In light of the long-lived, on-going debate surrounding the Aristotelian doctrines of prime matter and the four simple bodies (or 'elements'), the general message of this thesis is surprising: that Aristotle's theory is centred on neither. I argue that Aristotle does in fact have a substantial prime matter, but not the single, featureless, immutable prime matter of tradition. / More particularly, the thesis defends three main points: / Firstly, Aristotle’s discussion of pre-Socratic and Plato’s philosophies of nature reveals a commitment to finding elements in the sense of the most fundamental things knowable. These elements apply to not just matter, but to the whole of nature. The evidence for Aristotle’s commitment to absolute fundamentals is in his word usage: he speaks of the various kinds of elements (roots, first principles, etc.) as absolute fundamentals, and uses the terms interchangeably. The evidence for his interest in nature (rather than only matter) is found within his argument, where the assumptions give away his motives. / Secondly, since Aristotle considers nature to be, as he puts it, a principle of change, his elements turn out to be his familiar three elements of change: form, privation, and substratum. While change is the focus of this framework, the approach allows matter to be analysed, leading Aristotle to a substantial substratum underneath each change. Thus, he confirms the existence of the four simple bodies (earth, water, air and fire), and deduces, from the premise that they change, that there is another substratum beneath them. / And thirdly, since this substratum underneath the four simple bodies is known only by deduction, Aristotle cannot sense its features, and his three-element framework is powerless to analyse it any further. That last substratum is therefore at the edge of his knowledge, and in a purely epistemic sense, it is featureless and prime. / This epistemically prime matter is of no great importance to Aristotle - its primality is not even important enough to warrant extended discussion, and he certainly leaves the way open for further analysis, if ever that substratum turns out to suffer sensible change. In the hands of scholars focussed on the elements of matter, this last knowable substratum was perhaps the inspiration behind the traditional prime matter. / Many recent works deny Aristotle’s support for traditional prime matter. There is a danger that refutations of traditional prime matter refute also my epistemically prime matter, and thus attack the heart of this thesis. However, because they focus on matter rather than on change and nature more generally, those refutations in fact prove harmless, their analysis indeed often agreeing with mine in the course of their discussion.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [90]-102).

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