Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the degree Doctor of Philosophy: Public Management (Peacebuilding), Durban University of Technology, Durban, South Africa, 2015. / Nigeria has witnessed a plethora of conflicts and violence especially since her post independent era. Direct and structural violence as well as cultural violence have largely dotted her history. The various nature of violence that have over the years keeps the country teetering at the verge of precipice include, resource-based conflict in the Niger Delta, indigenes-settlers conflicts, gender-based conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts, electoral cum political conflicts and the recent Boko Haram violent menace that has claimed at least 13,000 lives in Nigeria. There have been attempts by government and civil society organisations to curb violence in the country. However, their limited apparent success and the extent of violence underlines the need for alternative approaches to build peace in Nigeria. Building infrastructures for peace is one such alternative. Using an action research approach, the research focusses on establishing peace clubs in four high schools and implementing a programme for a 12 month period. / D

This study investigates the use of violence by Salafi-Oriented Movement Organisations. Drawing mostly from Social Movement Theory’s “political opportunity” and “resource mobilisation” thesis, it uses the Northern Nigerian-born Boko Haram (BH) to study how such organisation evolved and used different forms of violent activisms for goal attainment. On that basis, three main research questions were formulated: (1) What socio-political structures enabled the evolution of the organisation in Northern Nigeria? (2) Under what conditions did BH begin to use armed violence against the Nigerian State? (3) What specific forms of armed violence did BH use and how were such forms of strategy sustained within the organisation? In answering these questions, the study relied on data collected through one-on-one semi-structured interviews from religious leaders in Northern Nigeria (particularly those within the Salafi networks); selected politicians in the areas where the group operates; some Nigerian security personnel, and on focus group interviews from victims of BH violence. In addition, the study also drew from other documentary sources (videos and audio recordings from different leaders in the group), and from internal correspondence between BH leaders and those of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Along the primary data, these documentary sources showed a striking historical continuity about the emergence and activities of BH from inception, up until they began using violence as a means for goal attainment. The data showed that while the emergence of the group was dependent on specific Northern Nigerian socio-political and mobilisatory structures, the adoption and sustenance of different forms of violence in the group were re-enforced by the interactions between the group’s leadership and the Borno state government; the violent response of the Nigerian government to the group's initial anti-state rhetoric; the mobilisation of different material resources (accruing from the organisation’s interactions and collaborations with similar international Salafi networks) and the internal dynamics in the group (competition between the different factions in the organisation). These inter-related conditions provided the windows of opportunity upon which both the establishment of the group, as well as the internal logic for the development and justification of different forms of violence were sustained within the organisation. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In this study, rhetorical analysis through the framework of victimage ritual is employed to analyze four Boko Haram messages on You Tube, five e-mail messages sent to journalists from leaders of Boko Haram, and a BlogSpot web page devoted to Boko Haram. The aim of this analysis is to understand the persuasive devices by which Boko Haram leaders create, express, and sustain their jurisprudence on acts of violence. The goal of this study is to understand how leaders of Boko Haram construct and express the group’s values, sway belief, and justify violence. The findings show that Boko Haram desire to redeem non-Muslims from perdition, liberate Muslims from persecution, protect Islam from criticism, and revenge perceived acts of injustices against Muslims. The group has embarked on this aim by allotting blame, vilifying the enemy-Other, pressing for a holy war, encouraging martyrdom, and alluding to an apocalypse. Boko Haram’s audience is made to believe that Allah has assigned Boko Haram the task to liberate and restore an Islamic haven in Nigeria. Therefore, opposition from the Nigerian government or Western forces is constructed as actions of evil, thus killing members of the opposition becomes a celestial and noble cause. This juxtaposition serves to encourage the violent Jihad which leaders of Boko Haram claims Allah assigned them to lead in the first place. As a result of this cyclical communication, media houses, along the Nigerian government, Christians and Western ideals become the symbolic evil, against which Muslims, sympathizers and would-be-recruits must unite. By locking Islam against the Nigerian government, Western ideals and Christianity in a characteristically hostile manner, Boko Haram precludes any real solution other than an orchestrated Jihad-crusade-or-cleanse model in which a possible coexistence of Muslims and the enemy-Other are denied, and the threat posed by the enemy-Other is eliminated through conversion or destruction. As a result, this study proposes that Boko Haram Internet messages Boko Haram’s mission reveals a movement of separatism, conservatism, and fascism. A movement based on the claim that its activism will establish a state in accordance with the dictates of Allah.