This thesis consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory concerning strategic interactions among parties with asymmetric information. The first chapter, ''Cheap Talk with Private Signal Structure" (co-authored with Maxim Ivanov) and published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 132 (2022), pages 288-304, addresses the question of how a designer of information --- which is privately observed by other players --- can benefit from designing it privately. The second chapter, ''Multidimensional Signaling with a Resource Constraint" (co-authored with Seungjin Han), studies competitive monotone equilibria in a multidimensional signaling economy where senders invest in their multidimensional signals (cognitive and non-cognitive) while facing a resource constraint. The third chapter, ''Consumer Privacy Disclosure in Competitive Markets", studies how competition among multi-product sellers with market power shapes the implications of consumer privacy on market outcomes. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)