Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Joe E. Tyner. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-101, 103-109). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1993. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-120). Also available via the Internet.

[by] Edgar H. Schein. / "Paper presented to Conference on Career Planning for POW Returnees, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C., November 16, 1972." / Bibliography: leaves [17]-[18]

The purpose of this study is to examine and evaluate the development of prisoner of war administration in the United States. No full account of this phase of World War II history exists. This study is an attempt to fill that gap.When the United States officially entered World War II in December, 1941 the War Department plans for handling prisoners of war had not anticipated the transfer of thousands of war prisoners to the United States. Consequently, when War Department officials decided on this move in 1942, no detailed policies existed. Agreements resulting from the projected African campaign called for transfer of an undetermined number of German and Italian prisoners to the United States for internment. Prisoners began arriving in large numbers after May, 1943. Ultimately some 375,000 German soldiers were interned in a total of 155 base camps and 511 branch camps. The Geneva Convention of 1929, untested in war, along with post-World War I Army Regulations, provided the War Department with some guidelines, if only in theory and principle, upon which to formulate a prisoner of war program. The lack of precedents and experience in handling prisoners in this country was reflected both in the administrative and operational organization of the War Department and in its initial regulations. The Office of Provost Marshal General, which was responsible for policy formulation and operation of the prisoner of war program, underwent several reorganizations as its tasks became more complex and diffuse. Other agencies, in particular the Army Service Forces, also were restructured in an effort to promote greater operational and administrative efficiency. In this respect the War Department faced a serious shortage of qualified personnel who were experienced in prisoner of war administration. As a partial consequence, numerous camp administrative and guard personnel proved to be incompetent or completely unsuited for such work. The situation was particularly serious at the start of the prisoner of war program. Lack of adequate training further hampered efficient administration. Also, the multifariousness of early regulations along with the absence of any coordinated filing system caused much confusion in camp administration. Eventually an orderly manual was developed.Initial regulations prepared for the prisoner of war program were both general and vague. Matters of security were of primary concern. As fears of sabotage proved groundless the War Department adopted a more flexible and practical policy. A growing manpower shortage contributed to the extension of that policy as public officials and private individuals urged that prisoners of war relieve the labor shortage through their employment in agricultural and forest work. Although the War Department feared that escaped prisoners would present a security problem, such fears proved groundless.A far more serious problem resulted from efforts of Nazi elements in the camps to control inner camp government. Although War Department officials made concerted attempts to identify and segregate those prisoners believed to be promoting Nazism, their efforts were hampered by uncooperative camp administrators and by conflicting and uncoordinated policies. Nevertheless, a fairly effective segregation program was implemented. Disciplinary measures in the form of courts-martial and an administrative policy of "no work, no eat," helped control disturbances among the prisoners, whether these stemmed from Nazi influence or other causes.The War Department's failure to fully inform the public of the prisoner of war policies, along with news reports describing Nazi influence in the camps and good treatment of war prisoners, led to chargesthat it was "coddling" its prisoners. The resultant Congressional investigations exonerated the War Department and supported on legal and humanitarian grounds the good treatment accorded the German prisoners of war. In this respect the War Department adhered to the Geneva Convention with unusual perserverance. This policy paid dividends both in the reciprocal treatment accorded American prisoners in German hands and in its psychological and morale impact on the German Wehrmacht fighting in Europe.In general, morale in the prisoner of war camps remained high and was sustained through a variety of recreational and work activities. In this matter the Red Cross and YMCA provided much needed assistance. Other personal needs and requirements were attended to by representatives of the Swiss Legation, which served in the capacity of Protecting Power. A secret re-education program was implemented in early 1945.With the end of the war, agricultural and other interests exerted strong pressures in an effort to retain prisoners needed for agricultural labor. Other groups urged their immediate repatriation. Although the process of repatriation began in earnest in the fall of 1945, the need for manpower caused some delay in the completion of that process. The last large contingent of prisoners left the United States in July, 1946. Many of these prisoners were not directly repatriated but served instead as forced labor in reconstruction work in Allied countries in Europe.The American experience with German prisoners of war in this country was unique in modern American history. For this reason administrative policy had to evolve as the situation warranted. While the War Department may be justly criticized with regard to some personnel and policy matters, the overall program must be commended.

Despite the plethora of material written on the history of prisoners-of-war in the Second World War, surprisingly few works treat the issue analytically, at least from the perspective of German military policy toward, and treatment of, British and American prisoners-of-war. The handful of dissertations written on the subject have examined tightly focused aspects within this subject, or did not make thorough use of the German federal military archives. Most published works, indeed, have tended to examine the issue from the perspective of the prisoners themselves. While these were valid and valuable approaches to the subject, they also left a significant gap in the historiography: what precisely was German policy towards British and American prisoners-of-war, how did it evolve over the course of the war years, and how was it ultimately put into practice? / The largest portions of this dissertation consist of distilling, from the thousands of pages of German military orders and documents which survived the war, the essence of the German Armed Forces Supreme Command (the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) directives to the lower levels of command, ultimately reaching the level of the camp Commandants, with regard to the many facets of prisoner-of-war life, from shelter, clothing, and food, to labour policy and security measures. Every report by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protecting Power delegates of their visits to most of the British or American prisoners-of-war in German-run camps for non-commissioned soldiers (Stalags) and camps for commissioned officers (Oflags) which could be found in the national archives of Great Britain, the United States, and Canada, was then examined, with the aim of providing a standard by which to measure German policy. / Given the sensitivities of each of the belligerents to the plight of their own soldiers held captive in enemy hands, the final results of the investigation are then presented in conclusion with a brief comparison of how German prisoners-of-war fared while in British or American captivity. Though necessarily relying on the scholarship of other historians in this regard, it allows for the original findings of this dissertation to be placed in a wider context for the reader. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

No description available.

Bonnie Singleton, wife of United States Air Force helicopter rescue pilot Jerry Singleton, saw her world turned upside down when her husband was shot down while making a rescue in North Vietnam in 1965. At first, the United States government advised her to say very little publicly concerning her husband, and she complied. After the capture of the American spy ship, the U.S.S. Pueblo by North Korea, and the apparent success in freeing the naval prisoners when Mrs. Rose Bucher, the ship captain's wife, spoke out, Mrs. Singleton changed her opinion and embarked upon a campaign to raise public awareness about American prisoners of war held by the Communist forces in Southeast Asia. Mrs. Singleton, along with other Dallas-area family members, formed local grass-roots organizations to notify people around the world about the plight of American POWs. They enlisted the aid of influential congressmen, such as Olin "Tiger" Teague of College Station, Texas; President Richard M. Nixon and his administration; millionaire Dallas businessman Ross Perot; WFAA television in Dallas; and other news media outlets worldwide. In time, Bonnie Singleton, other family members, and the focus groups they helped start encouraged North Vietnam to release the names of prisoners, allow mail and packages to be sent to the POWs, and afford better treatment for prisoners of war.