Previous research on privatization has focused on its effect on output, profitability, investment, and efficiency at the level of the firm, neglecting the economic growth and other impacts. Nigeria's port privatization through concession in 2006 covered virtually all the ports in the economy. However, the few studies on the subject neither factored in the complexity that characterize the multiple port system nor controlled for alternative explanations of the changes in the economy. This correlational study tested the property rights theory by investigating whether the changes in production efficiency at the ports following privatization are good predictors of economic growth in Nigeria. Eight years of existing panel data were collected from Nigerian ports, providing 160 observations on several selected variables. The analyses controlled for the influence of confounding or interacting variables and addressed the complexity of the port system using linear programming. The multiple regression analysis showed that privatization, deregulation, cargo increases, interest rate, and inflation rate accounted for high variations in short and long-term economic growth. Port privatization transmitted growth to the economy through cargo throughput increases. The Malmquist linear programming analysis revealed overall but modest improvements in production efficiency changes after the privatization. By isolating possible areas of efficiency improvements, this study may inform port managers in Nigeria on ways to improve overall competitiveness. The potential contribution of the research to social change lies in clearly identifying the critical variables to economic growth in Nigeria to aid economic planning, poverty alleviation and improving the quality of life.

This dissertation is composed of three chapters regarding international trade and environmental regulation. The first chapter focuses on the relationship between port ownership and the port R\&D investment. I investigate whether a larger degree of private involvement in the port sector makes for a higher level of welfare, as well as an improvement in port performance. I establish the stage games to analyze the reciprocal international trade. The theoretical findings indicate that the endowment of population plays an essential role in choosing the optimal port ownership. In the second chapter, I investigate the effect of port pollution regulation on port ownership. I incorporate the regulation tax on emissions from port cargo handling into the international duopoly trade model. The results of the stage games suggest the same ownership of the ports in both countries. I also extend the categories of port structures to include the transfer of port ownership to the other country. The policy implication is to have the small country own both ports, which is opposite to the port governance in reality. In the third chapter, I explore the equilibrium port ownership structures without other policy issues or regulation on the port sector being considered. The influence of country size per se suggests that a small country should privatize its port in the context of a privatized port in the large country. For a large country, it is better to choose a type of ownership different from the small country's. In addition, it is the country whose population is greater than a third of the scale in the other country that should own both ports.