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This study considers the relationship of federalism to public lands and water policy, challenging the prevailing wisdom that federalism is irrelevant and questioning the eagerness with which structural solutions are embraced. It argues that a more thorough understanding of how federalism works in public lands and water policy is a necessary first step toward understanding federal-state relations and is more useful than either discarding the concept or further redefining it. Seeking identifiable patterns of politics, this study reviews the voluminous federalism literature and applies the theories of dual and cooperative federalism to the history of public lands and water policy, and to five contemporary controversies. These include the Sagebrush Rebellion, the Aravaipa Canyon, Arizona Strip, and Bisti, De-na-zin, and Ah-shi-sle-pah wilderness designation cases, and the El Paso v. Reynolds water case. Lowi's and Salisbury's policy typologies, which point to the effect on policy outcomes of the interaction of decision structure with demands, were useful in explaining why federalism theories and structural remedies are unsatisfactory. A policy perspective on federalism was developed which adds levels of government to discussions of arenas and policy types. It finds that federal-level decision makers are more willing to make policy when policies can potentially reflect federal-level advantages such as broad geographic jurisdiction, general rule-making capability, constitutional powers or opportunities to offer divisible benefits. State-level decision makers will resist federal policies when they disagree with policy goals or methods, lack necessary resources, or perceive unfair burdens. Thus, the state role includes states acting as claimants in distributive politics, as conduits in self-regulatory politics, as platforms for disadvantaged interests in regulatory politics, or as supplicants in redistributive politics. Further, shifts from one policy type to another serve to signal major structural shifts. Finally, accepting the political scientist's role as contributing to policy learning, this study offers five lessons: (1) much federal state conflict is inter-state conflict; (2) federal projects and lands are federal in name only; (3) multiple interests use the federal system in bargaining; (4) federal government decisions involve costs to recipients and the federal treasury; and (5) federalism is best considered within the context of substantive public policy.

President Clinton created Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument on September 17, 1996. The Antiquities Act of 1906 gives the president power to establish national monuments on public lands through presidential proclamation. The Act has been used to create national monuments in places such as Muir Woods, Grand Canyon, Mount Olympus, Jackson Hole, and the 1978 Alaskan d-2 lands. Its use has also produced negative public response, manifested as demonstrations, lawsuits, and congressional bills. In spite of significant legal and legislative challenges, the Antiquities Act and most of the monuments established through its use remain. The negative public response to the Act and the monuments has not been able to dissuade presidents from using executive authority. In each of the controversial cases the scope of the Antiquities Act was expanded in regards to the values being protected, monument size, or land use. The public had little influence in reversing that expansion. The Antiquities Act was designed as a tool to provide protection to threatened lands. It has protected federal lands, and in many cases the national interest. The historic and scientific values of once controversial monuments such as the Grand Canyon, Muir Woods Mount Olympus, Jackson Hole, and the d-2 lands, are now indisputable. These monuments have evolved to represent part of our natural national heritage. Only time will tell if the same can be said for Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.