Competitive reaction to entry is an important issue in the marketing and economics areas. The monopolistic incumbent of a market often faces competitive entry if the market is profitable. This is a common issue that often occurs in the market transition from monopoly to competition. The entrant not only enters the market, but also wants to signal to tell consumers his quality level. The incumbent's reaction is also a signal to the consumers. Thus, how should the incumbent do? The paper "Response to Competitive Entry: A Rationale for Delayed Defensive Reaction" which is written by Ajay Kalra, Surendra Rajiv and Kannan Srinivasan (1998) and published in Marketing Science provides a completed and clear explanation of this issue. They claim that the incumbent would delay the defensive reaction to the competitive entry under information asymmetry. But it is still incorrect. Hence, we want to provide a revision to support that delayed defensive reaction is really a rational response to competitive entry, and explain this issue correctly and logically. We analyze the strategic interactions of the incumbent and the entrants which were omitted previously. Finally, we would obtain the conclusion that is also supporting this point of view¡G delayed defensive reaction is really a rational response to competitive. And it is really a Nash equilibrium, no firms would deviate.

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Submitted by Hugo de Andrade Lucatelli (h.lucatelli@hotmail.com) on 2017-06-10T00:54:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Hugo Lucatelli.pdf: 1969280 bytes, checksum: 7eca95ab0a82921b3b59ee3d58c073e0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2017-06-12T12:08:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Hugo Lucatelli.pdf: 1969280 bytes, checksum: 7eca95ab0a82921b3b59ee3d58c073e0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-12T13:04:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Hugo Lucatelli.pdf: 1969280 bytes, checksum: 7eca95ab0a82921b3b59ee3d58c073e0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-23 / Paper I – The paper shows that in bundle markets, when a monopolist faces sizeable constraints on supply capacity, implementing a two-part tariff is the optimal strategy for the firm. This contractual design allows the firm setting the consumers’ consumption level at the firm’s desired point. In this scenario, it is expected the final tariff of the contract to be smaller than it would be in a fixed tariff contract, what lead to the entrance of more consumers in the market. This equilibrium improves the welfare of producers and consumers. Paper II – The aim of this work is to study the optimal pricing strategy of a firm that introduces a new product and competes by quality and price in a market. In this environment, prices are not only able to signal quality, but can also change the quality perceived by the consumers. This work analyzes the problem in a theoretical dimension in an environment where firms are aware of their ability to change the consumers experience with its pricing policy. The paper analyzes the model fit to the empirical literature. Paper III – The third essay of this thesis empirically analyzes the relationship between perceived quality and the elements which form the consumers’ satisfaction: prices, market competition and product/service intrinsic quality. Using Brazilian data on mobile telecommunications, this study estimated these relationships. We found a robust connection between prices and satisfaction, endorsing the results found to others markets by the literature. As was expected, competition also seems to promote better services supply, what translates into better consumers’ evaluations. Finally, services with better operational quality appear to have substantial better consumers' rating. These results are especially important for markets where consumers evaluate the whole experience of consuming the service, as we verified in the robustness test. The analysis also found some evidence of the existence of important infrastructure bottlenecks in the sector. In an environment where the telecommunication services tend to converge, with high probability of demand growth, network sizing problems could become relevant. / Ensaio I – O ensaio mostra que em mercados de pacotes, quando um monopolista enfrenta significativas restrições de capacidade de oferta, implementar contratos compostos por tarifas de duas partes é a estratégia ótima para a firma. Este desenho contratual permite a firma posicionar o nível de consumo dos consumidores no nível ótimo desejado. Neste cenário, espera-se que a tarifa final do contrato seja inferior à tarifa exercida em um contrato composto por uma tarifa fixa, o que implica na entrada de mais consumidores no mercado. Este equilíbrio melhora o bem-estar da firma e dos consumidores, de forma agregada. À luz do modelo apresentado, o trabalho discute o uso de franquias de consumo em contratos de provisão de internet fixa no Brasil. Ensaio II – O ensaio tem como objetivo estudar a estratégia ótima de preços de uma firma que introduz um produto novo em determinado mercado consumidor e compete em preços e qualidade em um ambiente onde os preços, não apenas sinalizam a qualidade do bem, mas também têm a possibilidade de alterar a percepção sensorial e a classificação de qualidade dos consumidores. Busca-se avaliar o problema em sua dimensão teórica, ao estudar o comportamento das firmas em um ambiente em que são conscientes quanto a sua capacidade de alterar a experiência dos consumidores e a sua reputação de mercado com a sua política de preços. O artigo avalia o ajuste do modelo a literatura empírica. Ensaio III – O terceiro ensaio da tese estuda, empiricamente, a relação entre qualidade percebida e os elementos formadores da satisfação do consumidor: preços, competição de mercado e qualidade intrínseca do produto ou serviço. Utilizando dados do mercado de telefonia móvel do Brasil, o trabalho estimou estas relações. Encontramos uma robusta associação entre preços e satisfação, em linha com os resultados estabelecidos pela literatura para outros mercados. Competição, como esperado, também parece promover a oferta de melhores serviços, o que se traduz em melhores avaliações dos consumidores. Por fim, serviços ofertados com melhor qualidade operacional apresentam sensíveis melhores notas dos usuários. Estes resultados são especialmente importantes em um mercado onde os consumidores avaliam toda a experiência de consumo com o serviço, conforme foi verificado no exercício de robustez deste artigo. O trabalho também encontrou evidências de que existem gargalos de infraestrutura importantes no setor. Em um ambiente onde há tendência de convergência de serviços de telecomunicações, com indicativo de crescente demanda, problemas de dimensionamento de rede podem se tornar relevantes.