First, we analyze the optimal design of a markdown pricing mechanism with preannounced prices. In the presence of limited supply, buyers who choose to purchase at a lower price may face a scarcity in supply. Our focus is on the structure of the optimal markdown mechanisms in the presence of rational or "strategic" buyers who demand multiple units. We first examine a complete information setting where the set of customer valuations is known but the seller does not know the valuation of each individual customer (i.e., cannot exercise perfect price discrimination). We then generalize our analysis to an incomplete valuation information setting where customer valuations are drawn from known distributions. For both settings, we compare the seller's profit resulting from the optimal markdown mechanism and the optimal single price. We provide a number of managerial insights into designing profitable markdown mechanisms. Next, we focus on the purchasing behavior of the customers and the optimal pricing decisions of the seller assuming that the seller has incomplete information about the customer demand. Each buyer demands multiple units of the homogeneous product that the seller is offering via a priority pricing mechanism with multiple prices, where the only difference is the availability/scarcity of the supply at each price. We provide managerial insights based on the results from a stylized model. Finally, building on the incomplete demand information setting, we focus on the value of improved information about the customer demand to the seller. We investigate whether improved information benefits the seller and if the seller would prefer to share the improved demand information with the customers.

My dissertation consists of empirical and theoretical essays on Microeconomic Theory and International Economics. The first chapter discusses the existence and characterization of a model that determines producer's optimal pricing and allocation rule as a preannounced markdown schedule. The mechanism focuses on pricing and operational implications of allotting scarce resources when customers are heterogeneous in their valuations and sensitivities towards availability of product. The proposed mechanism suggests that a carefully designed multistep markdown pricing could achieve optimal revenue when selling a single unit. However, to sell multiple units, monopolist should modify the implementation of markdown pricing by either hiding the number of available products or selling them via contingent contracts and upfront payments. In the second essay, we study the heterogeneity of finance and growth nexus across countries. Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating whether this impact differs across regions and types of economy. Using a rich dataset, cross-section and dynamic panel estimation results suggest that the beneficial effect of financial deepening on economic growth in fact displays measurable heterogeneity; it is generally smaller in oil exporting countries; in certain regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and in lower-income countries. Further analysis suggests that these differences might be driven by regulatory/supervisory characteristics and related to differing performance on financial access for a given level of depth. The third chapter analyzes contraction of exports in the aftermath of severe financial crises and tests for its heterogeneity across different industries and based on their credit conditions. It provides a theoretical framework to provide insight on why sectors are hit disproportionately during and in the aftermath of severe financial distresses, and confirms most of them with empirical estimations. The findings suggest that industries with greater reliance on outside financing and fewer shares of tangible assets experience greater contractions in export volumes in the years following a severe financial crisis. / text