Why do people cooperate? Why does not every individuals in their groups choose to be a free-rider all the time? Based on two series of experiments, the author finds that reciprocity and punishment contribute to cooperation. When a group allows positive reciprocity where people can choose to cooperate, positive reciprocity facilitates cooperation. When reciprocity between group members turns to negative, however, group members make little contribution to the group and start to retaliate against their partners. Once punishment is incorporated into the experiment, people¡¦s behavior of cooperation varies. In the high positive reciprocity environment where punishment is used, people, as expected, continue to give more of their resources to their group. But it is worth noting that negative reciprocity did not get worse if punishment is used in group dynamics.

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In Chapter 2, we present a model that allows us to study the effect of increased competition among charities for donations, and show that it will result in a lower provision of public goods. When charities get donations, they must pay two fundraising costs: a travel cost and an extra cost, a "premium" in our terminology. This premium arises from the extra time, effort, or incentives a charity must provide to garner a contribution from a donor who is solicited by other charities. Increased competition raises this premium, which leads to deadweight loss, so that revenue net of fundraising costs falls after a new firm enters into the market. A problem with public goods markets is asymmetric information between charities and donors, such that donors do not know which charities will cheat. In Chapter 3, we show that honest charities can get more donations than dishonest charities by investing in a capital stock. We study a two-period model under two assumptions, one where first-period investment does not affect the provision of public goods in the second period, and one where first-period investment does affect the provision of public goods in the second period. In the first case, we prove the existence of a separating equilibrium where honest charities make an investment and dishonest charities invest nothing. Thus, donors will donate more to charities that make investments, even if the investment is not used to produce public goods. In the second case, honest charities may invest the efficient amount, overinvest, or underinvest, depending on the donors' beliefs. In Chapter 4, we borrow parts of the models in the previous two chapters in order to see what effect the signaling cost has on the number of firms and average revenue. In our model, donor utility increases when they give to a charity that matches their ideology. We are interested in the long-run equilibrium, so unlike in Chapter 2, we assume there is free entry in the market. The two important results are that the number of firms decreases and average revenue increases if the required signaling cost increases.

This dissertation investigates people’s responses when access to or the level of local public goods is proposed to or actually changes. By understanding how people respond to potential changes in school assignment, construction of the interstate highway system, and the widening of existing highways, researchers can gain better insight into how to accurately estimate people’s valuation of local public goods and policy makers can pursue effective policies to relieve traffic congestion and mitigate the impact of new highway construction. The first essay examines if information regarding potential school reassignment causes cross-sectional capitalization estimation techniques, most notably the border method, to undervalue people willingness to pay for school quality. Using hedonic regression techniques and home sale data from DeKalb County, Georgia, I find that residents’ expectations of future school quality are important factors in determining the magnitude of school quality capitalization estimates. The second essay explores how the construction of the interstate highway system impacted agricultural land loss in Georgia. Since agricultural land provides many positive externalities while its loss leads to several negative externalities, the results inform policy makers seeking to preserve agricultural land and study the urban form. Using a historical dataset covering 1945 to 2007, I find that each additional highway mile constructed led to the conversion of 468 acres of agricultural land. Finally, the third essay investigates commuter responses to the widening of existing highways in order to evaluate the effectiveness of road construction as a traffic congestion relief measure. The results indicate that the elasticity for the demand of driving with respect to the road supply is 0.522 and that it grows over time. Taken together, the result for the estimated elasticity imply that road construction may provide some congestion relief in the short run but eventually the expanded roads will be just as congested as before. The results of the three essays suggest that researchers and policy makers should take into the consideration how people will respond to potential changes to public goods as well as the short and long term impacts on investments in public goods.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Nevada, Reno, 2008. / "August, 2008." Includes bibliographical references. Online version available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2004. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xii, 173 p.; also includes graphics (some col.). Includes bibliographical references (p. 148-154).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2004. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xv, 180 p.; also includes graphics (some col.). Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-121).

Thesis (doctor agriculturarum)--Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [175]-186). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, June 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

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