This paper investigates the determinants of mutual fund portfolio manager ownership and its association with fund performance. Using hand-collected data of 1,420 U.S. equity funds from 32 fund families, we find that variations in fund manager holdings are broadly consistent with optimal contracting theory instead of the result of managers' personal investment consideration. Portfolio manager ownership is positively and significantly correlated with variables that proxy for intensity of agency conflicts. Specifically, portfolio managers hold more mutual fund shares when the size of concurrently managed hedge fund increases and when the advisor is affiliated to the bank. In addition, fund managers invest more in funds with primary investment in growth stock, non-index funds, and solo-managed funds. Regarding to the alternative governance mechanism, higher threat of dismissal for outsourced funds, stronger monitoring from institutional investors, and long-term performance based bonus work as substitutes of fund manager ownership while director ownership works as a compliment. Finally, we find little evidence supporting the notion that funds with higher portfolio manager ownership perform better.