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in English. / Lun wen (Zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2005. / Can kao wen xian (p. 217-224). / Zhou Lian.

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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Bibliography: leaves 308-316. / v, 346 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / This thesis seeks to understand the interrelation of knowledge, power and culture in the context of globalization. Crisis of Marxism has prompted intense reflection on the nature of modernity as a post-cultural phenomenon. This discourse highlights forms of domination and resistance neglected by Marxism and Liberalism. Intellectual developments in the West have acquired a halo of universality which makes it difficult for outsiders to recognise their limitations. The debate between modernists and postmodernists is a case in point. Post-colonial theorists appropriation of post-structuralism, thematic and methodological, raises questions about their own relationship to Western theory and whether their analyses neglect material aspects of globalization as well as problems specific to post-colonial societies. This thesis contends that it is unnecessary to absolutise the "culture vs. materialism" dichotomy. While it may be true that the cultural is "always already" political, critical theory must insist on foregrounding a more activist notion of political agency in a conjecture marked by global management of dissent, economic fundamentalism, media spectacles and cynical conflation of democracy with consumption. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Politics, 1998?

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 527-562).

Habilitationsschrift--Göttingen, 1974. / Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 345-360).

Thesis--Hessischen Ludwigs-Universität zu Giessen. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [3]-[5]).

In this thesis, I argue for rationalism, the claim that political legitimacy should be distributed such that justice is promoted best. In chapter 1, I define legitimacy as the permission to rule. I deny that political institutions generally enjoy authority, which is the moral power to directly impose duties on others. I then describe how legitimate political institutions without authority are possible in principle. In the second chapter, I outline a major problem for rationalism. If individuals have strong, moral rights, then it seems that political institutions cannot legitimately operate without their subjects' consent. I describe the key assumptions in this argument, and discuss a series of unconvincing proposals in the literature to escape it. In chapter 3, I argue that we can solve the problem if we look at theories of the moral justification of rights. There are two major such theories, the interest theory and the status theory. I outline the interest theory, and argue that it allows for non-consensual but legitimate political institutions. In chapter 4, I describe a Kantian claim about the nature of rights, according to which our rights are fully realised only if there are political institutions. If we accept this thought, then non-consensual political institutions can be legitimate on the status theory as well. In chapter 5, I outline what it means to promote-rather than respect-justice, and argue that the promotion of justice enjoys primacy over other values. At first sight, rationalism appears to have very radical implications, given that it asks us to base legitimacy on justice. In chapter 6, I argue that this impression is mistaken. We should often pursue justice indirectly, for example, through methods which focus on legal validity or democratic procedure rather than justice.