Th.--Sci. phys.--Grenoble 1, 1978. N°: DE 54.

No description available.

One major problem with moral discourse is that we tend treat moral utterances as if they represent propositions. But complex metaphysical problems arise when we try to describe the nature of the moral facts that correspond to these propositions. If moral facts do not exist, how can moralizers justify engagement in moral practice? One possibility is abolitionism; abandoning morality and growing out of our old habits. Another option that has been suggested is that morality be preserved as a useful fiction. Moral fictionalists propose that moralizers come to understand their moral beliefs as fictive precommitments that are instrumentally valuable. In this essay, I argue that this type of instrumentalist justification does not allow moralizers to have genuinely moral reasons for acting in accordance with their precommitments. The legislative function of morality and the concept of moral personhood cannot be supported by metaethical theories that only provide instrumental reasons for adopting moral discourse. Ironically, this implies that an instrumentalist moral society would not be able to preserve as many useful moral concepts as would a non-instrumentalist moral society. Since the fictionalists’ own criterion demands that they endorse the most instrumentally valuable metaethical theory, they cannot persuasively argue that their own metaethical alternative is viable. Fictionalists should, I argue, prefer a non-instrumentalist theory that preserves more of the functions of moral discourse, such as quasi-realism. The argumentative strategy employed by fictionalists is therefore self-undermining.

One major problem with moral discourse is that we tend treat moral utterances as if they represent propositions. But complex metaphysical problems arise when we try to describe the nature of the moral facts that correspond to these propositions. If moral facts do not exist, how can moralizers justify engagement in moral practice? One possibility is abolitionism; abandoning morality and growing out of our old habits. Another option that has been suggested is that morality be preserved as a useful fiction. Moral fictionalists propose that moralizers come to understand their moral beliefs as fictive precommitments that are instrumentally valuable. In this essay, I argue that this type of instrumentalist justification does not allow moralizers to have genuinely moral reasons for acting in accordance with their precommitments. The legislative function of morality and the concept of moral personhood cannot be supported by metaethical theories that only provide instrumental reasons for adopting moral discourse. Ironically, this implies that an instrumentalist moral society would not be able to preserve as many useful moral concepts as would a non-instrumentalist moral society. Since the fictionalists’ own criterion demands that they endorse the most instrumentally valuable metaethical theory, they cannot persuasively argue that their own metaethical alternative is viable. Fictionalists should, I argue, prefer a non-instrumentalist theory that preserves more of the functions of moral discourse, such as quasi-realism. The argumentative strategy employed by fictionalists is therefore self-undermining.

Economic literature suggests that private firms, especially small and medium ones, may not pursue technology research and development projects because of complexity of technology and financial barriers. Two main economic rationales have been discussed for public subsidies of private-sector research and development (R&D). First is the generation of positive externalities. Government R & D subsidies can have positive spillovers so that other firms or society would benefit. A second rationale is derived from the fact that government subsidies provide information on firms to financial institutions and potential investors. Information asymmetries tend to exclude entrepreneurs from private investments [Eshima, 2003]. Taiwan launched similar SBIR in 1997. Since then, Taiwan¡¦s SBIR research budget has steadily increased. SBIR¡¦s actual expenditure increased from NT$340 million to NT$520 million from 2004 to 2005. The SBIR produced 839 patents, 523 patent applications, 210 technical papers, and 265 contracts and industrial services in 2005. With respect to the benefits of research and development, the SBIR also produced 285 enterprise investments in 2005. There are many researches on the TDP and the objects are almost the firms which got the subsidies. On the other hand, there is no research focus on the firms which failed to apply. Because it is limited to examine the effect of the government subsidies, we can not know comprehensively whether the subsidies raise the companies¡¦ performance or not. This paper evaluates public support of private-sector R&D through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program in Taiwan. We not only want to know the effect of the subsidy subjects on the individual company, but also find the significant differences in the performance of the companies which got the subsidies or not. SBIR has been launched for seven years since 1999. The method which measures long-term performance should be applied. The research uses the Lerner and Eshima¡¦s quasi-experiment framework of the policy estimate to the United States and Japan. We distribute the firms into two groups. One is the treat firms that received subsidy, and the other is the matched firms each that applied the subsidy but not received. Furthermore, the research estimates the effect of the subsidies on the performance of the firms¡¦ R&D activities and operation with t tests of paired.

We consider a model of quasigeostrophic turbulence that has proven useful in theoretical studies of large scale heat transport and coherent structure formation in planetary atmospheres and oceans. The model consists of a coupled pair of hyperbolic PDE’s with a forcing which represents domain-scale thermal energy source. Although the use to which the model is typically put involves gathering information from very long numerical integrations, little of a rigorous nature is known about long-time properties of solutions to the equations. In the first part of my dissertation we define a notion of weak solution, and show using Galerkin methods the long-time existence and uniqueness of such solutions. In the second part we prove that the unique weak solution found in the first part produces, via the inverse Fourier transform, a classical solution for the system. Moreover, we prove that this solution is analytic in space and positive time.

No description available.

No description available.

Th. 3e cycle--Électronique et radiocommunications--Grenoble--I.N.P., 1978. N°: D3 55.

L'objet de ce mémoire est l'étude du problème de la quasi—analyticité généralisée, énoncé pour la première fois par M. g. Mandelbrojt et qui consiste â indiquer des conditions liant entre elles, d'une part, une suite de nombres positifs {Mn}, et d'autre part, une suite croissante d'entiers positifs de manière que, si une fonction indéfiniment dérivable f, sur un intervalle I. satisfait aux conditions : Ce problème généralise le problème de la quasi-analyticité classique posé par M. Hadamard et résolu par messieurs Denjoy et Carleman. Il correspond au cas où = n (n = 0,1,2...). La méthode classique pour résoudre le problème de la quasi-analyticité consiste à le ramener, au moyen des transformées de Fourier, â un problème d'unicité pour les fonctions holomorphes dans un domaine. M. Mandelbrojt a établi une inégalité fondamentale, qui majore les coefficients d'une série de Dirichlet asymptotique, et qui permet de ramener le problème de la quasi-analyticité généralisée, comme dans le cas classique, a un problème d'unicité pour les fonctions holomorphes dans un domaine. Les deux premiers chapitres de ce mémoire exposent l'essentiel de cette méthode.