How is the media agenda of Chinese television set by the three institutional powers, the state, market and civil society? How do formal and informal institutions of the state, market and civil society in contemporary China set the media agenda with specific rules and organizations? And what are the power relations among the three institutions that shape the structure and functionaries of mass media in general? Based on a new theoretical framework of media agenda-setting for the analysis of media politics in contemporary China, these questions are explored in three sections. First, policies and regulations had been established by formal and informal institutions of the state to safeguard the state agenda as the primary media agenda. The second, market set audience rating and commercial income as major rules for Chinese television to survive in a competitive economy. The third, emerging civil society set moral standards for television broadcasters to produce programs to check the failure of the state and market on one hand, and to serve the needs and rights of audience as-citizens on the other. The constant changing power relations between the state and market, or between the state and civil society are also explored in sections that market and civil society interact respectively with the state to set the media agenda. The first finding of this thesis relates to the nature of contemporary Chinese television. As one servant for three masters, Chinese television is a mixed entity, which can be motivated to be a state agent, a market entity, and sometimes, a civil society player as well. In long term, Chinese television can be expected to be differentiated and reorganized as affiliates to the three institutions respectively along with the gradual establishment of a checks-and-balances system within and between the state, market, and civil society. The second finding concerns power relations among the three institutions. While both market and civil society emerged to be more and more dynamic in motivating the media to accommodate new social agendas, the state remains as the primary power in setting the media agenda of Chinese television.

How is the media agenda of Chinese television set by the three institutional powers, the state, market and civil society? How do formal and informal institutions of the state, market and civil society in contemporary China set the media agenda with specific rules and organizations? And what are the power relations among the three institutions that shape the structure and functionaries of mass media in general? Based on a new theoretical framework of media agenda-setting for the analysis of media politics in contemporary China, these questions are explored in three sections. First, policies and regulations had been established by formal and informal institutions of the state to safeguard the state agenda as the primary media agenda. The second, market set audience rating and commercial income as major rules for Chinese television to survive in a competitive economy. The third, emerging civil society set moral standards for television broadcasters to produce programs to check the failure of the state and market on one hand, and to serve the needs and rights of audience as-citizens on the other. The constant changing power relations between the state and market, or between the state and civil society are also explored in sections that market and civil society interact respectively with the state to set the media agenda. The first finding of this thesis relates to the nature of contemporary Chinese television. As one servant for three masters, Chinese television is a mixed entity, which can be motivated to be a state agent, a market entity, and sometimes, a civil society player as well. In long term, Chinese television can be expected to be differentiated and reorganized as affiliates to the three institutions respectively along with the gradual establishment of a checks-and-balances system within and between the state, market, and civil society. The second finding concerns power relations among the three institutions. While both market and civil society emerged to be more and more dynamic in motivating the media to accommodate new social agendas, the state remains as the primary power in setting the media agenda of Chinese television.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

莊初傑. / "2005年6月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2005. / 參考文獻(leaves 137-143). / "2005 nian 6 yue". / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Zhuang Chujie. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2005. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 137-143). / Chapter 第一章： --- 引言及硏究問題 --- p.8 / Chapter 第二章： --- 文獻回顧 --- p.13 / Chapter 第一節： --- 論述分析 --- p.14 / Chapter 一、 --- 簡介 / Chapter 二、 --- 論述理論的假設 / Chapter 三、 --- 論述分析與主流政治分析 / Chapter 第二節： --- 文化霸權理論 --- p.20 / Chapter 一、 --- 論述分析下之文化霸權理論 / Chapter 二、 --- 霸權形成的兩種形態 / Chapter - --- 表層與深層的霸權 / Chapter 三、 --- 對文化霸權的批評 / Chapter - --- james Scott 的觀點 / Chapter - --- 「靜態穩定」形成之K釋 / Chapter - --- John Gaventa之權力關係觀 / Chapter 第三節： --- 溝通行動理論 --- p.34 / Chapter 一、 --- 簡介 / Chapter 二、 --- 與霸權槪念的關係 / Chapter 三、 --- 不同之公民社會槪念 / Chapter 第三章： --- 相關香港硏究回顧 --- p.39 / Chapter 第一節： --- 爲何採用論述分析？ --- p.40 / Chapter 第二節： --- 吳俊雄的硏究 --- p.42 / Chapter 第三節： --- 香港身份之歷史回顧：非政治化論述之形構？ --- p.45 / Chapter 第四節： --- 對非政治論述之批評 --- p.48 / Chapter 第五節： --- 與本硏究的關係 --- p.51 / Chapter 一、 --- 吳俊雄的硏究 / Chapter 二、 --- 李漢來的硏究 / Chapter 三、 --- 對吳、李研究之批評 / Chapter 四、 --- 谷淑美的硏究 / Chapter 第六節： --- 方法論與硏究策略方面的問題 --- p.60 / Chapter 第四章： --- 硏究設計及方法簡介 --- p.62 / Chapter 第一節： --- 問卷調查 --- p.63 / Chapter 第二節： --- 焦點組訪談 --- p.65 / Chapter 第五章： --- 中港關係論述 --- p.69 / Chapter 第一節： --- 量化硏究結果 --- p.70 / Chapter 一、 --- 「主動服膺」論述 / Chapter 二、 --- 「務實伙伴」論述 / Chapter 三、 --- 「相互確認」論述 / Chapter 四、 --- 「本質敵對」論述 / Chapter 第二節： --- 質化硏究結果 --- p.78 / Chapter 一、 --- 「主動服膺」論述 / Chapter 二、 --- 「務實伙伴」論述 / Chapter 三、 --- 「相互確認」論述 / Chapter 四、 --- 「本質敵對」論述 / Chapter 第三節： --- 總結 --- p.106 / Chapter 一、 --- 論述間之共同性 / Chapter 二、 --- 量化與質化的方法論結合 / Chapter 三、 --- 決定中港關係論述之基礎原則 / Chapter 第六章： --- 動態的論述分析 --- p.114 / Chapter 第一節： --- 誰是主流？ --- p.115 / Chapter 第二節： --- 論述間之相互關係 --- p.117 / Chapter 第三節： --- 「雙重悖逆」現象 --- p.125 / Chapter 第七章： --- 結論 --- p.130 / 後記 --- p.133 / 參考書目 --- p.137 / 附章：未來可能之硏究方向：理論模型的提出 --- p.144 / 第一節：槪念介紹 --- p.146 / 第二節：公共、大眾論述與政治體制的關係 --- p.147 / 第三節：理論模型與文化霸權的關係 --- p.149 / 第四節：與論文的關係 --- p.152 / 附錄一：電話問卷調查的樣本問卷 --- p.155 / 附錄二： 2004年「七一遊行」問卷調查數據之因子分析結果 --- p.157 / 附錄三：全港性電話問卷調查各論述類別受訪者人數 --- p.159 / 附錄四：一個計算分別代表四個描述中港關係論述類型強度指數的範例 --- p.160 / 附表（表一至表四） --- p.162

By analyzing the written documents and the inscriptions of the bronze artifacts excavated in the Ningzhen and Shaoxing regions, the author concludes that there were a long period of cultural dissemination and exchange among the kingdoms in the Central Plain with the Wu and the Yue people between the region of Huai River and the Yangzi River where Wu and Yue were located. Due to the geographical advantage, Wu and Yue gradually merged into a greater cultural entity which eventually had the same religious beliefs and social customs. However, as indicated in the following discussions, both the cultural traditions of the Wu and the Yue reserved their uniqueness in various aspects. First, they adopted different strategies and attitudes in absorbing the Han culture. Second, both the Wu and the Yue discarded part of their aboriginal cultures, while modified their own traditions by integrating cultural elements from neighboring feudal kingdoms. Third, since the cultural strategies of both the Wu and Yue were different, which directly affected Wu's and Yue's cultural and political development. For example, there were conflicts and disputes among the ruling classes, especially during the early period of their contending hegemony with the feudal lords in the Central Plain. After a long period of cultural acculturations, new cultures were formed under the reigns of the Wu and the Yue's rulers. / This thesis focuses on explaining different processes of cultural acculturations among the Wu and the Yue, and the culture between their neighboring countries. By examining the evidences from written literatures and bronze inscriptions, the author emphasizes the internal and external political developments that affected the paces and the directions of their cultural development. / Wu and Yue, were located in the south-east China, contended with the feudal lords in the Central Plain for the hegemony during the Chunqiu and Zhanguo Periods (770 B. C.--221 B.C.). These two neighboring countries had similar cultural characteristics. For instance, they shared the same language, similar living customs and political systems. The author holds the view that the cultural elements of the Wu and the Yue were fairly similar to the Han people in the Central Plain. However, due to the barbaric origins of the Wu and the Yue ethnic groups, they were regarded as outsiders and were rejected to participate in the ritual affairs with the feudal lords of Zhou Dynasty B.C. 1122? until B.C. 585. / 陳月平. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2006. / 參考文獻(p. 233-247). / Adviser: Ming Chiu Lai. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-02, Section: A, page: 0685. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / School code: 1307. / Lun wen (zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2006. / Can kao wen xian (p. 233-247). / Chen Yueping.

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After the return to China, the Hong Kong Government finally decided in January 2008 to reduce the Frontier Closed Area (FCA) coverage from about 2,800 hectares to about 400 hectares and over half of the people residing inside the current FCA are no longer required to have a closed area permit to enter or leave the excised area. For over a century, Lin Ma Hang villagers, especially some Hakka women, can be considered as ambassadors promoting communication between Hong Kong and Shenzhen. They not only witnessed the changing relations between China and Britain, but they also moved between different identities as Chinese, Hakka and Hong Kong people. The history of Lin Ma Hang records the experience of a group of Chinese refugees with Hakka consciousness, mostly with the surname Yip, who lived under British and subsequently Japanese rule and became Hong Kong people after the Second World War. It also highlights the complex and multi-layered nature of Hakka identity. / Emphasis has been placed on the manifestations and material culture of Hakka people, studies into their internal consciousness has not attracted much attention. Lin Ma Hang is a specific case to look into the Hakim psychology in the context of a closed area. Adjacent to the boundary between Hong Kong and the Mainland China, this is an indigenous Hakka-speaking village. For many years during the Qing Dynasty, its villagers had to walk on a bridge that enabled them to reach their farmland located on the other side of the Shenzhen River. However, after the Qing Government's signed unequal treaty, Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory in 1898 which allowed Britain to lease the New Territories, the original village area of Lin Ma Hang was divided into two parts - the Chinese side and the British side, with the Shenzhen River serving as the boundary. Indigenous villagers from Lin Ma Hang, which came under the jurisdiction of Britain, continued to cross this bridge to the Chinese side, just like their forefathers. Such border-crossing practice was maintained even during the 1960s when the Mainland China suffered a famine which led to mass exoduses of people and political and social turmoil such as the Cultural Revolution. Since the 1980s, the entire village has been enclosed by iron fences by the British for security reasons, which posed a formidable obstacle to the villagers' daily lives and travelling to nearby markets, and a psychological imprisonment in the minds of villagers, and their gradual loss of control of their farmland. However, it appears that the spirit of endurance embedded in Hakka culture had enabled them to overcome all types of obstacles and reestablish their confidence to communicate with the outside world, continuing their fight for the opening up of the closed area. / Using Lin Ma Hang Village in Sha Tau Kok, Hong Kong's New Territories as a case study, this thesis gives an historical account of how indigenous villagers living in the border area adjusted to political and social changes following the lease of the New Territories by Britain until Hong Kong's return to China, and how they inherited the Hakka culture through different ways. / With the case study of the Lin Ma Hang Hakka village, this thesis attempts to explore the Hakka culture that has been ignored by Hong Kong people. It signifies how an indigenous village, which was divided up due to political reasons, survives through its unique ways. / 阮志偉. / Adviser: Hok Ming Frederick Cheung; Pui Yin Ho. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-04, Section: A, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 308-321). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Ruan Zhiwei.

In order to explore the changing spatial politics and the changing ideas of "right to the city", I look in particular at how different ideologies have been used in different historical periods in planning the city, as well as the practices that led to spatial change. Using Henri Lefebvre's theory of the "right to the city", I suggest three dimensions in observing the right to the city, namely, the right to settle, the right to be different from the "modem city", and the right to keep the structure of meaning with regards to daily life and local space. By examining historical materials and using field work data, I show how "the right to the city" was ignored by the central and local governments during the planning process. I point out that the state always acts as the main factor that shapes the space of the city. The urban planning process was affected by the change of spatial politics, the politics of heritage, and the production of space from the state. Despite this, residents' daily lives help to shape the structure of meaning between their lives and their local space. Thus, the local residents have been able to find their own space in the city. / Quanzhou is a medium-size ancient city in Fujian, and as with other old cities in China today, its urban space became the arena of negotiation between different local and global social forces and the state. There is also great deal of politics and ambiguity around the concepts of "cultural heritage", and "modernization". / This research studies the changing spatial politics from the traditional to the modem state, and the factors that affect the form of space in Quanzhou's different historical stages. The central questions are: how have spatial politics led to the changes of local culture; in what ways have the local residents had their own right to the city and how have they reacted to the state's spatial politics? / 罗攀. / Adviser: Joseph Prosco. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-04, Section: A, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 216-225). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Luo Pan.