In response to the possibilities for selection created by reproductive technologies like IVF and Prenatal screening, Julian Savulescu has argued that parents have a moral obligation to employ selective technology in order to have the best child that they can possibly have. This idea, which Savulescu has called the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, appears reminiscent of historical eugenics. However, Savulescu has argued that this principle is not eugenic. In this paper I argue that there are good reasons to think that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence is eugenic. Specifically, I argue that this principle shares five common features with historical eugenics which justify the conclusion that it is eugenic. However, while I argue that this principle is eugenic, I argue that it is not morally problematic for that reason because the shared features of historical eugenics and the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, which justify the claim that the principle is eugenic, are not morally problematic. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-10-08 22:23:59.333

When it comes to potential children, is to love them to leave them be (nonexistent)? I examine the possibility of virtuous reproduction, as well as some more basic theoretical issues surrounding the nature of moral goodness and obligation generally. Currently, there is a large body of literature in the field of reproductive ethics on questions of what considerations and practices ought to guide reproductive decision-making. The appropriate use of testing technologies to inform such decision-making, for instance, has been widely debated. Much smaller and less visible is the debate surrounding the prior question of whether reproduction itself is morally appropriate or desirable. I am particularly interested in how consequentialist strategies for including considerations of beneficence in reproductive decision-making have shaped moral approaches to reproduction. The principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), which mandates potential reproducers to select the best possible child, highlights the problematic nature of these strategies. The limited conceptual resources and problematic normative foundations of such strategies have stymied the development of a robust discussion on the ethics of reproduction itself. Other types of ethical approaches, loosely defined as deontological, offer superior accounts of what is at issue in reproduction, but also draw on some flawed background assumptions regarding, for instance, the nature of the moral agent and the scope of the moral sphere. The question of the morality of reproduction itself thus leads to an examination of far more basic issues in ethical theory: namely, the significance of meta-ethical commitments, and the desirability of a normative framework that offers a rich and agent-focused account of moral goodness and badness. I argue that a virtue-centred ethics, grounded in neo-Aristotelian naturalism, accomplishes just that. And it is well-equipped to provide a meaningful and helpful analysis of the morality of reproduction, both holistically, in terms of the potential virtuousness of reproduction generally, and in terms of how the virtues of courage and benevolence may be expressed in reproduction. I conclude that a virtue-centred assessment of reproduction offers a sound and practical form of evaluation and that a virtuous character may indeed be expressed through reproduction. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-17 10:44:50.827

Är det möjligt att välja rätt embryo vid In-vitro fertilisering (IVF)? I sådana fall, vad innebär det att något är det rätta embryot? I denna uppsats diskuteras IVF och de moraliska dilemman som kan uppstå vid val av embryo. Vid IVF är det möjligt att ställa en preimplantorisk genetisk diagnostik (PGD) vilken kan ge information om genetiska sjukdomar och andra anlag, såväl som kön och kromosomfel. Enligt Julian Savulescu, som förespråkar the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, är vi moraliskt skyldiga att välja ett friskt embryo, vilket också anses vara det rätta embryot. I kontrast till detta ställs Christine Overall som menar att Savulescus princip innebär problem för hur vi bör se på barnafödande. Jag diskuterar vidare hur vi utifrån ett socialt och ett samhällsperspektiv kan se det som moraliskt tveksamt att förbjuda att personer med vissa anlag föds, samt försöker visa på Savulescus ignorans för hur IVF fungerar och att detta bidrar till att hans argument fallerar.