Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1981. / Typescript. Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 397-410).

Wai-kwan Li. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990. / Bibliography: leaves 31-38. / Abstract --- p.vii / Introduction --- p.1 / Boundary of Country of Origin Effects --- p.2 / Involvement level for making buying decisions --- p.2 / Information amount --- p.4 / Interaction effect of involvement level and information amount --- p.5 / Cognitive Processes of Stereotypic Evaluation --- p.7 / Cognitive elaboration hypothesis --- p.7 / Encoding hypothesis --- p.9 / Polarization hypothesis --- p.10 / Attribute hypothesis --- p.10 / Summary representation hypothesis --- p.12 / Method --- p.14 / Design --- p.14 / Subjects --- p.14 / Stimulus Material --- p.14 / Product --- p.14 / Selection of Countries --- p.14 / Attribute Information --- p.15 / Procedure --- p.16 / Manipulation of independent variables --- p.17 / Dependent measures --- p.17 / Demographic variables --- p.18 / Results --- p.18 / Manipulation checks --- p.18 / Boundary of Country of Origin Effect on Product Evaluation --- p.19 / Psychological Mechanisms for the Country of Origin Effect --- p.20 / Free recall of product information --- p.20 / Encoding hypothesis --- p.21 / Cognitive elaboration hypothesis --- p.21 / Polarization hypothesis --- p.22 / Attribute hypothesis --- p.22 / Summary representation hypothesis --- p.23 / Attribute hypothesis as the cause of stereotypic evaluation --- p.24 / Discussion --- p.24 / Boundary Conditions of Country of Origin Effects --- p.24 / Cognitive Processes of Country of Origin Effects --- p.25 / Marketing Implications --- p.29 / Product image building --- p.29 / Product packaging --- p.30 / References --- p.31 / Footnotes --- p.39

I consider the workings, under free entry, of some plausible mechanisms enforcing product quality when it is not readily observed by buyers, but is chosen by sellers: there is a moral hazard problem to be overcome. In equilibrium, uninformed buyers can often take price as indicating quality. This is however not the sarne as Spence's signalling notion, since quality is chosen by sellers. It is fruitful to consider price as a commitment, which changes the quality-incentives in a common-knowledge way. In the introduction, I note briefly much of the relevant literature, including my M. Phil, thesis. In Chapter 1, on Repeat-Sales, I consider a continuous model of that incentive to quality. With strong simplifying assumptions, I am able to solve for 'competitive' equilibrium, which involves a bunding of buyers at the minimum quality level, price premia for higher qualities, and consequent inefficiencies. The second chapter is the theory of cheating. It is possible, but costly, for buyers to be 'vigilant'; but equilibrium cannot involve their all being vigilant. There are various externalities between buyers. Different prices can exist in equilibrium, with different honesty levels. I identify a key feature of the cost function, which (together with buyers' tastes, etc.) determines equilibrium. In Chapter 3, I consider introductory offers and their role in entry and quality-signalling, when buyers are very rational. When buyers are identical, a single entrant will never use introductory offers. If there are many entrants, a low first-period price will be observed, but it conveys no information. Only some quality levels can (credibly) be promised by an entrant, and the result is that an incumbent can make positive profits but prevent entry.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1993. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 233-240). Also available via the Internet.

Mémoire (M.P.M.O.)-- Université du Québec à Chicoutimi, 1994. / Résumé disponible sur Internet. CaQCU Document électronique également accessible en format PDF. CaQCU

Thesis, PlanB (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Stout, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Viswanathan Krishnan. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1990. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 116-119). Also available via the Internet.