Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 32-01, Section: A, page: 0525. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1970.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Thesis (M. P. A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Citizen engagement and performance measurement are concepts inherently in conflict with each other. Local government values citizen input and good governance. Simultaneously, the pressure of local government to be efficient and effective utilizing managerial techniques common in the private sector is intense. Due to challenges associated with the integration of performance measurement and active citizen involvement, initiatives in this area are sparse. / This study, using a mixed methods analysis, explored the research questions through examination of thirty-six units of local government that participated in the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation's Government Trailblazer Program. This program provided a unique opportunity for exploratory research of whether active citizen participation enhances or hinders effective measurement of government performance. The second research question investigated necessary attributes for implementing Citizen Informed Performance Measurement (CIPM) that support democratic governance while maximizing efficiency in the areas of organizational commitment and leadership, public management skills, citizen participation, the use of performance measures, citizen outcomes, and organizational experience. / Results of the study produced three themes: Citizen Perspective, Performance Measures, and Collaboration. Findings revealed that citizen perspective in performance measurement was most important, followed by collaboration. The affect of citizen involvement in performance measurement of specific programs and services was not as strong in agreement. The research revealed key attributes for a successful CIPM include commitment of elected officials, shared decision-making with citizens, public management interpersonal skills, the use of performance measures for program continuous improvement, increased accountability to citizens, and prior experience of municipalities actively involving citizens in government.

Two theories argues that differences in public goods provision can often be explained by governments' levels of democracy, with more democratic governments spending more on public goods. These theoretical approaches are empirically well-supported but disagree on the mechanisms involved. On the one hand, democracy may operate by making it easier to remove leaders, thereby limiting waste and rent-seeking behavior. On the other hand, democracy may function through a process of particularistic exchange, such that supporters are rewarded with goods but non-supporters are excluded. Here, I test these contending theories statistical data analysis. I find that both theoretical approaches appear to have some explanatory power, but particularistic exchange appears to be most strongly and consistently associated with spending outcomes. I then expand the analysis to examine the impact of opposition strength, civil society, and economic inequality on particularism. I find that strong oppositions and strong civil society reduce particularistic exchange, and economic inequality increases particularism. The analysis presented here goes beyond the work of existing research by examining the causes of public goods provision within the population of democratic states, rather than focusing on the differences between democracies or authoritarian regimes. The implication of my findings is that much, perhaps most public service provision is a result of a process often referred to as constituent service, interest group politics, pork barrel politics, patronage, particularism, or clientelism, in which voters supply elected politicians with political support and in return, politicians provide tangible benefits such as government services. Further, rules which strengthen oppositions, increase jurisdictional sizes, decrease economic inequality, or promote civil society are likely to reduce particularism.

Thesis (M. Admin.(Public Administration))- University of Pretoria, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.