證期會於民國九十一年十一月十四日公布「公開發行公司公開財務預測資訊處理準則」，該準則中規定已公開財務預測之公開發行公司，於年度終了後一個月內須公告申報預計損益表之達成情形並說明差異原因。而且若與嗣後經會計師查核之稅前損益間之差異超過一定門檻時，亦須一併公告差異金額及原因。 本研究預期，公司為了聲譽、股價、融資受阻及溝通成本等原因，可能不希望自結損益與查核損益差異過大。另外，公司管理當局為了避免上述差異超過門檻，在公告自結損益前可能洽請審計人員進行財務報表初查或過目自結損益表；而審計人員也可能為了避免查核時調整事項過多，造成與客戶間的衝突，亦可能希望客戶在公告自結損益前能先洽請審計人員進行初查或過目自結損益表。因此，實施自結損益規定可能造成審計人員先前涉入公司之自結損益。 本研究以四大會計師事務所之合夥會計師九名及資深審計經理六十六名為對象，採取實驗的方式，探討實施自結損益規定對審計人員審計判斷的影響。並進一步探討審計人員先前涉入公司自結損益的普遍程度，及此一情形對審計人員審計判斷的影響 實驗結果顯示實施自結損益的規定的確會使得審計人員普遍先前涉入公司自結損益；審計人員調整應計損失的幅度比實施前小，尤其在其有先前涉入公司自結損益的情形下，更為明顯；且發現因設有重大差異標準而造成的門檻效果。換言之，依本研究結果推論，實施公告自結損益規定會影響審計人員的專業判斷，壓縮審計人員調整損益的空間。 / This thesis experimentally examines the effects of a regulation on audit judgments. In November 2002, the Securities and Futures Commission announced a new measure requiring listed companies that have made their financial forecast to the public to release within a month after the year end their income statements (hereafter called “pre-announced earnings”) and explain the discrepancy from the forecasted earnings. This new measure requires that the above listed companies release their earnings information earlier than the deadline for filing audited financial statements (hereafter called “audited earnings”) by three months, aiming to ask the listed companies to provide more timely information to investors. It also sets some threshold beyond which the companies and auditors are required to explain the discrepancy. The threshold dictates, among others, that the differences between the pre-announced earnings and audited earnings cannot exceed 20 percent of pre-announced earnings. The current study predicts that due to the consideration of reputation, communication costs, and stock price reaction, companies will have incentives to keep the difference, if any, between the pre-announced earnings and audited earnings within the limit. The auditors will also have similar incentives to do so to avoid the loss of clients, and communication costs. In doing so, the companies will ask auditors to involve in the process prior to pre-announcing earnings (hereafter called “pre-announcement process”), which will help narrow down the difference between pre-announced earnings and audited earnings. This study recruits 66 senior managers and nine partners from Big 4 firms to participate in an experiment in which they make audit judgment as to the adjustment required for a client’s allowance for bad debts. They are also required to generalize the client’s case to the listed companies as a whole and make similar judgments. Their perception on the extent to which auditors’ involvement in the pre-announcement process is also solicited. The data based on the experiment are used to examine the following hypotheses: H1: The adjustments required by auditors will be smaller after this new regulation than before the new regulation. H2: The degree to which auditors are involved in the pre-announcement process will be high. H3: The adjustment required by auditors will be smaller when auditors are involved in the pre-announcement process than when they are not. The results show that the adjustment required by auditors is smaller after the new regulation than before the new regulation. But the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.133). When generalizing the client’s case to the listed companies as a whole, the difference becomes marginally significant (p = 0.074). Thus, H1 is not supported. The auditors perceive that the extent to which auditors will be involved in the process prior to pre-announcement is significantly higher than 7 on a 1-9 scale (p = 0.002), supporting H2. The results also indicate that auditor’s prior involvement in the pre-announcement process has a significant effect on the required adjustment no matter it is a specific or general case (p < 0.001). Thus H3 is supported. Combining these findings suggests that the new regulation has an effect on constraining auditors in requiring adjustments to their client’s accounting estimates to the extent that the threshold permits. This new regulation therefore poses a trade off between relevance (timeliness) and reliability (representational faithfulness) of accounting information. Meanwhile, the role of auditors in attesting financial statements may also be adversely affected.