The production of equipollence is the most important part of the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s method for bringing about the suspension of judgment. The skeptic produces equipollence methodically, by opposing arguments, propositions, or appearances, in anyway whatsoever, until he produces an equality of “weightiness” on both sides of the conflicting views. Having no appropriate criterion to break the deadlock of equipollence, the skeptic (or his interlocutor) is left with no reason to accept either view. I have two main aims in this paper. My first aim is to distinguish between two different types of equipollence; that produced in the Pyrrhonist, called Psychological Equipollence, and that demonstrated to the dogmatist by the Pyrrhonist, called Normative Equipollence. My second aim in this paper is to argue that equipollence cannot be produced when the skeptic uses only epistemic possibility of error to oppose some compelling p.

Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.

In his Outlines of Skepticism, Sextus Empiricus claims that the Pyrrhonian Skeptic can live without holding beliefs. According to the 'Rustic' interpretation of this claim, Sextus holds that the Skeptic lives without beliefs of any kind. According to the 'Urbane' interpretation, Sextus' claim concerns only a restricted category of beliefs. I discuss each interpretation in the context of Sextus' broader philosophical stance, and argue for an Urbane interpretation. On this view, Pyrrhonism represents a practicable stance towards the world. / Master of Arts

This thesis is a comparative study of the approaches to mental tranquility advanced by the Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus and Huineng, the historically recognized Sixth Patriarch of the Southern Zen School. Relying on the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch, the principle texts of the Pyrrhonian and Zen schools respectively, I argue that the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s method of attaining ataraxia (“unperturbedness”) via the use of opposing arguments is essentially identical to that of the Sixth Patriarch Huineng’s employment of “opposition pairs.” Finally, in addition to contextualizing the schools historically, I compare their respective positions on ethical and metaphysical statements.