Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-06-13T12:25:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 João Negrini Neto.pdf: 661479 bytes, checksum: 0bc3941c07bdd5eaf535c6fcb7df45f5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-13T12:25:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 João Negrini Neto.pdf: 661479 bytes, checksum: 0bc3941c07bdd5eaf535c6fcb7df45f5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-04-04 / During the execution of a public works contract, it is very common for the contractor to encounter inaccuracies in the projects franchised by the administration or unforeseeable circumstances that require adaptation of the contracting scope. There are situations, even in which the contractor is led to execute these non-contractual installments, regardless of the inclusion in the scope of the contract by means of a previous addition. In this study, we identified how the legal system deals with this issue in the face of the constitutional duty to maintain the economic-financial balance of administrative contracts. We deal with the aspects related to the general theory of private contracts and the specifics involved in the legal regime of administrative contracts for public works. We delimit the scope of subsidiarity from the application of the former in reaction to the latter. We evaluate the theory of unilateral acts, especially business management and unjust enrichment. In the end, we rehearse the application of the theory of unilateral acts to public works contracts as a basis to guarantee the fair remuneration of the services executed at the risk of the particular in the context of these contracts, without previous modification contractual / Ao longo da execução de um contrato de obra pública, é muito comum que o contratado se depare com imprecisões nos projetos franqueados pela Administração ou circunstâncias imprevisíveis que demandam a adaptação do escopo da contratação. Há situações, inclusive, em que o contratado é levado a executar parcelas extracontratuais, independentemente da sua inclusão no escopo do contrato por meio de aditamento anterior. Neste estudo, identificamos como o sistema jurídico trata dessa temática em face do dever constitucional de manutenção do equilíbrio econômico-financeiro dos contratos administrativos. Enfrentamos os aspectos atinentes à teoria geral dos contratos privados e as especificidades incidentes no regime jurídico dos contratos administrativos de obra pública. Delimitamos a abrangência da subsidiariedade da aplicação da primeira em relação aos segundos. Avaliamos a teoria dos atos unilaterais, especialmente de gestão de negócios e de enriquecimento sem causa. Ao final, ensaiamos a aplicação da teoria desses atos unilaterais aos contratos de obra pública como fundamento para garantir a justa remuneração dos serviços executados mesmo que por conta e risco do particular no bojo desses contratos, sem a prévia alteração contratual

This study explores the connections of public procurement official perceptions of public-private partnerships and their contracting decisions for public infrastructure projects. Detailed discussion of previous scholarship and its focus on policymaking and project evaluation of public-private partnerships leaves a gap in the public policy process – implementation. Procurement officials are presented in the role of policy implementers rather than agents in a principalagent approach. This attempts to address a shortcoming of the description that these officials do nothing more than purchase. Arguments are put forth that these officials are given additional levels of discretion when faced with contracting decisions. Specifically, procurement officials observe that public-private partnerships provide sets of project consequences. A survey instrument is designed to explore the differences in perceptions that procurement officials have with respect to public-private partnerships and traditional contracting out. Survey failures result in findings only being able to attempt a more general view of public-private partnerships. Results allow perceptions to be placed in a decision-making model based on a project phase approach that develops on the assumption that tasks contracted to private vendors produce project consequences. Furthermore, analysis of significant consequence perceptions indicate that those perceptions do not provide a rationale for a procurement official’s decision-making on whether to contract using a public-private partnership for public infrastructure projects. Independent sample t-tests, controlled correlations, multiple ANOVA and linear regression analyses show that perceptions of consequences, the perceptions of differences of those consequences across project phases, relationships of consequences to perceptions of efficiency and effectiveness proxies and a bounded rationalitybased model of decision-making for procurement officials are all inconclusive. Discussion focuses on the development of consequences and phases as defining and clarifying public-private partnerships. Further discussions are presented for procurement officials with respect to their decision-making and possible role as policy implementers. Conclusions fail to uncover any inferential results. The research finds its primary contribution in the conceptual discourse of public procurement official roles and public-private partnership definitions. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Since 2009 the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima has partnered with private corporations to deliver three highway projects worth US$1.5bn. This process follows a state-building strategy developed since the 1990s to allow different levels of government to deliver infrastructure projects with private finance. In Lima, the model has almost exclusively produced highways through a specific scheme that allows firms to submit unsolicited proposals. In this dissertation, I investigate how the availability of private finance transforms the political process and local planning outcomes. I argue that rather than being simply a solution for cash-strapped governments looking to invest in specific pieces of infrastructure, the introduction of private finance shapes what projects get built. Private finance not only transforms the implementation part of a two-step process: it has a deep impact on the planning phase itself by setting constraints on what can be done and to what ends. I call the specific mechanism by which private finance influences planning ‘unplanning.’ Here, the state is not simply retreating to let the private sector determine priorities. In other words, it is not abandoning planning, or simply not planning. Rather, it is being transformed in order to follow a proactive role in attracting investment, and to adapt planning to the needs of private capital. The dissertation goes beyond understandings of infrastructures as neutral conduits and into their techno-political nature in order to reveal how they reflect, reproduce and become both the conduit and the site of political conflicts between private capital, the state, and urban dwellers.