Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1981. / Bibliography: leaves [230]-234. / Microfiche. / iv, 234 leaves, bound 29 cm

This thesis analyses theories of practical reason. In particular I compare desire theories of reasons with value theories of reasons. Desire theories of reasons, as I define them, claim that it is a necessary condition of A having a reason to ф that A’s reason depend on A’s antecedent desires. In contrast, I define value theories of reasons as those theories that claim that it is a necessary condition of A having a reason to ф that A’s ф-ing be valuable. In this thesis my main concern lies with those value theorists who accept the motivational requirement: the claim that if an agent is to have a reason to ф, then it must be possible for the agent to ф on the basis of this reason. In particular, I concentrate on those value theorists who claim that A has a reason to ф iff a) A’s ф-ing is valuable; b) it is possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason. I reject desire theories of reasons on the basis of several criticisms. I claim that our desires are normatively arbitrary, and that according to desire theories of reasons, some of our desires ought to be eradicated. I argue instead for a value theory of reasons that adopts a particular interpretation of the motivational requirement. I distinguish three different interpretations of the motivational requirement, each offering a connection between reasons and motivations that differs in strength. The first, strongest requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason given certain qualities that A possesses (where I take the sense of ‘possible’ relevant to these interpretations to be one that reflects an agent’s capacities). The second and weakest requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason if A possessed certain qualities. The last and moderate requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason if A possessed certain qualities and A either has these qualities, or it is possible for her to get herself into a state where she has them. I argue for a value theory of reasons that employs this last, moderate motivational requirement. I argue that a value theory that adopts the moderate motivational requirement is best, as it allows the theory to be practically useful; reasons on this account have a role in deterrence, encouragement and praise- and blame-worthiness. The theory also aligns with a plausible account of eligible candidates for reasons. While the employment of the moderate motivational requirement in a value theory of reasons likens the theory, in some respects, to a desire theory, it avoids the objections raised against desire theories of reasons. In this way, a value theory of reasons that employs the moderate motivational requirement combines the attractive features of a desire theory and a value theory. Specifically, it generates reasons that are both dependent on an individual’s qualities, and also aligned with an account of value. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2008

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of London, 1996. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-292) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of London, 1996. / Title from e-book title screen (viewed Oct. 15, 2007). Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-292) and index.

Thesis--Université de Paris. / On cover: Bibliographie méthodique du pragmatisme américain, anglais et italien. Paris, Alcan, 1923. The work does include bibliographical references for Italien philosophers.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliography.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of London, 1996. / Title from e-book title screen (viewed October 15, 2007). Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-292) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1938. / Reproduced from type-written copy. "Private edition, distributed by the University of Chicago libraries, Chicago, Illinois." Bibliography: p. 74-80.

Inaug.-diss.--München. / "Zur literatur": p. [5]-6.