My diploma thesis focuses on the M&A transaction closing mechanisms. Their function is to reflect the value changes of the target company into the purchase price. Value change occurs during the time lag between the date of the financial statements and the date of the transaction closing. Throughout history, there have been two major approaches developed. The "Completion Accounts Mechanism" uses post-completion price adjustments to reflect the change of the net working capital and net debt during the interim period. The "Locked Box Mechanism", using fixed price, assures non-fluctuation of target value in the interim period by imposing strict restrictions on the seller's activities. In this research, I have analyzed 44 transactions closed in the Czech Republic. I have challenged the theoretical foundations and described the application of the mechanisms in practice. At the end, I have compared the Czech and European practices. Thesis findings: 1. All the theoretical features of the mechanisms were proven by an analyzed sample of closed transactions. The completion accounts mechanism is buyer-friendly, while the locked box is a seller-friendly mechanism. 2. The main driver in mechanism selection is bargaining power. Buyers were in a better negotiating position in 69% of the completion account transactions. On the contrary, the sellers had bargaining power in 100% of the locked box transactions. 3. The Czech Republic is an environment where buyers (big multinational companies) dominate. They have preferred the completion account mechanism that provides them with higher protection from value leakage or other risks associated with small CEE economies. A total of 91% of analyzed transactions were executed by the completion account mechanism in the Czech Republic between 2011 and 2012.

This study investigates the concessioning of the commuter rail subsystem, which was discussed in the White Paper on National Transport Policy. The theoretical divide between private and public sector enterprise is investigated in terms of a principal-agent approach. The hypothesis underlying the fundamental shift of services traditionally provided by government enterprise to the private sector is X-efficiency gains under a concession regime. There are, however, potential challenges under a concession regime that must be anticipated. Challenges are identified in terms of an incomplete contract approach with its underpinning source manifested in a bounded rationality concept. The study investigates how rail concessionaires are regulated under a concession regime from an economics perspective and various price mechanisms are explored. The study provides strategies to deal with challenges under a rail concession regime with a view to minimising conflicts that will arise between the parties involved in a concession agreement. / Transport, Logistics & Tourism / M.Comm.(Transport Economics)

This study investigates the concessioning of the commuter rail subsystem, which was discussed in the White Paper on National Transport Policy. The theoretical divide between private and public sector enterprise is investigated in terms of a principal-agent approach. The hypothesis underlying the fundamental shift of services traditionally provided by government enterprise to the private sector is X-efficiency gains under a concession regime. There are, however, potential challenges under a concession regime that must be anticipated. Challenges are identified in terms of an incomplete contract approach with its underpinning source manifested in a bounded rationality concept. The study investigates how rail concessionaires are regulated under a concession regime from an economics perspective and various price mechanisms are explored. The study provides strategies to deal with challenges under a rail concession regime with a view to minimising conflicts that will arise between the parties involved in a concession agreement. / Transport, Logistics and Tourism / M.Comm.(Transport Economics)