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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Feb. 10, 2010). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: . Adviser: William Thompson.

The dissertation explores the phenomenon of joining behavior--non-neutral interventions by third party states in interstate conflicts. The opportunity and willingness theoretical framework (Most and Starr 1989) is used to develop a model of third party intervention that integrates simultaneously intervention decision, alignment choices, and selection of specific intervention techniques. Within the general model of third party intervention, two models of third party's preference formation--a rational choice and a homophily-based model--are compared. The models are empirically tested with newly collected data on interventions in interstate disputes for the 1946-2001 period. The data expand current knowledge on third states' activities by including information on non-military--diplomatic and economic--intervention techniques. Opportunity factors are found to predict effectively third parties' intervention; while willingness shapes alignment decisions and selection of intervention techniques. Strategic and homophily-based similarities with the state supported in a conflict and dissimilarities with the state being antagonized are found to matter equally in shaping third parties' decisions. Methodologically, this study addresses a variety of selection issues present in current research on joining behavior. Theoretically, it speaks to a variety of international relations issues, such as balance-of-power and bandwagoning, spatial diffusion of conflict, foreign policy substitutability and decision-making, and alliance formation and reliability.

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This thesis provides an overview of the complex problems related to the extraterritoriality of export controls. / In the last decades when trade became increasingly international, the tendency of governments to use trade embargoes as a political tool grew considerably. Since the effect of trade controls largely depends on the importance of the affected trade, the regulating State commonly interprets its jurisdiction in broad terms. Thus, the number of conflicts between countries concerning the extent of their jurisdiction increased. This thesis focuses on some pivotal cases and analyzes the different principles suggested to solve the problems. / Based on a territorial concept of sovereignty, it finally suggests a doctrine of evasion. The fundamental idea of the doctrine has already been applied in the tax laws of several countries. It is designed to close legislative loopholes. / It is believed that this doctrine, if applied, would strike an acceptable compromise between the interests of the parties concerned: the regulating State could evaluate the risks and costs involved in sanctioning other countries; the business community would be granted a higher degree of certainty in assessing the political risks involved in a commercial engagement with foreign partners and, finally, the sovereignty of foreign States would remain unimpeded.

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My dissertation strives to understand the conditions under which peaceoperations in intra-state wars succeed or fail. I address two main questions: Whatis peace operation success, and what contributes to such an outcome? I define thesuccess of a peace operation based on two dimensions: a) the accomplishment ofthe peace operation's mandate, and b) the establishment of order. This definitionallows me to avoid a binary framework of assessment in terms of success vs.failure by introducing intermediate categories: partial failure and partial success.To explain peace operations' outcomes, I look at the role of the type of strategyadopted and the type of intervener. I suggest that the three major ingredients ofany strategy are: communication, capacity and knowledge. These ingredients allinteract differently depending on which strategy is adopted. I apply my theoreticalframework to empirical cases, testing the saliency of my postulates by examining11 peace operations in three countries: Somalia (1991-1995), Sierra Leone (1999-2005) and Liberia (1990-2009). I assess these operations' outcomes and theprocesses by which they succeeded/failed at accomplishing their mandate whilesimultaneously contributing/hindering their chances at re-establishing order. Iargue that, for a peace operation in an intra-state war, the adoption of a deterrencestrategy works best for re-establishing order while the involvement of a greatpower facilitates the accomplishment of the mandate. / Cette thèse porte sur les conditions et les facteurs de succès des opérationsde la paix dans les guerres civiles au sein d'États déstructurés. Nous cherchons àrépondre à deux principales questions: qu'est-ce que le succès dans le cadre d'uneopération de la paix, et qu'est-ce qui contribue à ce succès? Nous identifionsd'abord deux axes principaux du succès des opérations de la paix: a)l'accomplissement du mandat et b) le rétablissement de l'ordre. Nous proposonsainsi un modèle de classification qui nuance la simple opposition succès/échec parl'ajout de catégories intermédiaires (succès partiel et échec partiel). Nouscherchons ensuite à mettre en valeur l'influence respective du type de stratégieutilisée (dissuasion, coercition et auto-défense) et du type d'intervenant(présence/absence d'une grande puissance, organisation régionale/internationale)sur le succès d'une opération de la paix. Nous nous intéressons aux troisprincipaux ingrédients de toute stratégie, soit la communication, la force de frappeet la connaissance des milieux humain et géophysique. Ces ingrédientsinteragissent différemment selon la stratégie adoptée. Nous appliquons notrecadre théorique et nous testons la pertinence de nos hypothèses en examinant 11opérations de la paix qui ont eu lieu dans trois pays, en Somalie (1991-1995), auSierra Leone (1999-2005) et au Liberia (1990-2009). Nous évaluons le type desuccès/échec ainsi que le processus par lequel ces opérations réussissent/échouentà accomplir leur mandat tout en contribuant/nuisant à leur chance de rétablirl'ordre. Nous soutenons que lors d'une opération de la paix au sein d'un Étatdéstructuré, la dissuasion est la stratégie la plus apte à rétablir l'ordre alors quel'intervention d'une grande puissance facilite l'accomplissement du mandat.