Brazil is renowned worldwide for its remarkable reforms in pharmaceutical regulation, which have enhanced access to essential medicines while lowering drug costs. As part of these reforms, the Generic Drug Act was introduced in 1999. This policy mandates that pharmaceutical products that are no longer protected by a patent must be interchangeable with an innovator (reference) drug. This thesis examines how and why Brazil promoted this large-scale regulatory policy. The literature on pharmaceutical policy often invokes international guidelines that inspire countries to reformulate their regulatory regimes or argues that regulations emerge in order to serve the interests of powerful interest groups. In contrast, this thesis examines how changes in the regulatory environment affect actors’ policy preferences. It argues that as actors adapt and respond to new regulatory environments, they also push the policy path further along the way. This historical qualitative case study relies on in-depth interviews and documentary research to trace the policy process of generic drug regulation in Brazil. It finds that Brazil’s generic drug reform can be attributed to a convergence of the evolution of pharmaceutical regulation, unexpected events (AIDS epidemic and scandal of fake medicines) and political activity of the Minister of Health. In turn, this study demonstrates that the new regulatory development altered the preferences of local pharmaceutical firms, who now support and uphold a policy they once opposed because of the high costs associated with adapting their industrial plants and processes. The regulation of generic drugs has also culminated in other unintended consequences. Public pharmaceutical factories were still unable to fully adjust to the new regulatory environment and patient groups slowly became aware of these limitations. Paradoxically, the generic drug regulation introduced in the name of patients and opposed by local pharmaceutical firms, is today opposed by important patient advocacy groups but solidified by the strong support of local and multinational pharmaceutical firms. These findings suggest although pharmaceutical firms strongly support the generic drug regulation today; they did not control the policy process that created it. Although Brazil’s norms resemble international guidelines, they were developed locally. Brazil’s case demonstrates that evolution of domestic political institutions were the most important determinant of the timing and direction of the regulatory policy. Thus, this thesis concludes that the state still matters for pharmaceutical regulation and that pharmaceutical regulation is only partially influenced by non-state actors.

This thesis consists of four essays in resource and behavioral economics. Resource Extraction, Capital Accumulation and Time Horizon The paper shows that relaxing the standard infinite horizon assumption can explain the patterns of exhaustible resource extraction and prices for the last century. An empirical test proposes a time horizon of roughly 28 years to be most likely. Model calibration yields an oil price which fits the falling price after WWII and suggests that the sharply increasing price after 1998 is due to scarcity. Optimal Forest Rotation under Climate Change    The scenario of forests growing faster over time, due to climate change, is analyzed. It is shown numerically that ignoring future changes is highly likely to be accurate in terms of harvesting and will cause insignificant profit losses. Tragedy of the Commons versus the Love of Variety    The opposing effects of overharvesting of renewable resources when property rights are missing and increased consumption variety, both due to trade, are analyzed. Trade increases welfare if the resource has strong regenerative power. If, instead, the resource regenerates slowly, then sufficient increases in the number of trade partners harms welfare and the stock may even collapse. Correcting policies may be very harsh and still improve upon laissez faire. The Distribution of Revealed Preferences under Social Pressure    Stated preferences, such as declared political opinions, are studied when individuals make the trade off between being true to their real opinions and conforming to a social norm. In orthodox societies, individuals will tend to either conform fully or ignore the social norm while individuals in liberal societies will tend to compromise between the two extremes. The model sheds light on phenomena such as polarization, alienation and hypocrisy. Furthermore, it suggests that orthodoxy cannot be maintained under pluralism.

O principal argumento deste trabalho é que a interação entre interesses, idéias e enquadramentos discursivos (frames) permite explicar como e por que certas instituições orçamentárias brasileiras foram escolhidas, desde 1987, em vez de outras. Defendo que os interesses dos parlamentares a respeito das instituições orçamentárias é definido, em grande parte, por como essas instituições funcionam na prática. Mostro que a estratégia de execução orçamentária utilizada pelo Executivo Brasileiro no período pós-1988 é fundamental para explicar por que parlamentares da coalizão devem, em tese, defender limites ao emendamento, a organização centralizada da Comissão Mista de Orçamento e o Orçamento Autorizativo. Os parlamentares da oposição, por sua vez, devem defender emendamento ilimitado, a descentralização da comissão orçamentária e o Orçamento Impositivo. Três critical junctures foram fundamentais para definir as instituições orçamentárias brasileiras no recente período democrático: a Assembléia Constituinte de 1987-1988, o período pós-CPI de 1994-1995 e a época de 2005-2006. Ao inserir as escolhas de instituições orçamentárias na lógica do processo constituinte, entende-se por que certas instituições da ditadura militar foram mantidas (por exemplo, a Comissão Mista de Orçamento) e outras foram ressuscitadas, parcialmente, do regime democrático de 1946-1964 (por exemplo, a prerrogativa de parlamentares emendarem o orçamento). Em seguida, o trabalho aborda as escolhas pós-constituintes, avaliando como escândalos de corrupção e as critical junctures derivadas parcialmente deles ajudaram a alterar diversos aspectos do emendamento orçamentário no Brasil. Mostro também como o entrepreneur de oposição Ricardo Barros conseguiu, em 2006, ser extremamente bem-sucedido na descentralização de aspectos da Comissão Mista de Orçamento. A estabilidade do Orçamento Autorizativo no Brasil é analisado em seguida e pode ser visto como um caso complementar aos demais, pois trata de uma quase mudança institucional. Os enquadramentos discursivos utilizados pelo entrepreneur Antônio Carlos Magalhães, principal defensor do fim do Orçamento Autorizativo, revelam quais interesses legislativos estiveram presentes na decisão de manter essa instituição. / How does the interaction between interests, ideas and frames help explain institutional development? This dissertation takes the evolution of budgeting institutions in Brazil since 1987 as a case study to answer this question. I argue that congressmens interests regarding budgeting institutions is mainly defined by how these institutions actually work. I show that the presidential strategy of executing amendments explains why coalition congressmen normally defend limited amendment power, a centralized budget process and the Authoritative Budget. The inverse goes for opposition congressment. Three critical junctures were very important in the definition of budgeting institutions in the recent democratic period: the National Constituent Assembly in 1987-1988, and two short periods during the unveiling of budgeting corruption scandals in 1994-1995 and 2005-2006. I show how the centralized budget process was kept in the 1988 Constitution and was used by the coalition up to 2006, when an opposition entrepreneur was successful in decentralizing part of the process. Congressmens prerogatives for amending the budget were enlarged in the 1988 Constitution, but somewhat toned down due to the influence of corruption scandals in shaping the institutional development agenda. Finally, I tackle the problem of how institutions remain stable in processes of reproduction that are not path dependent. I do so by analyzing Brazils main budgeting institution the Authoritative Budget as a case study to consider how control of the legislative agenda by the Executive can be considered a power mechanism through which institutions are endogenously maintained. It also illuminates the limitations of entrepreneurs who almost single-handedly attempt to change institutional arrangements. In this case, the entrepreneur, Antonio Carlos Magalhães, obtained relative success but ultimately failed.

O principal argumento deste trabalho é que a interação entre interesses, idéias e enquadramentos discursivos (frames) permite explicar como e por que certas instituições orçamentárias brasileiras foram escolhidas, desde 1987, em vez de outras. Defendo que os interesses dos parlamentares a respeito das instituições orçamentárias é definido, em grande parte, por como essas instituições funcionam na prática. Mostro que a estratégia de execução orçamentária utilizada pelo Executivo Brasileiro no período pós-1988 é fundamental para explicar por que parlamentares da coalizão devem, em tese, defender limites ao emendamento, a organização centralizada da Comissão Mista de Orçamento e o Orçamento Autorizativo. Os parlamentares da oposição, por sua vez, devem defender emendamento ilimitado, a descentralização da comissão orçamentária e o Orçamento Impositivo. Três critical junctures foram fundamentais para definir as instituições orçamentárias brasileiras no recente período democrático: a Assembléia Constituinte de 1987-1988, o período pós-CPI de 1994-1995 e a época de 2005-2006. Ao inserir as escolhas de instituições orçamentárias na lógica do processo constituinte, entende-se por que certas instituições da ditadura militar foram mantidas (por exemplo, a Comissão Mista de Orçamento) e outras foram ressuscitadas, parcialmente, do regime democrático de 1946-1964 (por exemplo, a prerrogativa de parlamentares emendarem o orçamento). Em seguida, o trabalho aborda as escolhas pós-constituintes, avaliando como escândalos de corrupção e as critical junctures derivadas parcialmente deles ajudaram a alterar diversos aspectos do emendamento orçamentário no Brasil. Mostro também como o entrepreneur de oposição Ricardo Barros conseguiu, em 2006, ser extremamente bem-sucedido na descentralização de aspectos da Comissão Mista de Orçamento. A estabilidade do Orçamento Autorizativo no Brasil é analisado em seguida e pode ser visto como um caso complementar aos demais, pois trata de uma quase mudança institucional. Os enquadramentos discursivos utilizados pelo entrepreneur Antônio Carlos Magalhães, principal defensor do fim do Orçamento Autorizativo, revelam quais interesses legislativos estiveram presentes na decisão de manter essa instituição. / How does the interaction between interests, ideas and frames help explain institutional development? This dissertation takes the evolution of budgeting institutions in Brazil since 1987 as a case study to answer this question. I argue that congressmens interests regarding budgeting institutions is mainly defined by how these institutions actually work. I show that the presidential strategy of executing amendments explains why coalition congressmen normally defend limited amendment power, a centralized budget process and the Authoritative Budget. The inverse goes for opposition congressment. Three critical junctures were very important in the definition of budgeting institutions in the recent democratic period: the National Constituent Assembly in 1987-1988, and two short periods during the unveiling of budgeting corruption scandals in 1994-1995 and 2005-2006. I show how the centralized budget process was kept in the 1988 Constitution and was used by the coalition up to 2006, when an opposition entrepreneur was successful in decentralizing part of the process. Congressmens prerogatives for amending the budget were enlarged in the 1988 Constitution, but somewhat toned down due to the influence of corruption scandals in shaping the institutional development agenda. Finally, I tackle the problem of how institutions remain stable in processes of reproduction that are not path dependent. I do so by analyzing Brazils main budgeting institution the Authoritative Budget as a case study to consider how control of the legislative agenda by the Executive can be considered a power mechanism through which institutions are endogenously maintained. It also illuminates the limitations of entrepreneurs who almost single-handedly attempt to change institutional arrangements. In this case, the entrepreneur, Antonio Carlos Magalhães, obtained relative success but ultimately failed.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of preference formation in the European Union. Thus, the study aims to answer the following research question: How were Sweden’s preferences in the Council of the EU affected by the British exit from the EU? The study tracked Swedish preferences within two policy areas: labor market policy, which is assessed to have high salience, and the common agricultural policy, which is assessed to have lower salience. The method used was a quasi-experimental design, comparing the stance of the Swedish government in the time periods before, during and after Brexit. The main finding of the study was that the content of Swedish preferences remained the same within both policy areas. However, the preferences for national competency over labor market regulation was stronger after Brexit than before. Based on these results, the paper reaches the conclusion that there is no evidence of Sweden adapting national preferences to a changed composition of preferences in the council. Even without support from a large state, Sweden maintains outlier positions in issues of both high and low salience. Hence, the study’s empirical findings confirm the understanding of preferences as stable and independent from a changing international setting.

Decision making for fast-moving consumer goods involves a choice between numerous similar alternatives. Under such demanding circumstances, a decision is made for one product. The decision is dependent on the interaction between the environment and the mind of the consumer, both of which are filled with information that can influence the outcome. The aim of this dissertation is to explore how the mind and the environment guides attention towards considered and chosen products in consumer decision making at the point-of-purchase. Consumers are equipped with several effort reduction strategies to simplify complex decision making. The selection of strategies can be conscious or automatic and driven by information in the environment or the mind of the decision maker. The selected decision strategy reduces the set of options to one alternative in an iterative process of comparisons that are fast and rely on perceptual cues to quickly exclude irrelevant products. This thesis uses eye-tracking to explore this rapid processing that lacks conscious access or control. The purpose is to explore how product packaging and placement (as in-store factors), and recognition, preferences, and choice task (as out-of-store factors) influence the decision-making process through visual attention. The results of the 10 experiments in the five papers that comprise this thesis shed new light on the role of visual attention in the interaction between the environment and the mind, and its influence on the consumer. It is said that consumers choose with their eyes, which means that unseen is unsold. The results of this thesis show that it is just as important to be comprehended as it is to be seen. In split-second decision making, the ability to recognize and comprehend a product can significantly impact preferences. Comprehension stretches beyond perception as consumers infer value from memory structures that influence attention. Hence, the eye truly sees what the mind is prepared to comprehend.